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General Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The underlying themes are the
determinants of skill development and the role of social influence on individual decisions.
The people that surround us, independent of whether we chose them or interact with them
by chance, have a great influence on our decisions. The existence and impact of peer
influences have been documented in various areas. At the same time, it has been shown in
different ways, how important parental investment and the environment an individual grows
up in is for human capital development. In Chapter 1, I combine the two main topics and
show how parental investment depends on the social interactions of their child. Chapter
2 investigates the long-run consequences of shocks on the socio-emotional development
during adolescence and documents gender differences. In Chapter 3, we underline the
importance of social interactions in the decision when to enter parenthood and provide
insight on potential spillover mechanisms.
In what follows, I summarize each chapter.
Chapter I: Parental Investment and Peer Effects in Cognitive
and Non-Cognitive Skills1
In this chapter, I investigate whether and in how far parents adjust their parenting behavior
in response to their child’s close peers as defined by friendship nominations. I distinguish
1This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris and
designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies
and foundations. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in
the original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on the Add Health
website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for
this analysis.
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between two types of parenting behavior: parental investment, in particular quality time,
such as help with homework and joint activities, and parenting style (monitoring). I show
the extent and means of parents’ response to two different skills of peers: first, cognitive
skills as measured by peers’ scholastic performance, and second, peers’ non-cognitive skills
as measured by self-esteem. Moreover, comparing constant to time-varying peer groups, I
allow parents to react to peer skills and peer characteristics.
This chapter contributes to the literature by expanding the focus on how parents re-
spond to the skills, behavior, and characteristics of close peers. Moreover, this study adds
to the literature on social interactions, showing how parental behavior might moderate /re-
inforce the effects of peers, and school-level policy interventions aimed at changing student
compositions.
The following three main results emerge from my analysis. First, parents compensate
for cognitive skill losses of their child’s peer by increasing monitoring. I provide evidence
that parents consider both cognitive performance and non-cognitive skills of peers in their
investment decision. Response patterns indicate that verbal investment and monitoring are
perceived as substitutes to peer cognitive skills, and joint activities are seen as complements
to the self-esteem of peers.
Second, I document gender differences in the response of monitoring. While cognitive
skill losses of sons’ peers are compensated, for daughters, increased peer self-esteem is
reinforced. Overall, adjustments in time investment are mainly driven by parents that
have no close relationship with peers’ parents and parents that expect their child to attend
college. However, results do not differ by parental education. Adjustments in monitoring
and verbal investment are mainly driven by children with below-median cognitive skills,
suggesting that parents try to prevent negative spillovers on their “at risk child”.
Third, by exploiting repeated information on friendship nominations, I show that par-
ents take peer characteristics along with peer skills into account. In addition to compensat-
ing cognitive skill losses, mothers compensate for decreases in the fraction of white friends,
reinforce higher fractions of peers with educated parents. Fathers’ response and parental
monitoring are mainly driven by changes in peer group characteristics rather than peers’
skills.
2
Chapter II: Fragile Boys (or Girls)? Impact of a Macro Shock
on Psychosocial Functioning and Long-run Health and Well-
being Implications
This chapter is joint work Ghazala Azmat and Katja Maria Kaufmann. We analyze the
determinants and consequences of socio-emotional development during adolescence. We
causally estimate the impact of a large macro shock, the German Reunification, on the
socio-emotional development of East-German adolescents, finding substantial negative ef-
fects in the short-run. In particular, we document an immediate increase in youths’ anger
and anxiety by 33 and 36 percent of a standard deviation, respectively, and a decrease of
more than 40 percent of a standard deviation in youths’ self-confidence. Contrary to the be-
lief that boys are more strongly affected by negative changes in their environment, we show
that these effects are similar for male and female youths, and in terms of self-confidence
even stronger for girls.
Next, we link changes in these socio-emotional dimensions to a wide range of behavioral
outcomes and document stark differences by gender. In line with the “fragile males”
hypothesis, we find that changes in the socio-emotional development lead to an increase in
externalizing behavior, such as physical fighting and destroying property, and behavioral
control problems like alcohol and tobacco consumption among boys only. Looking at
internalizing behavior, which is often linked to mental-health problems, we find a strong
association between changes in socio-emotional development and increased internalizing
behavior, but only for girls.
Ultimately, however, the effects on longer-run outcomes such as subjective health, well-
being, and educational attainment are grave, and similar, for both genders. Our results
highlight that even though boys and girls can be affected similarly in terms of their socio-
emotional development, these changes translate into different types of behavior. Overall,
this suggests that successful policies require careful targeting.
Chapter III: Fertility Peer Effects
This chapter is joint work with Katja Maria Kaufmann. We analyze family peer effects
in the adult fertility decision. Using Dutch administrative data, we provide well-identified
causal evidence that a sibling’s fertility is contagious, for women starting one year and for
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men, starting two years after a sibling enters parenthood. Specifically, a sibling entering
parenthood within the last two years can triple the probability of becoming a mother, and
double the probability of becoming a father in any given quarter.
Prominent mechanisms of peer effects include, for instance, social learning, or conform-
ing with the norm. We focus on the first child of an individual so that learning from the
sibling’s (or the sibling’s partner’s) experience is most pronounced in our analysis. This
finding is validated by weaker (in some cases negative) spillovers found for individuals
strongly attached to the labor market. In the sense that, for instance, the main breadwin-
ner of the household has to be strategic in decisions affecting their labor supply and is thus
less affected by fertility spillovers.
Additionally, two sub-mechanisms prevail. First, we document stronger spillovers for
siblings of the same gender (men with brothers), and siblings that are close in age (women
and siblings up to one year age difference). This result shows in the context of sibling
competition that conforming with the sibling is more likely as an underlying mechanism
than differentiation from the sibling. Second, we confirm that support provided by the
grandmother is a decisive factor. Siblings seem to compete for grand-maternal resources
shown by stronger results in case the grandmother is available in terms of time (i.e. not
active in the labor market) and geography (i.e. distance in residences).
While there is a big literature on peer effects, decisions to enter parenthood have been
so far mainly considered in the context of teen fertility. Our results contribute to the
literature by highlighting that social influences within the family are non-negligible in the
fertility decision and could be an influential mediator of policy interventions.
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Chapter 1
Parental Investment and Peer Effects in
Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills
1.1 Introduction
The importance of parental investment for the human capital development of children has
been shown in various ways (Cunha and Heckman, 2008; Cunha et al., 2010). Parents con-
tinuously adjust their allocation of different investment types over the age of their child (see
e.g. Del Boca et al., 2014, 2017). Doing so allows maximizing their child’s human capital
(cognitive and non-cognitive skills). At the same time, the social environment constructed
by classmates, friends, or siblings influences an individual’s educational achievement (see
e.g. Carrell et al., 2013; Hoxby, 2000). However, little is known about how these two factors
interact. Are parents adjusting their parenting behavior to the social environment their
child experiences, thereby compensating or reinforcing the influence of peers?
In this paper, I investigate whether and how parents adjust their parenting behavior
in response to their child’s close peers as defined by friendship nominations. I distinguish
between two types of parenting behavior: parental investment, in particular quality time
such as talk about schoolwork and joint activities, and parenting style, such as monitor-
ing. I show the extent and means of parents’ response to two different skills of peers:
first, cognitive skills as measured by peers’ scholastic performance, and second peers’ non-
cognitive skills as measured by their level of self-esteem. Moreover, comparing constant
to time-varying peer groups, I allow parents to react on peer skills as well as peer back-
ground characteristics. Lastly, I investigate heterogeneous effects to give an insight into
mechanisms driving parents’ responses.
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One way a parent can react to their child’s peers is via residential choices. Selecting a
neighborhood along the school quality allows parents to restrict their child’s set of potential
peers and hence close peers such as friends. In this paper, I take this decision as given, so
that parents already chose their area of residence and the school their child attends. Thus I
focus on whether parents react to the quality of their child’s friends - given the “restricted
set of potential peers”. Depending on whether parents perceive friends as substitutes
or complements to their parenting behavior, their response to peers’ cognitive and non-
cognitive skills and their characteristics will differ. Thereby, the focus of this paper is not
on peer effects per se, but rather on parents’ response to their child’s peers.
Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent of Adult Health (Add
Health), I investigate how the skill development process of adolescents in grades 7 to 11
depends on own past skills, on past health status, on peers’ skills and parental investment
and parenting styles and, most importantly, how parental behavior is affected by the skills
and characteristics of their child’s peers. It has been shown that peers have an important
effect on high school students’ outcomes, even in the long-run, and thus it is in the parents’
interest to take their child’s peers into account.1
The main challenge in analyses including peer effects is to distinguish between different
sources leading to similar outcomes of individuals within the same group (Manski, 1993).
Unobserved heterogeneity leading to selection into groups can confound results and lead
to a conclusion of behavioral spillovers while the effect is driven by similar environments.
To address these challenges and identify causal effects of peers I follow among others
Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) and De Giorgi et al. (2010). I make use of partially overlapping
peer groups, which is an instrumental variable strategy exploiting indirect links within
a network, together with peer group fixed effects. To solve the problem of endogenous
investments I use first-differencing, which differences out family and individual level fixed
effects, and instrument skills with their lagged values (see Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2008,
who provide evidence for internal logic and validity of these instruments). To strengthen the
instrumental strategy and capture the joint evolution of child skills and parental investment,
I simultaneously estimate a system of two skill and one investment equation. This allows
to account for direct peer effects on the child’s skills and captures the reversed effect of
parental investment on child’s skills along with parents’ response to peers of their children.
In the literature, there is limited evidence on parents’ reaction to their child’s social
1See e.g. Gaviria and Raphael (2001) for drug use, church-going, dropping out of school; Lin (2015) for
drugs, smoking, school skipping, physical fighting; Yakusheva and Fletcher (2013) for teenage pregnancy.
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environment, though on a more general level. Exploiting the Romanian secondary school
system Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) were one of the first to show, that parents reduce
their effort in case their child attends a better school. Similarly, Greaves et al. (2019)
find in the context of England, that parents belief school quality and time investments
to be substitutes. That these response patterns can differ between parents is shown by
Fredriksson et al. (2016), who exploit a maximum class size rule in Sweden. In the context of
intergenerational transmission of religion, Patacchini and Zenou (2016) show that parental
investment (targeting explicitly the transmission of religious values) and peers as measured
by close friends are complements. This study aims to contribute to this literature by
expanding the focus on how parents respond to the skills, behavior, and characteristics
of close peers. Thereby it contributes to shedding light on how parents make decisions
concerning investment into their child and providing evidence on parents’ perception of
their child’s skill development process. Moreover, this study adds to the literature on
social interactions, since it shows how parental behavior might moderate/reinforce the
effects of peers. Lastly, this study can provide insights into how parental response can
mediate school level policy interventions aimed at changing student compositions.
To the best of my knowledge, the only other paper looking at individual level friends
is Agostinelli (2018), who incorporates peers into the parental investment decision by in-
cluding average peer skill into the cognitive skill development function. Using a dynamic
equilibrium model the author shows that parents and peers constitute a dynamic com-
plementarity. While I do not use a structural model, in contrast to Agostinelli (2018) I
investigate parents’ response to peers’ skills as well as peers’ (time-constant) characteristics.
Also, instead of constructing one overall parental time investment measure, I distinguish
between time mothers and fathers spend on verbal interactions and time spend on joint
activities with their child, and given the growing evidence on the importance of parenting
style (see e.g. Cobb-Clark et al., 2019; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017), I provide insight on
how parents adjust their parenting as measured by monitoring.
I show that parents change their behavior in response to changes in the skills or the
characteristics of their child’s peers in three main ways. First, parents compensate for
decreases in the cognitive skill of their child’s peer by increasing monitoring. Also, I
provide evidence that parents not only respond to the cognitive performance of peers but
also consider peer non-cognitive skills in their investment decision. In particular, while
mothers compensate for cognitive skill losses of their child’s peers by increasing verbal
investment, fathers reinforce high non-cognitive skills of peers by increasing time spend on
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joint activities with their child. These response patterns indicate that verbal investment
and monitoring are perceived as substitutes to peer cognitive skills, and joint activities are
seen as complements to the self-esteem of peers.
Second, allowing parents to react differently in the case of daughters as opposed to
sons, I document gender differences for monitoring. While cognitive skill losses of sons’
peers are compensated by increased monitoring, for daughters increased peer self-esteem
is reinforced with higher levels of monitoring. Adjustments in time investment are mainly
driven by parents that have no close relationship with peers’ parents, and parents that
expect their child to attend college. However, results do not differ by parental education.
Adjustments in monitoring and the verbal investment of mothers are mainly driven by
children who have below-median cognitive skills, suggesting that parents try to prevent
negative spillovers on their “at risk child”.
Third, by exploiting repeated information on friendship nominations, I show that par-
ents take peer characteristics along with peer skills into account. In addition to com-
pensating cognitive skill losses, mothers compensate for decreases in the fraction of white
friends by increasing verbal interactions. On the other hand, a higher fraction of peers with
educated parents leads mothers to reinforce this peer quality gain by increasing verbal in-
vestment into their child. As opposed to that, fathers’ response and parental monitoring
is mainly driven by changes in peer group quality as measured by the composition of peer
characteristics rather than peers’ skills.
My findings suggest that school or classroom level interventions changing the composi-
tion of students will lead to feedback effects through parents. As I show, parents consider
peer quality as measured by skills and characteristics in their parenting behavior. This
means, depending on the skill considered, the net effect of policy interventions might be
under- or overestimated if parental responses are not taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 1.2 I discuss the related
literature. In Section 1.3 I shortly present the conceptual framework, and in Section 1.4 I
describe in detail the identification and estimation strategy. The sample and variables are
described in Section 1.5 and results are discussed in Section 1.6. Robustness checks are
provided in Section 1.7, and Section 1.8 concludes.
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1.2 Related Literature
This paper builds on work from the child development literature and in particular parents’
role in it, and on work from the peer effects literature in the educational context.
There are a series of papers highlighting the role of parental and public investment
in the process of skill development. Distinguishing between cognitive and non-cognitive
skills, it is shown that parental inputs are more influential to determine cognitive skills
at early and non-cognitive skills at later ages (Cunha and Heckman, 2008). Exploiting
non-linearities within a dynamic factor model Cunha et al. (2010) determine substitution
patterns between contemporaneous investments and skills inherited from previous periods.
They provide evidence for dynamic complementarity2, suggesting that the optimal strategy
in supporting disadvantaged children starts with early childhood interventions in cognitive
skills while targeting adolescents should involve the promotion of non-cognitive skills. Even
though skill models can pinpoint optimal investment strategies over the childhood, they
do not directly incorporate the child’s environment. This paper investigates the role of the
child’s social environment in the optimal parental investment decision.
The literature mainly distinguishes between two forms of parental investment, monetary
and non-pecuniary. The first covers expenses for books, private tutoring or extracurricular
activities3, the latter refers to quality time spend with the child such as reading to or
with the child. In the British context, Del Bono et al. (2016) show that maternal time
investment positively affects cognitive and non-cognitive development of 3-7 year old chil-
dren. Distinguishing between active time, including direct interaction, and passive time,
indicating presence but not an engagement of a parent, Del Boca et al. (2014) underline
the importance of both types of time investment on cognitive development. This paper
distinguishes between two types of time investment, verbal interactions and joint activ-
ities.4 The former includes only interactions between parent and child that occur on a
verbal basis, covering topics such as school work, grades, and personal problems the child
is having. The latter focuses on interactions during joint activities such as sports or social
2Dynamic complementarity captures the feature that skills produced in one stage of childhood increase
the productivity of investments a subsequent stages.
3e.g. see Plug and Vijverberg (2005) who shows how important parental income is the context of
education in general, Del Boca et al. (2017) who analyze the role of monetary investment over the childhood,
and Carneiro et al. (2015) who show how parental income shocks at different times in childhood can reflect
itself in intergenerational mobility via the education of the child
4The importance of active time investment is also underlined indirectly by the literature looking at
effects of day care, e.g. see Fort et al. (2019).
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events and support for school work.
Finding from the literature in health economics show that the (early) health of an
individual is related to educational outcomes like achievement and can have even impli-
cations in terms of intergenerational mobility (see e.g. Currie, 2009). Hereby it has been
shown that health shocks during early childhood can have long lasting drawbacks (see e.g.
Oreopoulos et al., 2008), while interventions targeting the improvement of health during
childhood can have long-run benefits (see e.g. Butikofer et al., 2019). These results suggest
that it should be interest of a parent to respond to the health status of their child, which is
why in this paper I allow parents to adjust their investment and monitoring in response to
their child’s current health. Yi et al. (2015) and Nicoletti and Tonei (2017) show, parents
do respond to their child’s health with both monetary and time investment so that leaving
it out could confound results. In line with that, I show that parents compensate health
losses of their child by higher levels of time investment.
The existence and importance of peer influences have been documented in various areas.
Depending on the particular topic at hand, mechanisms and thus reasons for these effects
differ. Peers or social networks can serve as a source of information so that individuals
can learn from others (see e.g. Banerjee et al., 2013; Cai et al., 2015), but can also lead to
the encouragement of imitating one another (see e.g. Patacchini and Arduini, 2016). This
possible effect due to peer pressure or a desire to conform has been documented in the
context of education decisions (see e.g. De Giorgi et al., 2010) as well as risky behavior.5
In the education context, it has been shown that indirect influences of disruptive behavior
in class negatively affects performance (see e.g. Neidell and Waldfogel, 2010) and can
have long-lasting consequences (see e.g. Carrell et al., 2018), while good peers creating
an atmosphere easing teachers’ instructions is positively related to achievement (see e.g.
Golsteyn et al., 2017; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011). While it is not always possible to pin
down the channel of peer effects, a consensus has been reached that all students benefit
from higher achieving schoolmates (see e.g. Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005) and might suffer
from very bad performing ones (see e.g. Lavy et al., 2012b). In line with this, I find
positive peer effects in cognitive skills, indicating that having friends with high cognitive
performance supports the own cognitive development.
The Literature provides to main ways to reach causal identification in the analysis of
peer effects. The first exploits quasi-experimental variation in the reference group com-
5See e.g. Gaviria and Raphael (2001) for drug use, church-going, dropping out of school; Lin (2015) for
drugs, smoking, school skipping, physical fighting; Yakusheva and Fletcher (2013) for teenage pregnancy.
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position (see e.g. Lavy and Schlosser, 2011) or random assignment rules provided by an
administrative instance (see e.g Feld and Zo¨litz, 2017; Sacerdote, 2001). The second makes
use of the existing network structure and is more data demanding. Individual specific peer
groups are created to exploit variations in group sizes (see e.g. Lee, 2007) or the existence
of indirect links (i.e. peers of peers) (Bramoulle´ et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2010). This
paper is based on the Add Health database which has rich individual-level network infor-
mation. Exploiting individual friendship nominations I follow the second approach and
make use of intransitivities within the available networks.
1.3 Conceptual Framework
In what follows, bold letters capture vectors, subscripts mark individuals (i) and time (t),
and superscripts indicate different skills with N referring to non-cognitives and C denoting
cognitives. Suppose parental utility depends on own consumption c, child’s acquired skills
θit, and parental human capital level θParent,i.
U(cit,θit, θParent,i)
where θit = [θ
C
it , θ
N
it ] is a vector containing two skills, with θ
C
it indicating cognitive skills
and θNit non-cognitive or socio-emotional skills. At each developmental stage t = 1, ..., T of
their child, parents maximize the expected discounted sum of their future utility subject
to the child’s skill production function (1.1) and parental budget constraint (1.2).
θki,t+1 = g
k(θi,t, θParent,i, Ii,t,θPeer,t, µ
k
i , η
k
it), k = C,N (1.1)
Yit = ci,t + p
I
t Ii,t + si,t (1.2)
where Iit captures parental investment, θPeer,t are peer skills, µ
C
i and µ
N
i are child and/or
family level time-constant unobservables in each skill function, ηCit and η
N
it capture idiosyn-
cratic shocks in each skill function, Yit is family income, p
I
t captures the price of investment,
and si,t allows for savings. Solving this dynamic problem will yield a policy function for
parental investment
Iit = ft(θit, θParent,i,θPeer,t, Yit, p
I
t , µ
C
i , µ
N
i , µ
I
i , η
C
it , η
N
it , η
I
it) (1.3)
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Parental investment is a function of their child’s set of skills (θit), their own level of human
capital (θparent,i), their child’s peers’ set of skills (θPeer,t), parental income (Yit), price
of parental investment (pIt ), child and/or family level time-constant unobservables in the
skill (µCi , µ
N
i ) and investment function (µ
I
i ), idiosyncratic shocks in the skill function (η
C
it ,
ηNit ), and idiosyncratic shocks in the parental investment function (η
I
it). While this and
similar frameworks have been widely used,6 the inclusion of peers is usually not considered.7
However, if parents take the peer group quality of their children into account while making
their decision, leaving peers out of the analysis will lead to misleading results.
As a simplified example suppose there are only two periods, the first where the child
can receive investment from the parent and a second in which the child already reaches
adulthood. For clarity of notation suppose there is one joint measure θi,t including both,
cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Then the parents’ problem will be
max U(ci,1, θi,1, θParent,i) + βU(ci,2, g(θi,1, Ii,1, θPeer,1), θParent,i)
s.t. ci,1 + p
IIi,1 +
ci,2
(1 + r)
= Yi,1 +
Yi,2
1 + r
The optimal investment decision will then be derived from
pI(1 + r)
∂U(ci,2,θi,2,θParent,i)
∂ci,2
∂U(ci,2,θi,2,θParent,i)
∂θi,2
=
∂g(θi,1, Ii,1, θPeer,1)
∂Ii,1
Whether and how exactly peer skills enter the parental investment function depends on the
specified functional form of the parental utility U(ci,t,θit, θParent,i) and the child’s skill pro-
duction function g(θi,t, Ii,t, θPeer,t).However, from the simple first-order condition above, it
can be seen that parental response to peers will depend on two things. First, the direct
influence of parents on their children which is captured by how Ii,t enters g(θi,t, Ii,t, θPeer,t),
and second, the way peer skills and parental investment interact in the child’s skill pro-
duction.
Ex ante it is not clear whether parents should increase or decrease their investment
with higher skills of their children’s peers. Suppose parents have a positive influence on
the child’s skill development, i.e.
∂g(θi,1,Ii,1,θPeer,1)
∂Ii,1
= g′I > 0, if in addition peers skills
6see for instance Cunha and Heckman (2008), Del Boca et al. (2014), Almond et al. (2018)
7As of my knowledge, only Agostinelli (2018) incorporates peers into a similar conceptual framework
considering a single skill dimension.
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and parental investment foster each other (g′′IθPeer > 0), then parents should increase their
investment with increasing peer skills. However, if peer skills and parental investment
enter as substitutes, i.e. g′′IθPeer < 0, then parents should not increase their investment
with increasing peer skills.
The main question aimed to be answered here is whether parents are sensitive to their
children’s social interactions. Which means whether parents adjust their investment in case
they observe or perceive peer influences on their child. Hereby the exact functional forms
of utility and production function leading to a parental investment function as described
in (1.3) are not of main interest here. For this reason, in the following the optimal parental
investment decision will be approximated by a linear function that is additively separable
in its inputs.
1.4 Empirical Application
Assuming ft, the parental investment function, is linear and additive in its inputs, it can
be written as
Iit = β0 + β1timet + θ
′
i,tβ2 + β3θParent,i +Gθ
′
i,tα +X
′
itγ + µi + µg + it (1.4)
where Iit captures parental investment of child i in period t; θi,t = [θ
C
i,t, θ
N
i,t] measures
human capital of child i in period t and includes cognitive and non-cognitive skills re-
spectively; θParent,i captures the human capital level of i’s parent; Gθit captures the peer
group quality of i’s close peers in period t, hereby G is a spatial weighting matrix capturing
how the individuals are connected so that the average skill level of peers is captured by
1
ng
∑ng
j=1 gijθjt with ng being the total number of close peers in group g and gij indicating
a link between students i and j being the entries of G; Xit includes controls referring to
parent or child; µi captures individual and family unobservables; µg represents peer group
level unobservables; it are idiosyncratic shocks. Equation (1.4) is basically the specifica-
tion Nicoletti and Tonei (2017) use extended by peer effects. In contrast to Nicoletti and
Tonei (2017), I specify parental investment to depend on contemporaneous skills instead
of one period lagged skills. This is mainly for data reasons, information is available on a
yearly basis, thus one lag could be too much reaction time for the parent. Also note, that
parental investment and peer skills enter the skill development of child i in the same period,
so that a contemporaneous specification allows parents to react on static complements or
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substitutes to their investment.
To estimate the above equation, unobservable characteristics of i and/or i’s parent cap-
tured by µi, and peer group level unobservables measured by µg have to be eliminated.
Hereby µg captures that friendship networks are not formed exogenously, which means
there might be unobservables inducing both, changes in θi,t as well as in the close peer
group and thus Gθi,t. This endogenous selection bias is controlled for by the use of peer
group fixed effects. Under the assumption that conditional on individual and group un-
observables peer groups are formed exogenously, i.e. E[it|µi, µg, G] = 0, I de-group-mean
the whole equation for each period using J = 1ng − 1ng ιngι′ng which eliminates µg. Hereby
J is a transformation matrix based on a ng dimensional identity matrix 1ng , and two ng
dimensional vectors of ones, where ng is the number of individuals in friendship group g.
This conditional exogeneity assumption is violated if unobservables leading to friendship
formation and skill development vary over time. The validity of this assumption is assessed
in the robustness section.
In addition to peer group fixed effects, I use first-differences to cancel out time invariant
individual and family unobservables µi. Doing so relates changes over time in parental
investment to changes over time in peer quality as well as child’s quality as measured by
their skills, which is summarized in equation (1.5).
∆JIit = β1 + ∆Jθ
′
i,tβ2 + ∆JGθ
′
itα + ∆JX
′
itγ + ∆Jit (1.5)
Equation (1.5) as it is cannot be estimated due to two endogeneity issues. The first potential
issue is that adjustments in parenting possibly induce changes in the child’s peer group
quality, at the same time since there is evidence of peer effects on skills there is a likely
correlation between the child’s skills θ′i,t and the peers’ skills Gθ
′
i,t. These issues can be
circumvented by instrumenting i’s close peer group by second-order friends, i.e. friends of
friends, which is referred to as partially overlapping peer group strategy.
This is the typical way of solving the endogeneity problem in the context of peer effects
proposed and employed among others by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), and Calvo´-Armengol
et al. (2009). Creating individual specific reference groups identification is reached using
variations in group sizes (Lee, 2007), or given knowledge on who is not connected to whom,
indirect peers (i.e. peers of peers) can be exploited (see e.g. Blume et al., 2015; De Giorgi
et al., 2010). In this approach, the model is expressed in a spatial autoregressive way,
wherein the specification of the weighting matrix, capturing the network structure, is the
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crucial point. With available data, networks can be taken as conditionally exogenously
given so that the weighting matrix is specified directly from the data (see e.g. Lee et al.,
2010; Lin, 2010, 2015).8 Assuming that conditional on group fixed effects peer networks
are exogenous, I specify the weighting matrix directly from the data.9
To understand the main idea behind the instrumental variable strategy of partially
overlapping peer groups consider Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1a depicts a network in form of a
big square. Located within the network, there are three partially overlapping peer groups
in form of two gray ovals and one light green oval. Each small green circle stands for one
individual, and individuals A, B, and C are highlighted. The arrow between individuals A
and B indicates, that there is a reciprocated link between the two of them. This means,
A is influencing B, and at the same time B is influencing A. A similar relationship is
indicated between individuals B and C. Further arrows indicating links between individuals
(green circles) within each peer group (bigger ovals) are omitted for clarity of presentation.
Suppose the aim is to estimate peer effects on individual B. All small circles located within
the light green oval represent B’s peers. Figure 1.1b highlights peers that A and B have
in common by white circles, and peers that B and C have in common by black circles.
Consider individual A, as the arrow between A and B indicates, the influence goes in both
directions. Thus, in order to estimate the influence of A on B, instruments for A are
required. Individuals that are peers of A but not of B, as depicted by the white circles
in Figure 1.1c will serve this purpose. Characteristics and outcomes of all white circles
individuals in Figure 1.1c can be used to instrument the outcome of individual A, when
estimating its effect on individual B. Analogously, characteristics and outcomes of all black
circle individuals in Figure 1.1c can be used as instruments for the outcome of individual C,
when estimating its effect on individual B. Both, white and black circle individuals in Figure
1.1c are indirect or second-order peers of individual B. For clarity of presentation Figure
1.1 shows only second-order peers, however, the partially overlapping peer group strategy
can be employed with higher-order peers in the same way. Exploiting intransitivities, i.e.
indirect links between individuals within a network relies on the correct representation of
8With less strict assumptions, endogenous networks can be included by joint modeling of outcome of
interest and network formation directly see e.g. Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013); Patacchini and
Arduini (2016).
9Alternatively, exogenous peer group variations could be used. With the argument in mind that children
are more likely to befriend others that are similar to them, quasi-random variations in the potential pool
of fiends like cohort mates can be used, e.g. Hanushek et al. (2003); Hoxby (2002); Lavy et al. (2012a);
Lavy and Schlosser (2011). This strategy wouldn’t work in the current analysis since first differences are
considered and exogenous peer characteristics like gender or ethnic background don’t vary over time.
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Figure 1.1: Overlapping Peer Groups - Example
(a) Whole network (b) Overlapping peers (c) Non-overlapping peers
Figure 1.1a depicts a network in form of a big gray square, with three partially overlapping peer groups
marked by two gray and one light green oval. Each peer group includes several individuals depicted by
small green circles. Three individuals (A, B, C) are highlighted. Figure 1.1b emphasizes in white common
peers of individual A and C, and in black common peers of individual B and C. Figure 1.1c highlights
non-overlapping peers of individual A in white, and non-overlapping peers of individual B in black.
connections within networks. Incomplete information on a link between individuals A and
C in Figure 1.1 could bias results. This potential issue will be discussed in length in the
robustness section.
The second issue arises due to potential unobservables affecting both, parental invest-
ment as well as human capital leading to a correlation between errors term and skills. In
order to overcome this as well as possible reversed causality between investment and skills,
∆Jθi,t should be instrumented. The usual approach in this is to use a lag that is far
enough in the past so break the correlation, which means in the current context, that e.g.
∆JθCi,2 = Jθ
C
i,2 − JθCi,1 is instrumented JθCi,0.
In order to strengthen the instrumental strategy and capture the joint evolution, equa-
tion (1.5) is extended to a simultaneous equation system accounting for changes in i’s skills
directly. This allows to account for direct peer effects on i’s skills (δ4) and captures the
reversed effect of parental investment on i’s skills (δ3), which would otherwise confound
the α in (1.5).
∆JIit = β1 + ∆Jθ
′
i,tβ2 + ∆JGθ
′
itα + ∆JX
′
itγ + ∆Jit (1.5 revisited)
∆JθCit = δ
C
1 + ∆Jθ
′
i,t−1δ
C
2 + ∆JIi,t−1δ
C
3 + ∆JGθ
′
i,t−1δ
C
4 + ∆JX
C
i,t−1δ
C
5 + ∆η
C
i,t (1.6a)
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∆JθNit = δ
N
1 + ∆Jθ
′
i,t−1δ
N
2 + ∆JIi,t−1δ
N
3 + ∆JGθ
′
i,t−1δ
N
4 + ∆JX
N
i,t−1δ
N
5 + ∆η
N
it (1.6b)
In the final system, α will show whether parents are responsive to any changes in peers
in general (i.e. whether α is significant). Further, the sign will give an indication of whether
parents try to compensate for depreciated peer skills thus perceiving them as substitutes to
their own investment (i.e. α < 0), or whether they consider peers as potential complements
or multipliers (i.e. α > 0).
The system is structurally identified by using behavioral problems at school as an
excluded instrument for cognitive skills, and emotional attachment to the school as an ex-
cluded instrument for non-cognitive skills. The investment equation controls for household
characteristics that are excluded from the two skill development functions leading to an
overall identification of the system. I estimate the system via three-stage least squares
(3SLS) using iterated generalized method of moments (GMM).
In the final estimation, both skill equations (1.6a) and (1.6b) have a set of 5 endoge-
nous variables (two skill dimensions of own skills, two peer skill dimensions, and parental
investment), and the investment equation has a set of 4 endogenous variables (two child
skills, and two peer skills). For the latter, lagged skills for each dimension, and 2nd and
3rd order lagged peer skills compose the set of instruments. For the skill equations, in
addition, lagged investment outcomes are included in the set of instruments.
1.5 Data and Measures
The analysis is based on the Add Health database, which has been designed to study the
impacts of the social environment on adolescents’ behavior in the United States. The survey
was conducted in the academic year of 1994-1995 and collected information on a nationally
representative sample of 7th-12th graders in US public and private schools. Around 90,000
students from 132 schools were surveyed in a first In-School sample. Later a sub-sample of
around 20,000 students was followed up in In-Home surveys during the years 1996, 2001/02,
and 2007/08 (Wave I - Wave IV).10 Besides information on the respondent’s demographics,
family background, and daily activities, Add Health contains rich information on individual
social networks. Here I focus on students that were first surveyed in school and subsequently
followed up for two waves at home.
10For details on the research design see Harris et al. (2009).
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1.5.1 Measures
While some data sources provide time-use diaries that specify exact amounts of time spend
with the child, Add Health lacks this kind of detailed information. Add Health provides
among other things information on performance, behavior, and family relationships which
can be considered as proxies for cognitive and non-cognitive skills as well as parental
investment.
Skills
The dataset includes measures that aim to capture different dimensions of skills. In terms
of cognitive skills, yearly updated school grades in the subjects English, Mathematics,
Science, and History 11 are used. With this set of measures principal component analysis
is employed to predict one factor that can be interpreted as a cognitive skill. This way
higher cognitive skills can be understood as better academic performance.
While cognitive skills are easily related to IQ, non-cognitive or socio-emotional skills
don’t have a single definition. Complete inventories of commonly used personality measures
like the Big Five are not available for the first waves. However, there are six questions that
fit into the Neuroticism of the Big Five. These questions are answered on a five-point
likert scale and are described in detail in Table A1a.12 Three of these questions also relate
directly to the Rosenberg self-esteem scale, which measures global self-worth accounting
for both positive and negative feelings about the self. In line with the cognitive skill, I
use principal component analysis to extract one common factor out of these six measures,
which I call self-esteem. Throughout the paper higher non-cognitive skill thus relates to
higher self-esteem and self-worth.
For both types of skills also simple measures such as the GPA of all courses taken, or
the GPA of only Math and English can be considered, the main results are robust in this
regard.
11Provided that the student took this course. English and Mathematics are taken by most students, but
Science and History are less frequently chosen.
12Young and Beaujean (2011) show how questions within the first wave relate to the Big Five Inventory,
and that few items available are internally consistent.
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Parental Investment
In the following, two different types of non-pecuniary parental investments will be de-
scribed. First consider time investment. The data includes activities pursued by mothers
or fathers together with the child. These activities can be split into “verbal interactions”
and “activity interactions”.13 For the first, I consider talk about dating someone, talk
about schoolwork or grades, talk about things done at school, talk about personal prob-
lems, and have a serious argument on the child’s behavior. In terms of activities, I consider
all social events (movie, play, museum, concert, sport event), play a sport, go shopping, and
church-related activities. These time investment measures are asked as binary questions
and refer to the past 4 weeks as of the interview date. For each set of measures principal
component analysis is employed. However, I also use measures constructed by standardized
averages that yield similar results. Higher time investment thus indicates that parent and
child are pursuing more verbal or activity interactions together. The implicit assumption
here is that pursuing more of these interaction types is a proxy for more actual time spend
together.
Second, consider monitoring which refers to the number of decisions the child is allowed
to make without a parent. These decisions include among others, with whom the child is
allowed to spend time, at what time to be home, or what and how much TV to watch.
For this parenting style measure, I take the average number of decision the child is not
allowed to make. This means increasing monitoring is in line with the parent making more
decisions in the name of the child.
Peer Influence
Exploiting the panel structure of the data allows the inclusion of peers in two different ways.
On the one hand, friendship groups can be assumed to stay constant so that the change
in peers refers to peer skill changes. On the other hand, exploiting the rich information,
an updating in friendship networks could be allowed. This would mean along with the
peers’ skill development, exogenous network characteristics would also vary over time. The
second approach is less stringent in its assumptions on how friendships evolve over time,
it requires however that there is sufficient variation in individual networks between two
academic years.
13A detailed list on the questions used to create parental investment measures see Table A1b.
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In the main part of the analysis, I assume peer groups are constant and effects can
only be driven by cognitive and non-cognitive skills of peers. Hereby skills are defined
as described above, i.e. cognitive skills are based on scholastic performance, and non-
cognitive skills refer to self-esteem. The peer measure then captures the average skill level
of an individual’s friends. In the second part of the paper in addition to average peer skills,
average peer characteristics are included.
Other Variables
To assess health an index out of ten different health measures is constructed. The index is
increasing in better health and is generated using principal component analysis based on
questions like ”In the last month, how often did you wake up feeling tired?” or ”In the last
month, how often did you have chest pain?”. For a full list of items can be found in table
A2.
Add Health updates information on household composition in each survey. This allows
accounting for changes in the household size. This captures that mothers might give birth
again, older siblings could move out or back home, and new living arrangements could lead
to new household members.
There is no information on whether or how much time students spend on studying, but
various questions target free-time activities. Combining four categories, one variable that
increases in the amount of time spend on free time activities is created. First there are
hobbies like playing a musical instrument, reading, or doing arts and crafts; second, active
sports like baseball, softball, or swimming; third, exercise like jogging, karate, gymnastics
or dancing; and fourth, spending time with friends.
To control for the family atmosphere affecting interactions between parents and chil-
dren, a variable that subjectively measures how much fun the family has together is in-
cluded.14
1.5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Due to the differencing strategy and lagged instruments, the present analysis requires
information on skills from at least three periods and non-missing values for all control
variables restricting the sample to 9,492 observations. Further, friendship nominations,
14Alternatively, a question measuring a negative shock like a death in the family could be used. In the
analysis, it makes no big difference which of these two measures are employed.
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and in particular nominations that can be linked to survey data are required, which reduces
the sample to 7,044 students. In the final analysis, students that are in school grade 12
during the first In-Home interview, i.e. Wave I, are excluded. Since those students are in
their last school year, including them would result in including only students that repeat
the 12th grade, which are likely to be different from students of similar age. Also, in order
to make sure that the partially overlapping peer groups exist, very small networks of sizes
2 and 3 are excluded. This leaves a final sample of 3,424 high school students, which is
summarized in Table 1.1.
The sample is balanced in terms of gender and consists mainly of students in their
junior years of high school which corresponds to grades 9 and 10. While the majority of
students are white, the biggest minority is composed of black students with 17 % of the
sample. The majority of mothers and fathers in the sample have at least a high-school
degree, while 31% of mothers and 34% of fathers are also college-educated. Only 13 %
of mothers are reported to not have an occupation, while around a third is a professional
which includes among other doctors, lawyers, or teachers. In contrast to that, only 4%
of the fathers are reported to not have an occupation, while the majority with around
57% has an occupation that does not fall into the category of a professional or technical
worker. Since Add Health is a self-reported survey, information on earnings and wealth
includes many missing entries. However, on the question of whether the family has enough
money to pay their bills, only 15% responded to have financial problems. Around half of
the students in the sample are the firstborn child in their family and 17% have no siblings.
For those who are not a single child, the number of siblings ranges between one and eleven
with an average number of 2 siblings.
1.5.3 Friendship Networks
During In-School data collection in 1994/95, each student was asked to nominate up to
five male and five female friends from a school roaster listing all students enrolled in a
given school. In the follow up In-Home survey, students were asked to nominate again one
male and one female friend. Even though students had the possibility to nominate anyone
within their school, not all nominated friends are followed up. So it is very well possible
that a student nominates a total of 8 friends but only half of them can be considered in the
analysis. I restrict the analysis to students that are in peer groups of at least four people
in order to avoid results driven by very small group sizes and to guarantee that enough
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Table 1.1: Descriptives: Child and Parent Characteristics
Mean Std.Dev. Min.& Max. N
Female 0.5470 0.4979 0 1 3424
Age 15.1209 1.3965 12 19 3424
Stage in High-School
Freshmen 0.3034 0.4598 0 1 3424
Junior 0.4889 0.4999 0 1 3424
Senior 0.2077 0.4057 0 1 3424
Race
White 0.6186 0.4858 0 1 3424
Black 0.1700 0.3757 0 1 3424
Asian 0.0464 0.2105 0 1 3424
Latin 0.1159 0.3202 0 1 3424
Education of Mother
no degree 0.1159 0.3202 0 1 3424
only HS degree 0.5467 0.4979 0 1 3424
college degree 0.3090 0.4621 0 1 3424
Education of Father
no degree 0.1082 0.3107 0 1 2596
only HS degree 0.5069 0.5000 0 1 2596
college degree 0.3386 0.4733 0 1 2596
Occupation of Mother
professional 0.3140 0.4642 0 1 3424
technical, office, sales 0.2418 0.4282 0 1 3424
other job 0.3122 0.4635 0 1 3424
no job 0.1294 0.3357 0 1 3424
Occupation of Father
professional 0.3151 0.4646 0 1 2596
technical, office, sales 0.0728 0.2599 0 1 2596
other job 0.5705 0.4951 0 1 2596
no job 0.0389 0.1934 0 1 2596
Household Characteristics
Single Child 0.1732 0.3785 0 1 3424
Number of Siblings 1.9376 1.2286 1 11 3155
First-born Child 0.4822 0.4998 0 1 3397
Enough money to pay bills 0.8482 0.3589 0 1 3352
networks satisfy the exclusion restrictions for third-order peers.15
Table 1.2 compares nomination patterns of my main sample, with the unrestricted
15Out of the 193 non-overlapping networks, 77 have a diameter of at least 4, and 135 have a diameter of
at least 3.
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Table 1.2: Outgoing and Incoming Nominations - Networks with minimum size four
Maina Unrestrictedb
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max
Nominations out 2.036 1.755 0 9 2.103 1.884 0 9
Nominations in 2.036 1.993 0 16 2.103 2.102 0 17
Reciprocated Links 0.870 1.127 0 7 0.866 1.156 0 8
Networksize 17.416 40.279 4 407 19.203 53.371 4 720
a Main refers to the peer-groups in the sample that is used throughout the analysis in the paper.
b Unrestricted refers to peer-groups including all individuals that can be followed in the used data waves,
including individuals with missings in variables of interest.
sample which refers to all individuals that can be followed in two In-Home interviews
irrespective of their response pattern. Excluding individuals with missings in variables
of interest leads to a decrease in the average network size from 19 to 17, however not in
the average number of incoming and outgoing nominations. Hereby incoming nominations
count how often an individual was listed as a friend by someone, and outgoing nominations
are the number of friends an individual listed herself.
Even though every student can nominate up to 10 total friends, in the considered sample
students nominate on average 2.02 friends. A concern might be that excluding some friends
due to missing data could lead to a completely different peer group. To check whether this
is a concern here, I compare average peer characteristics of the peer groups that are used
in the analysis, with the average peer group characteristics in the networks based on the
unrestricted sample, i.e. before students with missings are excluded. Results in Table
1.3 indicate that for the students in my main sample, the average peer composition stays
stable after excluding friends with missing information. Only age seems a little concerning
since after the exclusion, peers are on average 0.35 years younger. However, everything
else including gender, race and parental background are comparable for both sets of peers.
Also, there is no difference in the average level of the PPVT16 score indicating that the
average peer cognitives are not affected by the exclusion of peers with missing information.
Looking at children inside the same classroom, usually, it can be observed, that gender
or similar background and interests increases the likelihood of becoming friends. Doc-
umenting and accounting for endogenous network formation is very important (Carrell
et al., 2013). Neglecting to do so can bias findings and result in misleading interventions.
16This is a computerized and abridged version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised. The
test works as follows, the interviewer reads out loud a word and the respondent has to select the illustration
that fits best to the meaning.
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In the present study, homophily in exogenous characteristics like gender or race would not
be a problem since a differencing approach under the assumption of time-constant friend-
ships is used. However, skills are allowed to evolve, which is not necessarily taken care of
by differencing. Homophily in skills, for instance, would mean, that the source of a positive
relationship between peer and own skills can be due to social influence of interest as well as
sorting of students along with skills. Using network fixed effect partially controls for this,
wherein an assessment of how good this works in my context is provided in the robustness
section.
Table 1.3: Characteristics of Nominated Friends
Peer-groups
Main Unrestricted Difference
Female 0.4637 0.4709 -0.0072
[0.4069] [0.394] [0.4599]
Male 0.3715 0.3848 -0.0133
[0.3878] [0.3779] [0.151]
Race
white 0.5362 0.5417 -0.0056
[0.4788] [0.4738] [0.6288]
black 0.131 0.1373 -0.0063
[0.3197] [0.3241] [0.4216]
asian 0.0357 0.039 -0.0033
[0.1741] [0.1794] [0.4411]
other 0.0401 0.0407 -0.0000
[0.1626] [0.155] [0.8769]
Age 12.6789 13.0071 -0.3282∗∗
[5.7651] [5.4833] [0.0158]
PPVT Score 44.6539 45.2603 -0.6063
[29.4611] [28.3531] [0.3856]
College Degree
Mother 0.2514 0.2541 -0.0027
[0.3628] [0.3533] [0.7519]
Father 0.212 0.211 0.001
[0.3369] [0.3239] [0.8995]
N Individuals 3,424 3,424 3,424
Notes: Main refers to peer-groups in the sample that is used throughout
the paper. Unrestricted refers to peer-groups including all individuals that
can be followed in the used data waves, irrespective of missings.
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1.6 Results
1.6.1 Main Results
The focus here is on how far parents adjust their investment patterns in case their child’s
skills change. Hereby observing a negative coefficient indicates that parents pursue a
compensating strategy. For example, suppose there is a decrease in cognitive skill of the
child which can be observed by a decrease in school performance, where we observe parents
increase their investment to compensate for the “skill loss”. In case a positive sign of the
coefficient is observed, parents would rely on a reinforcing strategy. This means that if
there is an increase in the child’s skill, then parents increase their investment to further
boost its development.
The main results are presented in Table 1.4, wherein the first two columns refer to
maternal investment, columns three and four refer to paternal investment, and column
five focuses on monitoring which does not distinguish between mothers and fathers. Each
column presents results from a separate estimation of a system with two skill equations,
referred to as Supplementary Equations, and an investment equation which is the main
equation of interest and reported under Main Equation. Results on controls are omitted
from the table for clarity but can be found in Table A3 in the appendix.
Comparing columns the top panel of Table 1.4 it can be seen that both, mothers and
fathers respond to changes in their own child’s as well as their peers’ skills. However,
there is no uniform response in the sense that depending on the skill dimension and the
particular parent, the underlying strategy seems to differ. Column one shows, that mothers
do not respond to cognitive or non-cognitive skill changes of their child in terms of verbal
investment. However, whenever their child’s health decreases by one standard deviation,
mothers on average increase their verbal investment by 0.055 standard deviations. An even
stronger verbal compensation occurs, whenever their child’s peers experience a decrease in
their cognitive skills. In contrast to this, mothers adjust their activity investment solely in
response to their own child’s non-cognitive skills. In particular, a one standard deviation
increase in the child self-esteem leads on average to a 0.233 standard deviation increase in
the joint activities of mother and child.
While mothers distinguish between in their means of a reaction between their own
child and its peers, for fathers a different pattern emerges. In contrast mothers, fathers
are unresponsive to health changes of their children. Fathers react to changes in cognitive
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Table 1.4: Parental Investment and Child Skills
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Main Equation
Dep.Var.: Parental Investment
Cognitive Skill 0.026 0.011 0.118 0.173* -0.035
[0.124] [0.126] [0.102] [0.104] [0.136]
Self-Esteem 0.042 0.233** 0.054 0.065 -0.087
[0.117] [0.118] [0.050] [0.049] [0.128]
Health -0.055** -0.013 -0.027 -0.016 0.031
[0.024] [0.022] [0.017] [0.017] [0.026]
Peer Cognitive Skill -0.138** -0.025 0.002 0.055 -0.146*
[0.069] [0.067] [0.069] [0.076] [0.079]
Peer Self-Esteem 0.009 -0.002 0.051 0.133* 0.000
[0.097] [0.102] [0.077] [0.080] [0.106]
Supplementary Equations
Dep.Var.: Cognitive Skill
Lag-Cognitive Skill 0.332*** 0.336*** 0.294*** 0.289*** 0.321***
[0.042] [0.042] [0.048] [0.048] [0.042]
Lag-Self-Esteem 0.039 0.041 0.062 0.070* 0.039
[0.039] [0.039] [0.042] [0.042] [0.039]
Lag-Health 0.040 0.046 0.076* 0.077* 0.047
[0.037] [0.037] [0.045] [0.045] [0.037]
Lag-Investment 0.039** 0.039** 0.042* 0.042* 0.035*
[0.019] [0.019] [0.022] [0.023] [0.019]
Lag-Peer Cognitive Skill 0.113* 0.107 0.136* 0.131* 0.119*
[0.066] [0.066] [0.073] [0.073] [0.067]
Lag-Peer Self-Esteem 0.028 0.029 0.020 0.020 0.023
[0.061] [0.062] [0.069] [0.069] [0.060]
Dep.Var.: Non-Cognitive Skill
Lag-Cognitive Skill -0.025 -0.026 -0.037 -0.037 -0.030
[0.038] [0.038] [0.046] [0.046] [0.038]
Lag-Self-Esteem 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.088* 0.091** 0.122***
[0.039] [0.039] [0.046] [0.046] [0.039]
Lag-Health -0.010 -0.006 -0.033 -0.032 -0.003
[0.037] [0.036] [0.045] [0.045] [0.037]
Lag-Investment 0.020 0.019 0.009 0.009 0.018
[0.018] [0.019] [0.022] [0.022] [0.018]
Lag-Peer Cognitive Skill -0.015 -0.014 0.024 0.020 -0.019
[0.064] [0.064] [0.072] [0.072] [0.064]
Lag-Peer Self-Esteem 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.066 0.056
[0.057] [0.057] [0.065] [0.065] [0.056]
Observations 3424 3424 2299 2299 3332
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 9.3560 7.3964 14.1539 15.1552 14.1515
p-value (0.8980) (0.9648) (0.3631) (0.2978) (0.5874)
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1; Robust standard errors in brackets. Cognitive skill
equation controls for time spend on free time activities, behavioral problems in school, and
the peer analogs. Non-cognitive skill equation controls for time spend on free time activities,
emotional attachment to school, and the peer analog. Investment equation controls for family
atmosphere, household size, living conditions, time spend on free time activities, and peer
health. For the full set of results including controls see Table A3.
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skills of their own child and change in non-cognitive skills of their child’s peers. With a one
standard deviation increase in cognitive skills of their own child fathers increase on average
their joint activities by 0.173 standard deviations. Similarly, a higher level of average peer
self-esteem is reinforced with more frequent activities of fathers and children.
Overall, both parents reward their children for improved skills using joint activities,
but while mothers reinforce non-cognitive skills gains, fathers do so for cognitive skills. In
terms of peers, parents react to the opposite skill as they do for their own child. Mothers
are responsive to cognitive skills changes of friends, while fathers respond to changes in
peers’ self-esteem.
The last column considers monitoring as a form of investment, wherein a higher level
of monitoring is in line with the parent making more decisions in the name of the child.
This measure does not distinguish between a particular parent of the child so that the
response could be driven by the mother, the father, or as a joint decision. Parents are not
responsive to their own child’s skill, but in contrast to that for peer cognitive skills, a weak
compensation effect prevails. With peers that perform worse in school, parents increase
the extent of control over their child’s daily decisions.
At the bottom of Table 1.4 the Hansen J statistic testing for overidentifying restrictions
is reported. This statistic is commonly used to test for the validity of instruments and other
misspecifications with a significant value indicating concern about the estimation. Across
all investment measures this test of overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected.
1.6.2 Heterogeneous Results
To assess the underlying drivers of the main results, Table 1.5 allows for heterogeneous
responses on peer skills. The first panel shows results for maternal verbal investment, the
middle panel considers paternal activity investment, and the bottom panel shows results
on monitoring. Each panel consists of results from five separate estimations, wherein the
supplementary equations and some coefficients from the main equation are omitted for
clarity but can be found in the appendix.
Column [1] in part (a) of Table 1.5 tests for differences in the mothers’ reaction to
peers of their daughters as compared to peers of their sons. Even though the effect seems
to be stronger for sons, mothers do not significantly discriminate by the gender of their
child. The sample includes students between the ages of 12 to 19, which makes it likely
that the mother does not employ the same parenting practices over this whole age range.
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Table 1.5: Heterogeneous Results
(a) Verbal Investment of Mother
Interaction Variable X Female Under
Age 15
First-
born
Expect
College
Met peer
parents
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Dep.Var.: Investment
Peer Cognitive Skill -0.224** 0.005 0.005 0.010 -0.212**
[0.100] [0.123] [0.091] [0.098] [0.085]
Peer Cognitive Skill * X 0.195 -0.297* -0.279* -0.293** 0.352**
[0.147] [0.180] [0.156] [0.145] [0.177]
Peer Self-Esteem -0.135 0.022 0.004 0.093 0.015
[0.125] [0.157] [0.127] [0.113] [0.125]
Peer Self-Esteem * X 0.103 -0.049 -0.159 -0.349* 0.009
[0.196] [0.197] [0.205] [0.209] [0.203]
Observations 3424 3424 3397 3399 3424
Supplementary Equations YES YES YES YES YES
Test of Overidentifying Restriction 13.0353 13.2819 13.2503 12.1360 10.4969
p-value (0.8368) (0.7746) (0.7193) (0.8401) (0.8815)
(b) Activity Investment of Father
Interaction Variable X Female Under
Age 15
First-
born
Expect
College
Met peer
parents
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Dep.Var.: Investment
Peer Cognitive Skill 0.131 0.160 0.079 0.024 -0.018
[0.115] [0.114] [0.070] [0.087] [0.073]
Peer Cognitive Skill * X -0.075 -0.135 -0.005 0.153 0.284*
[0.177] [0.157] [0.119] [0.174] [0.148]
Peer Self-Esteem 0.234* 0.209 0.083 -0.035 0.138
[0.126] [0.144] [0.105] [0.070] [0.107]
Peer Self-Esteem * X -0.215 -0.134 -0.042 0.238* 0.004
[0.177] [0.174] [0.162] [0.124] [0.167]
Observations 2299 2299 2279 2287 2299
Supplementary Equations YES YES YES YES YES
Test of Overidentifying Restriction 16.7724 15.4224 19.7153 18.8881 15.6142
p-value (0.2685) (0.3499) (0.1831) (0.2189) (0.4081)
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Cognitive and non-
cognitive skill equations are omitted for clarity. Investment equation controls for family atmosphere, house-
hold size, living conditions, time spend on free time activities, and peer health.
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Table 1.5: Heterogeneous Results continued
(c) Monitoring
Interaction Variable X Female Under
Age 15
First-
born
Expect
College
Met peer
parents
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Dep.Var.: Investment
Peer Cognitive Skill -0.267** -0.205 -0.071 -0.077 -0.246***
[0.121] [0.132] [0.099] [0.109] [0.095]
Peer Cognitive Skill * X 0.300* 0.163 -0.111 -0.122 0.395**
[0.178] [0.177] [0.173] [0.156] [0.197]
Peer Self-Esteem -0.177 0.048 0.045 0.034 0.098
[0.124] [0.178] [0.144] [0.131] [0.117]
Peer Self-Esteem * X 0.317* -0.048 0.009 -0.013 -0.178
[0.176] [0.229] [0.230] [0.225] [0.232]
Observations 3332 3332 3305 3308 3332
Supplementary Equations YES YES YES YES YES
Test of Overidentifying Restriction 25.9433 18.8312 17.4152 18.4282 16.6386
p-value (0.2541) (0.3383) (0.4266) (0.4278) (0.4791)
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Cognitive and non-
cognitive skill equations are omitted for clarity. Investment equation controls for family atmosphere, house-
hold size, living conditions, time spend on free time activities, and peer health.
This is confirmed in column [2] which tests for age differences in the response pattern. The
compensation strategy is entirely driven by children that are 15 years of age or younger,
which could be because mothers are more aware of the friends during their child’s early
adolescence or older children might refuse the investment offered by the mother. However,
the latter seems more likely given that around 96% of parents report to have met the best
friend of their child. This contact with peers does not differ between children that are of
age 15 or younger as compared to older students (see part (b) of Table A4). Column [3]
allows the response to differ by the child’s birth order and shows that the effect is mainly
driven by the response to peers of children that are the firstborn in their family. This
indicates that verbal investment is time-consuming so that mothers respond to peers when
they have a single child but with additional children at home their time constraint gets
more stringent.
If the compensation behavior is strategically driven, then this effect should be stronger
in case the mother expects there to be a substantial influence on her child or in case
her child is already on risk. Results in column [4] show that the response is driven by
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mothers who have high educational expectations of their child. The variable expect college
takes a value of one in case the parent reports to be disappointed if their child does not
attend college. So it seems, that only mothers who expect their child to succeed in high-
school counteract cognitive skill losses of their children’s peers. In addition, mothers that
have high educational expectations also compensate for non-cognitive skill losses of their
children’s peers.
If mothers know the parent of their child’s friends, then expectations over these friends
and knowledge about their skills might be more accurate. The last column in Table 1.5
tests the difference in the response of mothers who report to have talked to at least four
parents of their child’s peers in the past month. As can be seen in Table A4, many parents
report to have met the parents of the best friend of their child. On average parents seem
to talk to around 2 peer parents within a month. For mothers who had contact to more
parents, the compensation effect is significantly weaker. In fact, the net effect even turns
positive, so that mothers reinforce cognitive skill gains by increasing verbal investment. It
could mean that those mothers have no uncertainty about the parenting behavior of the
peers’ parents, so that they do not feel the need to take precautions about possible negative
spillovers on their child.
Part (b) of Table 1.5 test for heterogeneities in fathers’ activity investment. Overall
results are in line with those of mothers reported in part (a). Column [1] shows that also
fathers do not discriminate by their child’s gender, though the effect seems stronger for
sons. Fathers do not differ their response to their child’s friends by the age of their child. A
reason for that could be that the investment measure is composed of a range of activities so
that by the age of the child the exact activity changes but not the sensitivity with respect
to peer non-cognitives. Column [3] shows that fathers, as opposed to mothers, do not seem
to have time constraint issue. In the case of joint activities, a higher number of children
would not necessarily make the fathers’ time constraint more stringent. It is possible to
include multiple children in these activities so that response to peer skill changes does not
differ by the child’s birth order.
In line with the results of mothers, the reinforcement strategy is mainly driven by par-
ents who report being disappointed if their child would not attend college. The last column
tests for differences by contact with peer parents. If fathers have more contact with the
peers’ parents, then knowledge about the actual skill level might be more accurate. While
the response to changes in peer self-esteem does not differ by the contact to peer par-
ents, fathers with more contact in addition to reinforcing non-cognitive skills also reinforce
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cognitive skill gains of their children’s friends by increasing joint activities.
Part (c) of Table 1.5 provides heterogeneous results for monitoring. In contrast to time
investment of mothers and fathers, parents react differently to peers of sons and peers of
daughters when monitoring is considered. Increased control as a reaction to cognitive skill
loss of peers is entirely driven by sons, for daughters the non-cognitive dimension seems
more important. In particular, in case a daughters’ friends have higher self-esteem, parents
increase their monitoring by taking more decisions in the name of their daughter. These
response patterns are in line with findings in the literature, in the sense that education lit-
erature usually finds an academic performance gap favoring girls (see e.g. Pomerantz et al.,
2002), so that parents worrying about their sons’ but not daughters cognitive performance
is reasonable. The psychology literature shows that boys tend to have higher self-esteem
during adolescence, and while girls tend to have problems influencing boys, the opposite
does not seem to hold (see Zahn-Waxler et al., 2008). So the increase in monitoring due
to higher peer self-esteem could be driven by parents’ concern about their daughters hav-
ing certain type of friends influencing their behavior. This can be confirmed by allowing
parents to respond to skills and characteristics (see Section 1.6.3 for detail), estimated sep-
arately for boys and girls. Table A7 shows that more male and minority friends actually
drive the results for girls reported in column [1] in part (c) of Table 1.5.
As can be seen in column [2], even though responses to peer cognitive skill changes
seem stronger for children that are 15 years or younger, there is no significant difference
in the monitoring adjustment by the age of a child. Similarly, birth order as measured
by being the firstborn in the family does not lead to a stronger adjustment of monitoring.
Even though parents that have high educational expectations of their children seem to
react stronger to cognitive skill losses, there seems to be no significant difference to parents
with lower expectations.
In line with heterogeneities in time investment, compensation for cognitive skill losses
with increased monitoring is driven by parents that had only contact less than four of their
child’s peers’ parents. Those who talked to at least four parents, indicating that they have
a better notion of the peers’ skills respond significantly less. In fact, the net effect turns
not only positive but also insignificant.
Overall heterogeneous indicate that parents respondent strategically to counteract neg-
ative spillovers on their own child. To provide an additional test for this conclusion, I
allow parents to respond differently along with their own child’s ability. In particular,
Table 1.6 allows parents to respond differently to their child’s peers in case their own child
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneous Results - Child’s relative ability
Investment Measure Mother Verbal Father Activity Monitoring
Interaction Variable X
below median below median below median
cognitive selfesteem cognitive selfesteem cognitive selfesteem
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dep.Var.: Investment
Peer Cognitive Skill 0.027 -0.055 0.046 0.092 0.024 -0.044
[0.098] [0.103] [0.068] [0.077] [0.113] [0.115]
Peer Cognitive Skill * X -0.295** -0.112 0.056 -0.068 -0.319* -0.141
[0.148] [0.150] [0.123] [0.118] [0.167] [0.164]
Peer Self-Esteem -0.131 -0.052 0.081 0.108 0.125 0.000
[0.097] [0.103] [0.079] [0.076] [0.110] [0.110]
Peer Self-Esteem * X 0.141 -0.053 -0.099 -0.149 -0.207 0.059
[0.150] [0.148] [0.113] [0.116] [0.172] [0.170]
Observations 3424 3424 2299 2299 3332 3332
Supplementary Equations YES YES YES YES YES YES
Test of Overidentifying
Restriction
15.9523 12.8141 20.4552 19.1014 18.7602 21.3331
p-value (0.6605) (0.8025) (0.2004) (0.2634) (0.4723) (0.2629)
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Cognitive and non-
cognitive skill equations are omitted for clarity. Investment equation controls for family atmosphere, house-
hold size, living conditions, time spend on free time activities, and peer health.
has below-median cognitive or non-cognitive skills. For both, verbal investment of mothers
and monitoring, it can be seen that the compensation behavior is significantly stronger in
case the own child has below-median cognitive skills. As opposed to that, fathers’ response
to peer non-cognitives does not depend on their own child’s skill level.
1.6.3 Changing Friendship Networks
One case in which the assumption of time constant group effects is violated is if there
are actual changes in the peer networks. If the group composition changes, it is also
likely that group-level characteristics will differ. In this case, changes in network composi-
tions as measured by exogenous characteristics need to be accounted for as well since the
parents’ reaction might not be a response to peer skills but rather the peers themselves.
This possibility will be considered in this section, where the equation system consisting of
(1.5), (1.6a), and (1.6b) will be extended by exogenous peer-group characteristics in each
equation.
While allowing for dynamic peer groups is a less stringent assumption as compared to
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assuming groups to stay constant, it requires that there is sufficient variation in individual
networks between two academic years. Table 1.7 compares friendship nominations over
different waves, wherein old nominations refer to those used in the analysis up until now,
and new nominations make use of information form follow-up waves. While the average
number of friends a student nominates (outgoing nominations), as well as the average
number of friends by which a student gets nominated (incoming nominations), is quite
stable over time, only on average 37% of friendships indicated during the in-school survey
are renewed during follow-up interviews. This low renewal percentage is partly due to the
lower number of nominations the students were allowed to make during the follow-up, but
also because students indicated new friendships instead. This suggests that for the majority
of students in my sample, the peer group composition changes over time. I exploit these
changes to identify parental responses to peer characteristics along with peer skills.
Table 1.7: Nomination Dynamics
Nominations Fraction
Old New Renewed
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Nominations out 2.262 1.927 2.105 2.076 0.370 0.383
Nominations in 2.262 2.174 2.105 2.456 0.361 0.386
Reciprocated Links 1.057 1.219 0.952 1.270
Network size 54.196 72.836 7.302 34.272
This approach allows for the inclusion of additional instruments that naturally occur in
the dynamic context. In the previous section, peer skills were instrumented by lagged skills
of higher-order friends. In this section these instruments will be combined with the changes
in the network members. As an example, in addition to friends-of-friends, old-friends-of-
new-friends and new-friends-of-old-friends are used to instrument skills and characteristics
of immediate friends. In what follows, I first present results on estimations allowing for
exogenous peer effects only (in Table 1.8), and in second step I allow an influence from
both peer skills and peer characteristics.
Table 1.8 reports results from 5 separate estimations of a system with two skill and one
investment equations. Results on the two skill equations as well as additional controls in
the investment equation are omitted clarity (for the complete results see Table A5). The
first two columns use maternal investment, columns [3] and [4] use paternal investment,
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Table 1.8: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks with
exogenous peer effects only
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Dep.Var.: Investment
Cognitive Skill 0.015 0.068 0.011 0.169*** -0.030
[0.071] [0.070] [0.067] [0.063] [0.099]
Self-Esteem 0.035 0.207* 0.095 0.024 -0.095
[0.063] [0.123] [0.058] [0.057] [0.083]
Health -0.158 -0.195 -0.086 0.053 -0.040
[0.130] [0.145] [0.095] [0.097] [0.183]
Peer Characteristics
Female 0.007 -0.038** -0.016 -0.040** -0.049*
[0.020] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.026]
Mother high-school 0.061* 0.036 0.001 -0.003 -0.052
[0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.028] [0.043]
White -0.071* 0.068* 0.007 0.023 0.067
[0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.036] [0.056]
Minority -0.016 0.031 -0.017 0.006 0.104**
[0.033] [0.033] [0.036] [0.036] [0.047]
Father Professional 0.021 -0.005 0.000 0.043*** -0.024
[0.017] [0.017] [0.015] [0.014] [0.024]
Observations 1818 1818 1156 1156 1745
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 27.9191 35.4492 31.4379 29.4473 27.4869
p-value (0.3625) (0.1902) (0.2124) (0.2457) (0.2823)
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Cognitive and non-
cognitive skill equation are omitted for clarity, they include as controls all peer characteristics presented
in the table. Investment equation controls for family atmosphere, household size, living conditions, time
spend on free time activities, and peer health. For the full set of results see Table A5.
and the last column uses parental monitoring as the investment measure.
Allowing parents to respond to peer characteristics only, I show that both mores and
fathers value the peers’ background. with a higher fraction of peers with at least high-
school educated mothers, mother increase the verbal investment into their own child. A
higher fraction on white friends is perceived as a substitute leading mothers to decrease
their verbal investment.
In contrast to the main results, where mothers did not respond to the skills of their
child’s peers in terms of joint activities, they do take peer group composition into account.
With a higher fraction of white students in their child’s peer group, mothers increase the
joint activities with their child. Further, a higher fraction of female friends leads to a
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decrease of joint activities the mother offers her child.
In line with the main results, fathers do not use verbal investment as a response to
their child’s or their child’s peers’ skills. However, when activity investment is considered,
it can be seen that when fathers are allowed to consider the peer group composition along
with peer skills, they respond to changes in peers. It seems that having a higher fraction
of peers with professional fathers is reinforced with more activities. In addition, a higher
fraction of girls in the friend group is considered as a substitute for joint activities with
fathers.
Similar to this, also for parental monitoring, peer characteristics are important. A
higher fraction of female peers is seen as a substitute to monitoring, while more minority
friends lead to a higher level of parental control.
Since background characteristics and skills are correlated, a concern of the main results
presented in Table 1.4 and in Table 1.8 actually capture the same response.17 To test
whether parents respond to both peer skills and characteristics, in Table 1.9 I report
results from 5 separate estimations of a system with two skill and one investment equations
including both sets of peer measures. Results on the two skill equations as well as additional
controls in the investment equation are omitted clarity (for the complete results see Table
A6). The first two columns use maternal investment, columns three and four use paternal
investment, and the last column uses parental monitoring as the investment measure.
In line with results in Table 1.4 mothers compensate cognitive skill losses of their child’s
peers by increasing their verbal investment. The response to peer group composition
presented in column [1] of Table 1.8 persists, and even gets stronger. In addition to
increasing verbal investment with a higher fraction of white friends and decreasing it with
more female friends, a higher fraction of friends fathers being professionals18 is perceived
complementary to verbal investment. This effect did not prevail in when mother were only
allowed to respond to peer group characteristics because both, average peer cognitives and
average peer self-esteem, is positively correlated with the fraction of educated fathers.
Comparing results on mothers’ activity investment, when peer skills are included, the
negative response to a higher fraction of female friends becomes insignificant. The reason
for this is that average peer cognitive skills is positively correlated with the fraction of
female friends, so that leaving skills out the fraction of female friends partially measures
peer cognitive skills.
17For details on the correlation patterns see Tables A8 and A9.
18The definition of being a professional includes occupations such as doctors, lawyers, teachers etc.
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Table 1.9: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Dep.Var.: Investment
Cognitive Skill 0.064 0.077 0.017 0.157** -0.041
[0.074] [0.073] [0.069] [0.067] [0.106]
Self-Esteem 0.030 0.177* 0.075 0.022 -0.093
[0.063] [0.104] [0.057] [0.058] [0.080]
Health -0.070 -0.189 -0.049 0.072 -0.061
[0.126] [0.135] [0.100] [0.102] [0.180]
Peer Skills
Cognitives -0.113** -0.007 -0.043 0.020 0.021
[0.054] [0.052] [0.051] [0.053] [0.070]
Self-Esteem -0.013 0.042 0.042 -0.004 0.087
[0.047] [0.041] [0.044] [0.046] [0.057]
Peer Characteristics
Female 0.028 -0.034 -0.004 -0.043** -0.044
[0.026] [0.024] [0.021] [0.021] [0.031]
Mother high-school 0.077** 0.025 0.005 -0.008 -0.081*
[0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [0.029] [0.045]
White -0.085** 0.070* -0.010 0.022 0.070
[0.043] [0.042] [0.041] [0.038] [0.057]
Minority -0.045 0.034 -0.034 0.013 0.111**
[0.035] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.050]
Father Professional 0.035* -0.001 0.011 0.043*** -0.019
[0.018] [0.018] [0.006] [0.016] [0.025]
Observations 1818 1818 1156 1156 1745
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 38.1680 34.5425 33.1427 34.9175 32.6385
p-value (0.1455) (0.2200) (0.2720) (0.2073) (0.2493)
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Cognitive and non-
cognitive skill equation are omitted for clarity, they include as controls all peer characteristics presented
in the table. Investment equation controls for family atmosphere, household size, living conditions, time
spend on free time activities, and peer health. For the full set of results see Table A6.
Comparing results in columns [3] and [4] of Table 1.8 with those in columns [3] and
[4] of Table 1.9, it can be seen that the significant effect with respect to peer self-esteem
documented in the main results disappears. Similarly, also for parental monitoring, peer
characteristics rather than peer skills are the main drivers. Note that when peer skills are
included, higher monitoring with less female friends loses significance, while more friends
with high-school educated mothers leads to less monitoring. This change in pattern can
be explained by the positive correlations between peer skills and the fraction of peers with
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educated mothers, as well as the positive correlation between the fraction of female friends
with the fraction of educated mothers.
Overall results in Table 1.9 show that while mothers consider both peer quality dimen-
sions, fathers and parental monitoring is mainly based on peer quality as measured by the
peer group composition.
1.7 Robustness
1.7.1 Potential Threats
Endogenous Network Formation
The estimation employed above rests on the assumption that potential peer-group level
unobservables are time constant and thus eliminated through the combination of first-
differences and group fixed effects. This is in line with keeping peer networks constant
within the estimation period. Peer groups are based on the first nomination lists available
and assumed to stay the same over throughout the analysis. This assumption was relaxed
in section 1.6.3.
In a single period context network fixed effects are used to control for sorting into
networks due to unobservables that are common to all individuals within a group. The data
is treated as a quasi-panel to average-out group constant unobservables. With an actual
panel available, the key assumption of group-level conditional exogeneity, E[it|µg, G] = 0,
can be changed into E[it|µi, G] = 0 or extended to E[it|µi, µg, G] = 0.
The first, E[it|µg, G] = 0, will lead to inconsistent estimates if there are unobserved
shocks that are not common to all individuals within a group. The second, E[it|µi, G] =
0, assumes that conditional on individual level unobservables, peer groups are formed
exogenously. However, if there are unobservables common to individuals in a given group
that vary over time, estimation results will be inconsistent. The third combines these two
by conditioning exogeneity on both, individual and group level unobservables. Conditioning
period wise on group fixed effects and across periods on individual fixed effects takes time-
varying group level unobservables into account. However, in case there are time-varying
unobservables on individual level affecting both, the friendship link formation and the skill
and investment development, results will be inconsistent.
I check the validity of these exogeneity assumptions using a network formation model
that is commonly used in the literature on dyadic network formation based on homophily
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(see e.g. Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Graham, 2017). Assuming that homophily, i.e. the
tendency of individuals to socialize with those similar to themselves, is an appropriate
approximation of the underlying network formation, the likelihood of observing a link can
be described in characteristic distances of two individuals.
gij,g = β +
K∑
k=1
γ1k1{ xik,g = xjk,g}+
L∑
l=1
γ2l
1
|xil,g − xjl,g| + δ|ηi,g − ηj,g|+ µg + uij,g (1.7)
Where the distance between the K categorical and binary variables is defined by their
equality and distances between the L continuous variables is measured by the inverse of
their absolute difference. In addition to observable characteristics, the error terms from the
main equations ηi,g are included as well. The parameter δ is of main interest, it captures
time-varying unobservables in the main equation. A significant coefficient would indicate
that homophily in time-varying unobservables partly explains initial network formation.
This would indicate that the approach intended to control for selection bias in the main
equation failed, leading to inconsistent estimates.
I estimate this network formation model separately for a specification including only
individual level first differences, and one combining first-differences with group fixed ef-
fects. Hereby each equation of the system composed by (1.5), (1.6a), and (1.6b) is tested
separately.
Table 1.10: Endogenous Network formation
No Group Fixed effects Main Specification
Cognitive Non-Cognitive Investment Cognitive Non-Cognitive Investment
[1a] [1b] [1c] [2a] [2b] [2c]
Residuals 0.000012 -0.00142 -0.00016 0.00004 0.00013 -0.00010
[0.00004] [0.00109] [0.00018] [0.00005] [0.00011] [0.00018]
Individual and Peer Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Group Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 167025 167025 167025 167025 167025 167025
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Residuals included
in columns [1a]-[1b] are based on a simultaneous system including first differences. Residuals in columns
[2a]-[2c] are based on a simultaneous system combining group fixed effects and first differences. Each
column in a separate logistic regression.
Table 1.10 shows results from logistic regressions based on residuals from the main
specification and one that uses solely first-differences. Results in columns 1a through 1c
show that for both, skill and investment equations, using only first differences is enough
to control for unobservables influencing friendship formation. In addition to that, columns
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2a-2c provide results from a specification including both, first differences and group fixed
effects. For none of the three equations there is a significant correlation in the likelihood
of a link and the residuals of each equation.
In my analysis, I follow the more conservative strategy of combining first differences
and group fixed effects. Even though also first differencing seems to solve the potential
endogenous network formation, using network fixed effects means comparing students that
are exposed to similar schools, teachers, and social events.
Observability of Excluded Peers
The strategy of partially overlapping peer groups relies on the observability and inclusion
of all connections of an individual. Thus a threat to exogeneity emerges if the observed
networks do not depict the real networks. To give an example, see Figure 1.2 which is an
extension of Figure 1.1.
Consider Figure 1.2a and suppose all highlighted individuals, A, B, C, and D are ob-
served, but only the links depicted by black arrows are observed in the data. Based on
that individual D would qualify as an instrument for individual A, however, if in reality
there is a direct connection between individual D and B (red arrow) then the exclusion
restriction would be violated. In the Add Health survey students are allowed to nominate
up to five male and five female friends. If the total number of 10 friends is too restrictive,
then non-observability of some friends could be a severe problem.19
Figure 1.2b depicts a case in which an individual (here E) is entirely not observed. Based
on observable information individuals F and G qualify as instruments for individual A since
they are connected to B only via A. However suppose there exists an individual E, that
is connected to individuals B, F, and G. Then the exclusion restriction, that the influence
of F (or G) on B only works through A is violated. In particular, while with observed
information (left) the network (big gray square) would be partitioned in 3 subgroups (the
ovals), in reality, the network would only consist of two subgroups (right).
In the Add Health survey students are allowed to nominate not only students that are
part of the study, but also others that attend the same school, or the sister school. This
means that there is a chance, that some existing links as depicted in 1.2b are likely to be
not observed. Table 1.11 compares the total number of nominated friends in column 1 with
19One possibility could be to use undirected networks, which means if A indicates a link with B the
reverse is also assumed to hold. This would increase the restriction of 10 friends, however, at the same
time, it would decrease the intransitivity within networks leading to weaker instruments.
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Figure 1.2: Overlapping Peer Groups - Observability
(a) Unobservable Link (b) Unobservable Individual
Figure 1.2a depicts a network in form of a big gray square, with three partially overlapping peer groups
marked by two gray and one light green oval. Each peer group includes several individuals depicted by
small green circles. Four individuals (A, B, C, D) are highlighted. The Individuals A, B, C and the links
between them (depicted by the black arrows) are observed, individual D surrounded in red is observed, but
the link between D and B (red arrow) is not observed by the econometrician. The two Figures 1.2b depict
a case in which an individual E (in red) and the links of individual E (red arrows) are not observed by the
econometrician. The left figure captures the partially overlapping peer groups that are constructed based
on observed information, the right contrasts the actually situation.
the number of nominated friends that are part of the Add Health study in column 2. While
the number of overall nominated friends (column 1) significantly differs from nominated
friends that are part of the survey (column 2), for the majority of students in my sample
the overall nominated friends completely coincide with nominated friends that are part of
the Add Health study (column 4).
To ensure that higher-order links exist and milden threats to exogeneity by non-observed
links, I exclude very small peer groups of the sizes two and three, which could be small
subgroups of bigger peer networks with a non-observable friend to link them. In addition,
I re-weight the adjacency matrix based on the interaction intensity between two students.
Exploiting information on whether and how students report having interacted with their
nominated friends in the weeks prior to their interviews, friendships with more interaction
are given a higher weight. Doing so allows to focus on the most prevalent friendships of an
individual and implicitly assumes that the influence of a link depends on the “strength” of
that connection as measured by frequency of interaction.
The present analysis is limited to friendships within the high school a student attends.
Each student may have friends living in the same neighborhood but attending a different
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Table 1.11: Number of Nominated Friends
Total Add Health difference all coincide
Total nominations 7.0441 6.5908 0.4533∗∗∗ 0.7757
(2.9549) (3.0172) [0.0000] (0.4172)
Male nominations 3.4547 3.2012 0.2535∗∗∗ 0.8496
(1.7757) (1.815) [0.0000] (0.3575)
Female nominations 3.5894 3.3896 0.1998∗∗∗ 0.8674
(1.7893) (1.8113) [0.0000] (0.3392)
Observations 3,424
Notes: Column 1 refers to the total number of nominations. Column 2 includes only those
nominations that refer to students part of the Add Health study. Column 3 reports the difference
in means between the original number of nominated friends and those friends who can be followed
up on. The last column reports the fraction of individuals for whom all initial nominations were
within the Add Health sample.
school. Since the data only allows one to follow friendships within the sampled schools,
the results are limited to within-school friends and are likely to be prone to measurement
error with respect to the peer group definition.
1.7.2 Alternative Specifications
The results presented are robust with respect to alternative definitions of variables. If
for parental investments and both skills simpler measures such as averages or weighted
averages of measures are used, the results look very similar. Also using clustered standard
errors on the peer group level does not have a major impact on the results.
The above-presented results are robust to alternative lower bounds of peer group sizes.
If instead of a minimum group size of four a minimum of ten students is chosen, the sample
size decreases by around 700. Due to this, the effects get slightly weaker in terms of their
significance but still persist.
1.8 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to answer three questions describing parenting behavior. First,
whether and in how far parents take potential peer effects into account when they invest
in their child. Second, who is driving the response to peer quality. And third, what peer
quality dimension is the parent reacting on. I show that parents change their behavior in
response to changes in the skills or the characteristics of their child’s peers. Interestingly, I
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find that mothers and fathers respond in different ways. The following three main results
emerge from my analysis. First, parents compensate for cognitive skill losses of their child’s
peer by increasing monitoring. Also, I provide evidence that parents not only respond to the
cognitive performance of peers but also consider peer non-cognitive skills in their investment
decision. In particular, while mothers compensate for cognitive skill losses of their child’s
peers by increasing verbal investment, fathers reinforce high non-cognitive skills of peers by
increasing time spend on joint activities with their child. These response patterns indicate
that verbal investment and monitoring are perceived as substitutes to peer cognitive skills,
and joint activities are seen as complements to the self-esteem of peers.
Second, allowing parents to react differently in the case of daughters as opposed to
sons, I document gender differences for monitoring. While cognitive skill losses of sons’
peers are compensated by increased monitoring, for daughters increased peer self-esteem
is reinforced with higher levels of monitoring. Adjustments in time investment are mainly
driven by parents that have no close relationship with peers’ parents, and parents that
expect their child to attend college. However, results do not differ by parental education.
Adjustments in monitoring and the verbal investment of mothers are mainly driven by
children who have below-median cognitive skills, suggesting that parents try to prevent
negative spillovers on their “at risk child”.
Third, by exploiting repeated information on friendship nominations, I show that par-
ents take peer characteristics along with peer skills into account. In addition to com-
pensating cognitive skill losses, mothers compensate for decreases in the fraction of white
friends by increasing verbal interactions. On the other hand, a higher fraction of peers with
educated parents leads mothers to reinforce this peer quality gain by increasing verbal in-
vestment into their child. As opposed to that, fathers’ response and parental monitoring
is mainly driven by changes in peer group quality as measured by the composition of peer
characteristics rather than peers’ skills.
My findings suggest that school or classroom level interventions changing the composi-
tion of students will lead to feedback effects through parents. These type of interventions
change the potential set of peers and thus can influence friendships that are actually formed.
As I show, parents consider peer quality as measured by skills and characteristics in their
parenting behavior. This means, depending on the skill considered, the net effect of policy
interventions might be under- or overestimated if parental responses are not taken into
account.
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Chapter 2
Fragile Boys (or Girls)? Impact of a Macro
Shock on Psychosocial Functioning and Lon-
grun Health and Well-being Implications
joint work with Ghazala Azmat∗ and Katja Maria Kaufmann‡
2.1 Introduction
There is a growing interest in the importance of the determinants, as well as the con-
sequences, of socio-emotional development (or non-cognitive skills). From a number of
perspectives, the literature has investigated the development and formation of these skills
(see, for instance, Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha et al., 2010). Important links have
been established between socio-emotional development and economic and educational out-
comes (see, for example, Almlund et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2008; Deming, 2017; Heck-
man et al., 2013, 2006; Jackson et al., 2020). What is less well understood, however, is
whether the determinants of socio-emotional development differ by gender and whether
socio-emotional development (and changes in these skills) manifest differently for males
and females in terms of behavior and longer-term outcomes.
Understanding the gender differences in the determinants and consequences of socio-
emotional development (SED, hereafter) is important from an academic and policy perspec-
tive. From a biological perspective, the medical literature has well-established evidence in
favor of the “fragile males” hypothesis, showing that the male fetus is more at risk than the
female fetus, and certain disadvantages exist in utero and continue throughout life (Krae-
∗Sciences Po and Centre for Economic Performance (LSE)
‡Department of Economics, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, briq, CESifo, HCEO and IZA
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mer, 2000). From a behavioral perspective, males have been shown to engage more in
unhealthy (or “risky”) behavior, which has important consequences for health outcomes,
such as the development of cardiovascular disease (Juutilainen et al., 2004). Consistent
with the medical literature, in economics, it has been shown that for school-aged chil-
dren, a worse home or school environment has a stronger impact on disruptive behavior
and schooling outcomes for boys (Autor et al., 2019; Bertrand and Pan, 2013; Brenøe and
Lundberg, 2018; Fortin et al., 2015) and that early childhood interventions that enrich
the environments of disadvantaged children are more affective on the behavior and health
outcomes of boys than girls (Conti et al., 2016).
In this paper, we causally estimate the impact of a large exogenous macro shock on
the SED of young adolescents. We then link changes in SED to a wide range of behavioral
changes, (including both, externalizing and internalizing behavior), as well as long-term
consequences for their health, life satisfaction and educational outcomes as young adults.
We document that there is an immediate (negative) and sizeable impact on youths’ anger,
anxiety and self-confidence, which then has long-term negative consequences for their be-
havior and outcomes. Importantly, we find a gender-neutral impact of the shock on most
dimensions of SED. However, focusing on the link between changes in SED and different
types of behavior, we see striking gender differences. While changes in SED lead to an
increase in the externalizing behavior of boys, we see no impact on this type of behavior
among girls. This is consistent with the “fragile males” hypothesis and with gender asym-
metries in “acting out” when adolescents are subjected to similar adverse circumstances.
Similarly, when we examine the impact of SED on behavioral “control” problems, such
as alcoholism and other types of risky behavior, we see that changes in SED are more
strongly associated with longer-run problems for male than female youths. However, when
we investigate internalizing behaviors (such as suicidal thoughts), which are often linked
to depression and other mental-health problems, we see that changes in SED are strongly
associated with increases in internalizing behavior, but only for girls.1 By examining a wide
range of outcomes, we see that changes in SED play an important role for both genders.
In terms of more general long-run outcomes, such as subjective health and life satisfaction,
1According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), suicide attempts and thoughts
have nearly doubled for US children and teenagers over the last decade, with the rate of 6.7 suicides per
100,000 people in 2007 increasing to 11.8 suicides per 100,000 people by 2017. The agency determined that
suicide is the second leading cause of death among teenagers aged 15 to 19. Also, for the first time in
more than thirty years, mental-health problems have displaced physical conditions as the leading causes of
disabilities in U.S. children (Slomski, 2012).
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as well as objective measures of educational success, we see similar impacts on male and
female youths’, suggesting that both genders are impacted, albeit on somewhat different
dimensions, by changes to their SED. From a policy perspective, these results are key,
since, if the focus is mostly on conduct in the classroom, such as attendance and disci-
plinary incidents (e.g., fighting and disturbances), this would largely measure externalizing
behavior, biasing attention towards the behavior of boys and thereby fostering investments
in skills and SED that put a stronger focus on boys than on girls.
In our study, we estimate changes in the SED of adolescents using the natural ex-
periment of German Reunification in October 1990. Through Reunification, Germany
witnessed some of the most important structural changes in Germany’s recent history (see
Hunt, 2002; and Krueger and Pischke, 1995, for a detailed overview). In particular, East
Germany transitioned from a socialist system with a planned economy to a capitalistic
and democratic system in line with that of West Germany in a very short time period.
The enormous and rapid economic, cultural and political changes implied a drastic rise
in uncertainty about the economic and social environment.2 Work in psychology (see, for
instance, Kirkcaldy et al., 1999; Krauss and Faas, 1994 and Schmitt and Maes, 1998), doc-
uments that after Reunification East German adults exhibited substantially higher stress
and anxiety levels, with important implications for their mental well-being, and the inci-
dence of suicides increased. Among other channels, the changes and the resulting adaptive
pressures as well as the political revolution in East Germany threatened individuals’ psy-
chological identity. The focus of this paper is on East Germans during their adolescence
– a particularly relevant time for socio-emotional development – and, more specifically,
the short-run impact of the large shock on their SED and the longer-run implications for
important behavioral outcomes as well as their health, well-being and educational success
as young adults.
Using a unique detailed dataset on cohorts of youths in East Germany, where students
were interviewed annually for several years, when they were aged 9 to 20, we measure their
SED (as measured by their anger, anxiety and self-confidence) shortly before and shortly
after Reunification. We use variation in the timing of Reunification for two different cohorts
of students, to identify its effect on SED. We then link SED to later behavioral, health and
educational outcomes. In particular, we analyze the change in SED for the younger cohort
2Shortly after Reunification, East Germany experienced a sharp rise in unemployment. According to
Krueger and Pischke (1995) and Hunt (2008) employment decreased by up to 3.3 million people from 1989
to 1992 and unemployment rose to more than 15 percent in East Germany in the mid-nineties.
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between 1989 and 1991 (shortly before and after Reunification), using as the counterfactual
trend the evolution of the older cohort’s SED between the same ages (both of which were
before Reunification). To understand the impact of SED on students’ later outcomes as
young adults, we link the changes in SED to externalizing (fighting, destroying things)
and internalizing behavior (suicidal thoughts), as well as to behavioral control problems
(alcoholism and smoking), health (subjective health and life satisfaction) and education
(academic grade point averages and college entrance requirement).
We show that the large macro shock of Reunification had substantial negative effects
on youths’ socio-emotional skills and psychosocial functioning. In particular, Reunification
led to increases of 33 and 36 percent of a standard deviation in anger and anxiety levels, re-
spectively, while it decreased youths’ self-confidence by more than 40 percent of a standard
deviation. Importantly, these negative effects are present for both genders. Contrary to
the belief that boys are more strongly affected by negative changes to their environment,
we show that, the anger and anxiety levels of boys and girls increased similarly, while
self-confidence decreased for both but, actually, even more strongly for girls.
We next document that changes in SED for adolescents have important implications for
them as young adults. We show that changes in SED are associated in an important way
with longer-run externalizing behavior (fighting and destroying property), internalizing
behavior (suicidal thoughts and their frequency) and behavioral control problems (alcohol
and cigarette consumption). However, there are striking gender differences in these links.
While we see a change in externalizing behavior only for boys, as well as more negative
behavioral control problems, we see a change in internalizing behavior only for girls. An-
alyzing the association between SED and longer-run global measures on life satisfaction,
well-being, and objective academic success, we find that all these measures are gravely
affected by a negative change in SED and in a very similar way for both genders. Our
findings are, therefore, consistent with a “fragile males” hypothesis in that adverse shocks
impact boys’ disruptive behavior and behavioral control problems. However, we also find
evidence to suggest that negative shocks affect girls on important mental health dimen-
sions, and ultimately, they appear to have similar consequences on longer-run health, life
satisfaction and educational success.
Looking more closely at the different components of SED, we show that an increase in
anger is strongly related to youths’ longer-run propensity of “fighting” and “destruction
of property”, which is entirely driven by male teenagers. Turning to behavioral control
problems, we find that changes in anger are strongly related to youths’ propensity to
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smoke cigarettes and consume heavy quantities of alcohol, and again the effects are mostly
driven by male youths. However, in terms of the effects on suicidal thoughts and the
persistence of such thoughts, we see that all SED components (changes in anger, anxiety
and self-confidence) play a role, albeit much more strongly for female teenagers. With
respect to health outcomes, we find that all SED components are linked to life satisfaction
and subjective well-being. Increased anger and anxiety and decreased self-confidence are all
linked to worse health outcomes. This is the case for both, male and female youths. Finally,
in terms of educational attainment, increased anger and anxiety and lower self-confidence
are associated with lower GPAs in German and math, as well as a lower probability of
completing the entrance requirement for college, the Abitur degree, and again the effects
are very similar for males and females.
2.2 Background
Until 1945, East and West Germany were united as a single country. When separation
occurred after Germany’s defeat in the Second World War, it was exogenously imposed
by the winning Allies. In the fall of 1989, change swept through Eastern Europe and led
to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. On October 3, 1990, East Germany
joined the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), creating a sovereign unified German state
(“Reunification”). Importantly, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), instead
of experiencing a change of government within its borders or newfound independence like
other countries in this area, ceased to exist as a separate state. In this process, East
Germany switched from state socialism to liberal democratic capitalism in a short period
of time and without a gradual transition.
This large and unexpected change in the entire economic and political system cre-
ated a substantial amount of uncertainty. Upon Reunification, the economic system in
East Germany was replaced and led to a substantial rise in unemployment (Hunt, 2008;
Krueger and Pischke, 1995).3 Bhaumik and Nugent (2011), for example, show that eco-
nomic uncertainties (especially employment-related uncertainty) driven by Reunification
led to an important decrease in childbirths. In general, the consequences of Reunification
had important effects on individuals’ stress levels and well-being. Psychologists have shown
that the Reunification led to substantially higher stress levels related to the adaptive pres-
3During state socialism under the GDR there was no official unemployment, i.e. people were employed
even though their productivity were low, which changed upon Reunification.
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sures associated with changes, as well increased threat of unemployment (Kirkcaldy et al.,
1999). Beyond the changes in economic pressure, Krauss and Faas (1994), among others,
note that beyond the changes in economic pressures, the political revolution in East Ger-
many threatened individuals’ psychological identity and the previously held notion that
individuals have only one reality, which could lead to increased anxiety. Krauss and Faas
(1994) conducted extensive interviews during which they saw “very intense and powerful
feelings”, which ranged from “visible euphoria about the anticipation of more closeness and
new possibilities for the relationships to anxiety over being accepted or outright panic.”
Our study focuses on the impact of Reunification on the anxiety, anger and self-
confidence among adolescents and changes in them, shortly before and after Reunification.
We causally estimate the impact of a large macro shock on these youth social-emotional
development as well as the long-run consequences of changes in these psychological mea-
sures.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Longitudinal Study of Students in East Germany
The data used in the following analysis come from the Longitudinal Study of Students
(1985-1995). The study follows two parallel cohorts of students in East Germany from
1985 to 1995. Students in the younger cohort were surveyed from ages 9/10 to 18/19,
while students in the older cohort were surveyed in the same years from ages 11/12 to
20/21. The goal of the study was to understand the determinants of the development
of cognitive abilities and mental health as well as of values, goals, and attitudes during
childhood and adolescence. The data are ideal for our purpose in that the survey followed
the same individuals from before to after German Reunification, covering a wide range of
topics, including educational achievement and attainment, as well as psychological well-
being measures and health-related behavior.
Importantly, the survey asks students about their socio-emotional development and
their psychological well-being at several points in time before and after Reunification,
allowing us to study whether and to what extent these measures translate into long-run
outcomes. Given the longitudinal nature of the study, we can link exogenously driven
changes in psychological functioning (in particular anxiety, anger and self-confidence) to
longer-run behavioral, educational and health outcomes post Reunification, when students
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are young adults.
2.3.2 Variable Description
In Table 2.1a, we describe the three main variables used in our analysis. Our main outcome
of interest is the socio-emotional development (SED) of adolescents, as measured by their
levels of anger, anxiety, and self-confidence. We use students’ level of agreement with items
related to the different psychological measures. Possible answers for each item range from
4 (“very strongly”) to 1 (“not at all”). In the case of anger and anxiety, we use factor
analysis to combine the different items, since there is more than one item available.4 Since
these measures do not have a natural unit, we standardize them, i.e., subtract the mean
and divide by the standard deviation to be able to interpret regression coefficients in terms
of standard deviation changes.
In Table 2.1b, we describe the long-run outcomes, as measured when individuals are
aged 18 to 21, which are linked to their early (exogenous) changes in psychological well-
being around the time of Reunification. We classify these outcomes into the following five
categories: externalizing behavior, internalizing behavior, behavioral control issues, health
outcomes, and educational outcomes.
For externalizing behavior, we measure self-reported deviant behavior during the past
12 months. There are two main measures: (1) Physical fighting, which captures whether the
individual has deliberately beaten or hurt someone, (2) Destroy property, which captures
whether the individual has deliberately destroyed or damaged private public property.
In terms of internalizing behavior, we measure individuals’ suicidal tendencies, where
(1) Suicidal thoughts capture whether the individual has thought of committing suicide
at least once and (2) Repeated suicidal thoughts indicates whether the individual has had
thoughts of committing suicide more than once.
With respect to behavioral control problems, we focus on (1) Alcohol consumption,
where we can measure the extent of consumption, specifically (a) regular alcohol consump-
tion and (b) heavy alcohol consumption, over the past three months and (2) Cigarette
4In terms of the variable anger, individuals are asked about their agreement with the following state-
ments: “I have destroyed things out of anger.” and “When provoked, I lose my temper”. In terms of the
anxiety variable, individuals are asked about their agreement with the following two statements: “Some-
times I am too nervous to speak in class.”, and “I am afraid of being laughed at by my classmates.” Self-
confidence is measured as the extent of agreement to the statement “I struggle with low self-confidence.”
To interpret higher values as higher self-confidence, while in the raw data higher-value answers imply lower
self-confidence, we revert the scale.
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Table 2.1: Variable Description
(a) Variables in the short-run
Description Values
Psychological Measures
Anger Combined score of 2 items. 1 4
Anxiety Combined score of 2 items. 1 4
Self-Confidence Problems with low self-
confidence.
1 4
(b) Variables in the long-run
Description Values
Externalizing Behavior
Physical Fighting Indicator for having started or
been in a physical fight in the
past 12 months.
0 1
Destroy Property Indicator for having destroyed
someone’s property in the past 12
months.
0 1
Internalizing Behavior
Suicidal Thoughts Indicator for having thought of
committing suicide at least once.
0 1
Repeated Suicidal Thoughts Indicator for having thought of
committing suicide more than
once.
0 1
Behavioral Control Problems
Alcohol Consumption: Regular Indicator for drinking alcohol 1-2
times per month.
0 1
Alcohol Consumption: Heavy Indicator for drinking at least
once per week.
0 1
Cigarette Smoking Indicator for smoking regularly/
occasionally.
0 1
Health & Well-being
Subjective Health Subjective health measure (1
lowest, 5 highest).
1 5
Life Satisfaction Satisfaction about life in general/
overall (1 lowest, 4 highest).
1 4
Academic Outcomes
German Grade German grade in school grade 10
(1 lowest, 5 highest).
1 5
Math Grade Math grade in school grade 10 (1
lowest, 5 highest).
1 5
Abitur Degree Indicator for having a degree per-
mitting university studies.
0 1
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Smoking, indicating if the individual is a regular smoker.
Physical health and general well-being are captured using measures of (1) Subjective
health, which ranges from 5 (“very good”) to 1 (“bad”) and is referring to the current
health status perceived by the adolescent and (2) Life satisfaction, which measures the
individual’s life satisfaction in general. It is defined in four categories (where 1 is “not at
all satisfied” and 4 is “completely satisfied”).
Finally, we can measure academic outcomes using (1) Students’ academic GPAs in
Math and German during 10th grade, i.e. the highest grade with mandatory education,
(where 1 is the lowest grade and 5 is the highest) and the obtainment of (2) “Abitur”, the
university entrance certificate necessary for admission to university.
2.3.3 Summary Statistics
In Table 2.2a, we present the summary statistics for the three SED measures by gender
when the youths are between ages 12 and 14. The first column presents the averages
for girls, the second column presents the averages for boys, and the third column tests
for a difference between the two. Overall, boys, on average, report higher levels of anger
and higher levels of self-confidence than girls at the same age. Girls, however, report, on
average, higher levels of anxiety than boys do.
In Table 2.2b, we similarly report the summary statistics for each of the long-run
outcomes, when individuals are aged 18 to 21. The prevalence of externalizing behavior, in
terms of physical fighting and destroying property, is higher for young men than for young
women at the same age. However, internalizing behavior, in terms of suicidal tendencies,
is higher for young women than for young men. Among men, for instance, approximately
10 percent have gotten into a physical fight, compared with only 2-3 percent of women.
With respect to suicide, while only 19 percent of men have thought about suicide, more
than 34 percent of women have had these thoughts.5
5In Appendix Table B13 we compare our measures on externalizing and internalizing behaviors with
similar measures from another German and a US survey targeted at the surveillance of risky behaviors
among youths (the German survey KiGGS from 2003 on youths aged 14-17 and the US survey “Youth Risk
Behavior Surveillance” on 12th graders in 1995). Despite the fact that the age of the youths and the year
when the survey was conducted are not exactly the same and also the exact survey questions and reference
periods differ somewhat, average incidence and in particular patterns in terms of gender differences are
similar. For example, in our survey of 18-21 year olds in 1995 the likelihood of female (male) youths to get
into fights is 2-3 percent (10 percent) compared to 10 percent (21 percent) in the younger sample from the
more recent German survey and compared to 6 percent (16 percent) in the US sample. In terms of suicidal
thoughts, in our sample 34 percent (19 percent) of female (male) youths have ever had thoughts about
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With respect to behavioral control problems,the gender differences are less stark than
those that appear in terms of externalizing and internalizing behavior. While smoking and
regular drinking are similar for boys and girls, heavy drinking is more prevalent among
young men. In terms of smoking cigarettes, on average, 36 to 38 percent of adolescents
consume tobacco. In terms of alcohol consumption, around 60 to 70 percent of men and
women drink regularly. However, while 55 percent of men are heavy drinkers, this is the
case for only 40 percent of women.6
With respect to health and educational outcomes, we similarly see that there are no
strong gender differences. Both, young men and women, report similar levels of life satisfac-
tion. However, young men report a higher level of subjective health. In terms of academic
performance, we see no gender difference in taking the university entry exam (the Abitur),
with approximately 40 to 45 percent taking it. Looking at academic performance at the
end of high school, we see that, while girls tend to perform better in German, there is no
significant difference in math.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics by Gender
(a) Variables in the short-run
Girls Boys Diff.
Psychological Measures
Anger -0.1746 0.0486 0.22***
[0.9129] [0.9629] [0.00]
Anxiety -0.0024 -0.1701 -0.17***
[0.9725] [0.8897] [0.00]
Self-Confidence -0.0646 0.1143 0.18***
[1.0224] [0.9096] [0.00]
N Individuals 462 394
committing suicide at least once, while 17 percent (8 percent) of 14-16 year olds had suicidal thoughts in
the past 14 days in the German part of the European survey SEYLE conducted in 2010 and 24 percent (16
percent) of the US 12th-graders had seriously thought about attempting suicide in the past 12 months.
6Also in terms of these measures of behavioral control problems, average incidence and gender differences
are similar (see Appendix Table B13). In our survey around 36 to 38 percent of female and male youth
report to smoke (regularly and occasionally), while in the younger KiGGS sample of 14-17 year olds around
31% of both, female and male youth, report to be current smokers. In comparison, around 34 percent
of US 12th graders smoked at least once in the past 30 days. In terms alcohol consumption, 38 percent
(58 percent) of 18-21 year old female (male) youths in our sample consume alcohol at least once per week
compared to 23 percent (41 percent) among the German survey of 14-17 year olds. 54 percent (60 percent)
of female (male) US 12th graders drink alcohol once per week, 32 percent (47 percent) of American females
(males) are heavy drinkers.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics by Gender continued
(b) Variables in the long-run
Girls Boys Diff.
Externalizing Behavior
Physical Fighting 0.0238 0.0950 0.07***
[0.1525] [0.2936] [0.00]
Destroy Property 0.0324 0.1150 0.08***
[0.1772] [0.3194] [0.00]
N Individuals 463 400
Internalizing Behavior
Suicidal Thoughts 0.3480 0.1979 -0.15***
[0.4769] [0.3989] [0.00]
Repeated Suicidal Thoughts 0.0859 0.0264 -0.06***
[0.2805] [0.1605] [0.00]
N Individuals 454 379
Behavioral Control Problems
Alcohol Consumption: Regular 0.6740 0.7546 0.08*
[0.4693] [0.4309] [0.01]
Alcohol Consumption: Heavy 0.4053 0.5594 0.15***
[0.4915] [0.4971] [0.00]
Cigarette Smoking 0.3855 0.3615 -0.02
[0.4872] [0.4811] [0.48]
N Individuals 454 379
Health & Well-being
Subjective Health -0.0262 0.1977 0.22***
[1.0387] [0.9156] [0.00]
Life Satisfaction -0.0084 0.0432 0.05
[1.0199] [0.9000] [0.44]
N Individuals 459 400
Academic Outcomes
German Grade 0.4777 0.0295 -0.45***
[0.9124] [0.9247] [0.00]
Math Grade 0.2655 0.3016 0.04
[0.9521] [0.9705] [0.62]
Abitur Degree 0.4684 0.4085 -0.06
[0.4996] [0.4923] [0.11]
N Individuals 395 328
Notes: For a description of the variables, see Table 2.1. In Panel (a), we
pool both cohorts and show the means of the psychological measures for
youths at ages 12/13 and 13/14 (i.e. before and after Reunification for the
young cohort) as in the analysis of short-run effects. The psychological
measures anger and anxiety are created using factor analysis based on
two items in each case. In the analysis, all categorical variables are used
as standardized scores. In Panel (b), we display means of the longer-
run outcomes when youths are between ages 18 and 21, using the same
(pooled) sample as in the short-run analysis.
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2.4 Empirical Methodology
2.4.1 Short-run effects of Reunification on socio-emotional development
We causally estimate changes in SED using the natural experiment of German Reunifi-
cation in October 1990, whereby students’ birth cohort and the timing of Reunification
jointly determine their exposure to the change in regime. We use this variation to identify
the effect of regime change on three dimensions of SED: anger, anxiety and self-confidence.
In particular, we analyze the change in the SED of the younger cohort before and after
Reunification, using as the counterfactual trend the evolution of the older cohort’s psycho-
logical well-being at the same age before Reunification. Importantly, the regime change
allows us to isolate a change in SED that is not driven by age effects. In a second step,
we study how these changes in SED translate into changes in longer-term behavior and
outcomes.
The survey follows two cohorts – one being three years older than the other cohort is
– between 1985 and 1995. We exploit the comparability across cohorts at the same age
and the structure of the data, which at regular (annual) intervals, surveys the students
on the same questions, to identify the effect of regime change on SED. The “treatment”
of interest is that of regime change on the SED of the younger cohort. The older cohort
serves as the “control” group, capturing how socio-emotional skills would have evolved if
there had been no Reunification. For instance, the older cohort at age 14 (in 1988) is
in the pre-Reunification period, while the younger cohort at age 14 (in 1991) is in the
post-Reunification period.
We estimate the change in SED for the younger cohort from before to after Reunification
(i.e., between 1989 and 1991), using the older cohort as a control for the trend across the
same ages for the younger cohort. The empirical design is such that we focus closely on
the ages directly pre- and post-Reunification for the younger cohort, i.e., when aged 12 to
14, which allows us to identify the short-run effects of Reunification. More generally, we
estimate the following equations:
SEDic = β0 + β1Ti + β2Pic + β3(TiPic) + β4Fi +Xicδ + ic (2.1)
SEDic = β0 + β2Pic + β3(TiPic) +Di + ic (2.2)
where SEDic is the measure of the socio-emotional development of student i in cohort
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c. Ti is a dummy indicating “treatment” (i.e., taking the value of one if the individual
belongs to the younger cohort and zero otherwise), and Pic indicates the “post” period,
representing the student’s age. Since we restrict the analysis to ages 12 to 14, Pic is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the age of the individual is 14 (where age
12 is the excluded category); Fi is a gender dummy taking the value of one if the student
is female. Xic is a vector of pre-determined individual-specific characteristics. In a second
specification, we include individual fixed effects Di (see equation (2)).
To understand the gender differences in impact on SED, we estimate equations (1) and
(2) by fully interacting the specification with the female dummy Fi, leading to:
SEDic = β0 + β1Ti + β
F
1 (TiFi) + β2Pic + β
F
2 (PicFi) (1.1)
+ β3(TiPic) + β
F
3 (TiPicFi) + β4Fi +Xicδ + (XicFi)δ
F + ic
SEDic = β0 + β2Pic + β
F
2 (PicFi) + β3(TiPic) + β
F
3 (TiPicFi) +Di + ic (2.1)
The main coefficients of interest are β3 and β
F
3 , which capture the effect of a change in
regime (β3), and whether this effect differs by gender (β
F
3 ). The interaction term (TiPic )
takes the value of one if a student is from the younger cohort and is 14 years old, which is in
the post-Reunification period for the young cohort, while (TiPicFi ) takes the value of one
if the student is female, in the young cohort and in the post-Reunification. All equations
are estimated using ordinary least squares with standard errors that are clustered at the
individual level.
One possible way to apply the Difference-in-Differences approach is to compare the
young and the old cohorts in the same years before and after Reunification. However, the
older cohort is also likely affected by Reunification, such that we might expect a response
within the “control” group as well. In our application of the Difference-in-Differences
approach, we compare the younger and the older cohorts at the same age. In this way,
the older cohort is not affected by Reunification since the relevant ages are all before
Reunification, and it allows us to control for age (life-cycle) effects, which are likely to
be particularly important during adolescence. More specifically, we control for how the
younger cohort’s socio-emotional development would have developed without Reunification
by making use of the change in these measures within the control group at the same ages.
Under the parallel trend assumption, it is assumed that without the German Reunifi-
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cation, the young cohort’s psychological development between ages 12 and 14 would have
been the same as the older cohort’s psychological development between ages 12 and 14.
We test this parallel trend assumption by conducting a placebo test in which we compare
the evolution of the SED for the younger cohort in the pre-period with that of the older
cohort.
2.4.2 Linking socio-emotional development to long-run behavior and out-
comes
In this section, we discuss how we study the link between SED and long-run behavior
and outcomes. We measure whether anger, anxiety, and self-confidence – and changes
in these variables – impact students’ longer-run externalizing/internalizing behavior, as
well as behavioral control issues, health and well-being, and academic performance, and
whether this relationship differs by gender.
We estimate the following equations:
Bic = γ0 + γ1∆SEDic + γ2SEDic,pre + γ3Ti + γ4Fi + ic (2.3)
Bic = γ0 + γ1∆SEDic + γ
F
1 (∆SEDicFi) + γ2SEDic,pre (3.1)
+ γF2 (SEDic,preFi) + γ3Ti + γ
F
3 (TiFi) + γ4Fi + ic
where Bic is an indicator for a certain behavior (or a measure of health, well-being or
academic performance) of individual i in cohort c, SEDic,pre captures the level of a certain
socio-emotional skill at age 12 (i.e., before Reunification for both cohorts), and ∆SEDic
captures how a certain SED indicator changed from age 12 to age 14 (i.e. before vs. after
Reunification for the young cohort). The coefficient of interest is γ1, which measures how
an exogenous change in SED affects individuals’ later behavior and outcomes. Equation
(3.1) repeats the exercise but measures the heterogeneity by gender.
2.5 Results: Short-run Effects of Reunification on Socio-
emotional Development
The macro shock of Reunification had drastic effects on adolescents’ SED and psychological
well-being. In Table 2.3, we present the impact of Reunification on anger, anxiety and self-
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confidence. According to columns (1) and (2), Reunification increased the level of anger by
33 percent of a standard deviation. In particular, those in the younger cohort have a level
of anger that is 33 percent of a standard deviation higher after Reunification as compared
to before, controlling for how their anger level would have evolved without Reunification
between the relevant ages. The counterfactual anger levels are measured by subtracting the
change in anger level for the old cohort between the same age (both of which took place
before Reunification). Results are very similar without and with controls for individual
fixed effects (compare columns (1) and (2)). Similarly, Reunification led to substantially
increased levels of anxiety among adolescents – with an increase of 36 percent of a standard
deviation (columns (3) and (4)) and their levels of self-confidence decreased by 44 percent
of a standard deviation (columns (5) and (6)).
In Table 2.4, we analyze whether the macro shock affects the SED of adolescent boys
and girls differently. Columns (1) to (4) show that (with and without fixed effects), anger
and anxiety increase similarly for both genders. This finding is important in that when we
focus only on changes in behavior (such as disruptive and aggressive behavior) following a
major life disruption, those changes are predominantly observed in boys, while girls appear
to be unaffected (or less affected). This might give the impression that the SED of boys is
more severely affected by adverse shocks. However, by directly measuring SED, we show
that the effects are similar for both girls and boy. As we will discuss in the next section,
what differs by gender is how SED is linked to different types of behavior.
Columns (5) and (6) show that compared with that of adolescent boys, the self-
confidence of girls is more negatively impacted by the macro shock, in that girls’ self-
confidence levels decrease by 62 percent of a standard deviation but only by 23 percent
of a standard deviation for boys. This highlights again that, if anything, girls are more
strongly affected by the shock than boys.
In Panel B of Tables 2.3 and 2.4, we conduct a placebo experiment to test whether
the pre-trends in SED are similar for the two cohorts. We estimate a Differences-in-
Differences specification (without and with fixed effects, respectively) comparing the evo-
lution of youths’ SED before age 12. The results are consistent with the parallel trends
assumption in that pre-trends for both cohorts are very similar (the estimated coefficient
is close to zero and not significantly different from zero). This lends support to our causal
interpretation of the effect of Reunification on youths’ socio-emotional skills.
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Reunification on Psychological Measures
Panel A Main Results
Anger Anxiety Self-Confidence
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Treated x Post 0.334*** 0.334*** 0.362*** 0.362*** -0.439*** -0.439***
[0.071] [0.071] [0.068] [0.068] [0.077] [0.076]
Treated -0.061 -0.020 0.034
[0.066] [0.066] [0.067]
Post -0.080* -0.080* -0.130*** -0.130*** 0.005 0.005
[0.046] [0.046] [0.045] [0.045] [0.047] [0.047]
Constant -0.079* -0.106*** -0.086** -0.095*** 0.097** 0.112***
[0.046] [0.018] [0.043] [0.017] [0.044] [0.019]
N Observations 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712
N Individuals 856 856 856 856 856 856
Individual FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
R-squared 0.012 0.030 0.017 0.033 0.031 0.065
Panel B Placebo-Tests
Treated x Post 0.046 0.043 0.051 0.070 0.060 0.059
[0.071] [0.071] [0.070] [0.071] [0.080] [0.080]
Treated -0.028 0.056 -0.031
[0.069] [0.066] [0.069]
Post -0.078* -0.078* -0.127*** -0.127*** 0.006 0.006
[0.046] [0.046] [0.044] [0.044] [0.049] [0.049]
Constant -0.002 -0.013 -0.046 -0.026 0.010 -0.004
[0.046] [0.018] [0.042] [0.018] [0.045] [0.020]
N Observations 1688 1688 1689 1689 1685 1685
N Individuals 856 856 856 856 856 856
Individual FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
R-squared 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.000 0.001
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post” represents the student’s age. In Panel A, “Post” is a dummy variable that takes the value of one
if the age of the individual is 13/14 (this is pre-Reunification for the older cohort and post-Reunification
for the younger cohort) and zero when aged 12/13 (i.e., pre-Reunification for both cohorts). “Treatment x
Post” indicates changes in the outcome for the younger cohort, after versus before Reunification. In Panel
B, we perform a placebo test that compares the change in outcomes of both cohorts in the pre-Reunification
period to lend support to the parallel trend assumption.
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Reunification by Gender
Panel A Main Results
Anger Anxiety Self-Confidence
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Treated x Post 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.302*** 0.302*** -0.226** -0.226**
[0.110] [0.109] [0.099] [0.099] [0.109] [0.109]
Treated x Post x Female 0.062 0.062 0.111 0.111 -0.392** -0.392**
[0.144] [0.144] [0.137] [0.137] [0.152] [0.152]
Treated -0.176* -0.127 0.075
[0.100] [0.095] [0.094]
Treated x Female 0.217 0.194 -0.074
[0.132] [0.131] [0.133]
Post -0.107 -0.107 -0.107 -0.107 -0.047 -0.047
[0.071] [0.071] [0.066] [0.066] [0.067] [0.067]
Post x Female 0.052 0.052 -0.044 -0.044 0.098 0.098
[0.093] [0.093] [0.090] [0.090] [0.095] [0.095]
Female -0.360*** 0.077 -0.106
[0.091] [0.087] [0.088]
Constant 0.114 -0.106*** -0.127** -0.095*** 0.154** 0.112***
[0.069] [0.018] [0.062] [0.017] [0.066] [0.019]
N Observations 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712
N Individuals 856 856 856 856 856 856
Individual FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.034 0.046 0.073
Panel B Placebo-Tests
Treated x Post 0.166 0.145 0.060 0.082 0.156 0.141
[0.106] [0.107] [0.108] [0.109] [0.104] [0.105]
Treated x Post x Female -0.221 -0.188 -0.016 -0.023 -0.179 -0.152
[0.143] [0.142] [0.142] [0.143] [0.157] [0.157]
Treated -0.236** -0.080 -0.030
[0.100] [0.090] [0.100]
Treated x Female 0.389*** 0.248* 0.002
[0.137] [0.130] [0.138]
Post -0.105 -0.105 -0.104 -0.104 -0.048 -0.048
[0.072] [0.072] [0.065] [0.065] [0.069] [0.069]
Post x Female 0.051 0.051 -0.043 -0.043 0.101 0.101
[0.094] [0.093] [0.088] [0.088] [0.097] [0.097]
Female -0.366*** 0.075 -0.109
[0.092] [0.084] [0.090]
Constant 0.194*** -0.013 -0.086 -0.026 0.068 -0.004
[0.070] [0.018] [0.060] [0.018] [0.067] [0.020]
N Observations 1688 1688 1689 1689 1685 1685
N Individuals 856 856 856 856 856 856
Individual FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
R-squared 0.021 0.006 0.017 0.011 0.004 0.003
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger
(older) cohort. “Post” represents the student’s age. In Panel A, “Post” is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the age of the individual is 13/14 (this is pre-Reunification
for the older cohort and post-Reunification for the younger cohort) and zero when aged
12/13 (i.e., pre-Reunification for both cohorts). “Treatment x Post” indicates changes in
the outcome for the younger cohort, after versus before Reunification. In Panel B, we
perform a placebo test that compares the change in outcomes of both cohorts in the pre-
Reunification period to lend support to the parallel trend assumption.
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2.6 Long-run Behavior and Well-being
In this section, we study how the change in socio-emotional skills as young adolescents,
due to the macro shock, transmit to their longer-run outcomes as young adults. In par-
ticular, we look at their behavior (externalizing, internalizing and control issues), their
psychological health and well-being, and their long-run academic outcomes.
To analyze how the effect of the macro shock on SED is transmitted to longer-run
outcomes, we link the change in each of the three socio-emotional skills (anger, anxiety,
self-confidence) at the ages after versus before Reunification (Post-Pre) to outcomes ap-
proximately five years later. In each specification, we investigate the overall impact, as
well as the differential impact by gender. In all specifications, we control for the pre-
Reunification level of socio-emotional skills, a cohort (“treatment”) dummy and a gender
dummy and in the columns with gender interactions (columns (2), (4), (6)), we also interact
each of these controls with the gender dummy.
We present the results in terms of externalizing and internalizing behavior and be-
havioral control problems in Table 2.5 and results for health, well-being and longer-run
educational outcomes in Table 2.6, displaying only the main coefficients of interest, i.e.,
the coefficients on the change in socio-emotional skills, to analyze the impact on long-run
outcomes, and the coefficients on the interaction of the change in socio-emotional skills with
gender (for the full set of coefficients for each of the longer-run outcomes, see Appendix
Tables B1 to B12). Columns (1) to (6) refer to the three socio-emotional skills (with the
main effect of the change in anger in column (1) and female interaction in column (2), the
main effect of the change in anxiety and female interaction in columns (3) and (4), and
the main effect of the change in self-confidence and female interaction in columns (5) and
(6)), while the different longer-run outcomes are displayed in different rows (for example,
in Table 2.5, externalizing behaviors such as physical fights and destroying property appear
in rows (1) and (2), internalizing behaviors such as suicidal thoughts and repeated suicidal
thoughts in rows (3) and (4) and behavior control problems such as regular and heavy
alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking in rows (5) to (7)).
2.6.1 Externalizing Behavior
To understand the impact of changes in SED on externalizing behavior as a young adult,
we take into account two main measures: (1) Physical fighting, which captures whether
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the individual has deliberately beaten or hurt someone. (2) Destroying property, which
captures whether the individual has deliberately destroyed or damaged private or public
property.
Table 2.5, row (1), shows that the level of physical fighting is strongly linked to changes
in anger (columns (1)). In particular, a one-standard-deviation change in anger post versus
pre-Reunification increases the likelihood of physical fighting by 4 percentage points (signif-
icant at the one percent level). Since about 8 percent of youths engage in physical fighting,
this is equivalent to a 50 percent increase in physical fighting. This regression controls
for the pre-Reunification level of anger, which is also strongly correlated with longer-run
physical fighting, that is a pre-Reunification level that is one standard deviation higher
increases longer-run physical fighting by 4.6 percentage points (see Online Appendix Table
B1 for the full set of coefficients).
While male and female youths’ socio-emotional skills (in particular anger and anxiety)
are similarly affected by Reunification, the change in anger relates to the likelihood of
physical fighting as a young adult only for male teenagers. The coefficient on the interaction
of the change in anger with the girl dummy is -5.3 percentage points (significant at the
5 percent level) and thus nearly as large as the main coefficient on the change in anger
(6.8 percentage points). From columns (3) to (6), we see that changes in anxiety and
self-confidence do not influence the level of physical fighting, with coefficients close to zero.
The results in terms of destroying property are very similar (see row (2) of Table 2.5),
in that engaging in the destruction of property is strongly linked to changes in anger (see
column (1)), but only for male youths (see column (2)). In particular, a one-standard-
deviation increase in anger increases the likelihood of destroying property by 4 percentage
points in the full sample (significant on one percent). This effect is almost entirely driven
by males, whose likelihood increases by 7 percentage points (significant at the one percent
level), while the coefficient on the female interaction is -0.056 (significant at the 5 percent
level). Changes in anxiety and self-confidence do not influence the incidence of destroying
property in the pooled sample (see columns (3) to (6)).
To conclude, in terms of the impact of changes in SED on externalizing behavior as
young adults, we find that the key relevant psychological measure is anger which is linked
to fighting and property destruction, but only for male youths.
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Table 2.5: Longer-Run Outcomes: Behavior
Explanatory Variable: Change in SED
Anger Anxiety Self-Confidence
main coef. female int. main coef. female int. main coef. female int.
Outcomes:
Externalizing Behavior
Fighting 0.041*** 0.000 -0.003
[0.012] [0.010] [0.010]
0.068*** -0.053** -0.002 0.006 0.012 -0.025
[0.021] [0.025] [0.019] [0.022] [0.020] [0.022]
Destroy Property 0.041*** -0.001 -0.007
[0.013] [0.010] [0.009]
0.071*** -0.056** 0.028 -0.047** -0.008 -0.003
[0.023] [0.026] [0.021] [0.023] [0.020] [0.021]
Internalizing Behavior
Suicidal thoughts 0.070*** 0.040** -0.050**
[0.019] [0.020] [0.019]
0.040 0.053 -0.006 0.071* 0.022 -0.110***
[0.026] [0.039] [0.027] [0.039] [0.026] [0.037]
Repeated Suicid. thoughts 0.021* 0.021* -0.017
[0.011] [0.012] [0.012]
0.012 0.016 -0.017 0.063*** 0.014 -0.046**
[0.010] [0.022] [0.010] [0.021] [0.010] [0.020]
Behavioral Control
Alcohol regular 0.016 0.005 -0.005
[0.021] [0.021] [0.020]
0.054* -0.073* 0.012 -0.013 0.000 -0.007
[0.029] [0.042] [0.029] [0.041] [0.030] [0.040]
Alcohol heavy 0.037* 0.026 0.020
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
0.066** -0.055 0.056* -0.053 0.040 -0.031
[0.032] [0.045] [0.033] [0.044] [0.035] [0.045]
Cigarette Smoking 0.058*** 0.015 0.017
[0.022] [0.022] [0.021]
0.085*** -0.052 -0.011 0.042 0.061* -0.067
[0.032] [0.045] [0.034] [0.045] [0.033] [0.043]
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. The “main coefficient” is the coefficient on the change in the
particular socio-emotional skill (i.e. anger, anxiety, or self-confidence, as indicated by the column) between
age 12/13 to 13/14, i.e. prior versus post Reunification for the young cohort. The “female interaction” is
the coefficient on the previously described variable (change in SED) interacted with a dummy for “female”.
All regressions include as controls the level of the relevant socio-emotional skill at age 12/13 (i.e. prior
to Reunification for the young cohort), a “treatment” dummy, which is a dummy for being part of the
young cohort, and a “female” dummy. Columns (2), (4), and (6) include further interactions between the
“Pre-”level of the socio-emotional skill and “female” and between “treatment” and “female”. The full set of
coefficients, including all included controls for the relevant outcomes in this Table, are displayed in Online
Appendix Tables B1 to B7.
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2.6.2 Internalizing Behavior
To understand the impact of adverse shocks in adolescence on internalizing behavior,
we measure individuals’ suicidal tendencies, where (1) Suicidal thoughts capture whether
the individual has thought of committing suicide at least once and (2) Repeated suicidal
thoughts indicates whether the individual has had thoughts of committing suicide more
than once. In Table 2.5, rows (3) and (4), we show that unlike the externalizing behavior
effects, any impact of the shock on internalizing behavior is almost entirely driven by female
youths, and all three socio-emotional skills are related to the longer-run propensity towards
suicidal thoughts (see Online Appendix Tables B3 and B4 for the full set of coefficients).
Row (3) in Table 2.5 (columns (1) and (2)) shows that a one-standard-deviation increase
in anger post versus pre-Reunification increases the likelihood of suicidal thoughts by 7
percentage points (equivalent to a 41-percent increase and significant at one percent).
This effect does not significantly differ according to gender, but the point estimate is twice
as large for girls. From columns (3) to (6), however, we do see that changes in anxiety
and self-confidence are only related to suicidal thoughts for female youths. A change in
anxiety level by one-standard deviation increases the likelihood of experiencing suicidal
thoughts by 4 percentage points (significant at the 5 percent level). This is entirely driven
by female youths (see column (4)), for whom the coefficient on the interaction term is 7
percentage points (while the main effect is zero), equivalent to an increase of 24 percent
in girls’ likelihood of experiencing suicidal thoughts. Moreover, a fall in self-confidence is
strongly and significantly related to longer-run suicidal thoughts. A one-standard-deviation
decrease in self-confidence increases the likelihood of suicidal thoughts by 5 percentage
points (significant at the 5 percent level). Again, this effect is entirely driven by female
youths for whom the coefficient on the interaction term is -11 percentage points(while
the main effect is zero), equivalent to an increase the likelihood of experiencing suicidal
thoughts of 38 percent (significant at the one percent level).
In Table 2.5, row (4), we see similar patterns when we focus instead on the likelihood
of having repeated suicidal thoughts. Increases in anger or anxiety and decreases in self-
confidence are linked to (repeated) suicidal thoughts in young adulthood, but only for
females.
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2.6.3 Behavioral Control Problems
In this section, we analyze the effect of changes in SED on later engagement in “risky”
behavior – often referred to in the psychology literature as behavioral control issues. We
focus on (1) Alcohol consumption, which was measured for the past three months and
we distinguish between regular (versus irregular or no) alcohol consumption and heavy
drinking (versus no heavy drinking), and (2) Cigarette Smoking, indicating whether the
individual is a regular smoker.
Table 2.5, rows (5) and (6), displays the effect of changes in anger, anxiety and self-
confidence on alcohol consumption.7 We find that a change in anger is positively related
to regular alcohol consumption leading to an increase of 5 percentage points, but only for
male youths. When focusing on heavy alcohol consumption, we see even stronger effects. In
particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in anger post versus pre-Reunification leads
to an increased likelihood of heavy alcohol consumption of 7 percentage points for males,
while the coefficient on the interaction tern of the change in anger with the female dummy
is -6 percentage points (albeit not significant).
In terms of the effect of changes in SED on longer-run smoking behavior (see Table 2.5,
row (7)), we find that the change in anger post versus pre-Reunification is strongly related
to regular cigarette consumption. In particular, a one-standard-deviation change in the
degree of anger increases the likelihood of smoking by 6 percentage points (equivalent to
an increase of 17 percent and significant at 1 percent).
As in the cases of the other types of behavioral control problems and of externalizing
behavior, the relationship between the change in anger and the likelihood of smoking is
strongly driven by male youths, whose likelihood of smoking increases by 9 percentage
points when anger increases by one standard deviation, while the coefficient on the change
in anger when interacted with a female dummy is -5 percentage points. Additionally, as
with externalizing behavior, the changes in anxiety and self-confidence are generally not
related to longer-run behavioral control problems.
2.6.4 Health and Well-being
In this section, we relate changes in socio-emotional development due to Reunification to
longer-run health and life satisfaction measures. Unlike the behavioral measures, these
7The full set of coefficients for behavioral control problems can be found in Online Appendix Tables B5
to B7.
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measures potentially provide a useful summary of individual well-being. We consider two
measures: (1) Subjective health, which refers to the current health status as perceived by
the adolescent and (2) Life satisfaction, which measures the individual’s life satisfaction in
general.
For both measures, we find that changes in all SED measures are linked to later health/
well-being outcomes (see Table 2.6, rows (1) and (2)).8 We find substantial negative effects
of the increases in anger and anxiety, and the decrease in self-confidence on longer-run
subjective health and life satisfaction. In the case of subjective health, a one-standard-
deviation increase in anger post versus pre-Reunification decreases subjective health by 12
percent of a standard deviation, an increase in anxiety of the same magnitude decreases
young adults’ health status by 8 percent of a standard deviation and a one-standard-
deviation decrease in self-confidence decreases subjective health by 9 percent of a standard
deviation. Similarly, for life satisfaction, an increase in anger of one standard deviation
reduces life satisfaction by 10 percent of a standard deviation, while similar increases in
anxiety decrease satisfaction by 12 percent of a standard deviation. A fall of one standard
deviation in self-confidence, reduces life satisfaction by 8 percent of a standard deviation.
Interestingly, the effects are similar for male and female youths. For subjective health
as well as life satisfaction, most of the interaction terms with gender are close to zero
and not significant (columns (2), (4) and (6)), with the exception of anxiety being more
strongly linked with subjective health for women and self-confidence being more strongly
linked with life satisfaction for men. Thus, while changes in SED due to adverse shocks
are linked to behaviors (whether externalizing or internalizing) in very different ways for
male and female youths, their longer-run impact on health and well-being appears to be
very similar.
2.6.5 Long-run Academic Outcomes
We have shown so far that causal changes in socio-economic development affect longer-run
behaviors and measures of health and well-being. In this last section, we ask whether
changes in SED as an adolescent have lasting economic impacts. In particular, we analyze
the effects of changes in SED on longer-run academic performance and individuals’ like-
lihood of completing the “Abitur” degree, which is the entrance ticket to university and
thus ultimately highly relevant for success in the labor and marriage market (see Card,
8The full set of coefficients can be found in Online Appendix Tables B8 and B9.
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Table 2.6: Longer-Run Outcomes: Health and Academics
Explanatory Variable: Change in SED
Anger Anxiety Self-Confidence
main coef. female int. main coef. female int. main coef. female int.
Outcomes:
Health & Well-being
Subjective Health -0.115** -0.084* 0.085*
[0.045] [0.044] [0.045]
-0.138** 0.057 0.014 -0.162* 0.082 -0.013
[0.064] [0.089] [0.061] [0.088] [0.068] [0.092]
Life Satisfaction -0.103** -0.118*** 0.083*
[0.044] [0.043] [0.043]
-0.100* -0.001 -0.093 -0.043 -0.014 0.158*
[0.059] [0.088] [0.067] [0.088] [0.062] [0.086]
Academic Outcomes
German Grade -0.086* -0.101** 0.053
[0.046] [0.044] [0.041]
-0.111* 0.058 -0.047 -0.084 -0.079 0.205**
[0.065] [0.092] [0.069] [0.090] [0.064] [0.083]
Math Grade -0.072 -0.066 0.023
[0.048] [0.044] [0.043]
-0.128** 0.110 -0.084 0.028 0.034 -0.017
[0.065] [0.097] [0.073] [0.092] [0.071] [0.090]
Abitur Degree -0.044* -0.050** 0.003
[0.023] [0.022] [0.022]
-0.046 0.001 -0.049 -0.004 -0.031 0.058
[0.032] [0.047] [0.036] [0.045] [0.034] [0.044]
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. The “main coefficient” is the coefficient on the change in the
particular socio-emotional skill (i.e. anger, anxiety, or self-confidence, as indicated by the column) between
age 12/13 to 13/14, i.e. prior versus post Reunification for the young cohort. The “female interaction” is
the coefficient on the previously described variable (change in SED) interacted with a dummy for “female”.
All regressions include as controls the level of the relevant socio-emotional skill at age 12/13 (i.e. prior
to Reunification for the young cohort), a “treatment” dummy, which is a dummy for being part of the
young cohort, and a “female” dummy. Columns (2), (4), and (6) include further interactions between the
“Pre-”level of the socio-emotional skill and “female” and between “treatment” and “female”. The full set of
coefficients, including all included controls for the relevant outcomes in this Table, are displayed in Online
Appendix Tables B1 to B7.
1999, for a survey on the returns to education in the labor market and Kaufmann et al.,
2015 on the returns to education in the marriage market).
In Table 2.6, rows (3) and (4), we display the effect of a change in socio-emotional skills
on German and math grades in grade 10, which is the last grade of compulsory education so
that we have data on the performance for all individuals.9 Changes in anger and in anxiety
9The full set of coefficients on long-run academic outcomes can be found in Online Appendix Tables B10
to B12.
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are negatively related to individuals’ GPA. A one-standard-deviation increase in anger
(anxiety) decreases the grade in German by 9 (10) percent of a standard deviation.The
effects run in the same direction for math but are not statistically significant. Changes
in self-confidence are not significantly related to German or math grades for the pooled
sample.
These effects are relatively similar for female and male youths (only one of the six
gender interactions is significantly different from zero). One notable difference is that a
reduction in self-confidence is linked to a worse German grade, but only for female youths.
In particular, a one-standard-deviation decrease in self-confidence reduces the German
grade of female adolescents by 21 percent of a standard deviation, but has no effect on
male youths. Increases in anger, on the other hand, appear more strongly linked to worse
math grades for male youths (a one-standard-deviation increase in anger reduces the math
grade by 13 percent of a standard deviation), while the female interaction is +11 percent
(albeit not significant), so that there is no significant effect for females.
Lastly, we investigate the longer-run effects of the change in SED on individuals’ like-
lihood of obtaining the “Abitur”, which is the school-leaving certificate for the highest
educational track, namely, the academic track, and a requirement for university entry.
For the likelihood of Abitur completion, we find that changes in anger and anxiety have
substantial and significant effects on the likelihood of Abitur completion (see Table 2.6,
row (5)). A one-standard-deviation increase in anger (anxiety) decreases the likelihood of
obtaining the Abitur by 4.4 (5) percentage points, which is equivalent to a decrease of 18
(22) percent. The effects of changes in anger and anxiety on Abitur completion are very
similar for male and female youths.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we identify the long-run impacts of a macro shock on young adults’ behaviors
as well as health and educational outcomes, propagated via causal changes induced by the
shock on their socio-emotional development as adolescents. We document that short-run
effects on socio-emotional development, as well as longer-run effects on health, well-being
and educational success are similar for both, girls and boys, despite the common perception
that males are more strongly impacted by (negative) circumstances or changes in their en-
vironment. While our results support the “fragile male” hypothesis if attention is restricted
to certain behaviors/outcomes, by broadening our focus, we show that negative effects on
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socio-emotional skills manifest themselves in very different ways by gender. In particular,
adverse shocks and circumstances negatively affect externalizing and self-control (risky)
behaviors, but only (or mostly) for boys, as predicted by the “fragile male” hypothesis.
However, it is important to take into account that for girls (and only for them), internaliz-
ing behaviors related to mental health problems are instead strongly impacted. Ultimately,
in the longer run, (adverse) changes in socio-emotional development have similarly negative
impacts on subjective health measures and life satisfaction as well as educational success.
From a policy perspective, our study highlights a number of important results. First,
our study provides evidence for a causal link between uncertainty and youths’ socio-
emotional development. We show that, among early-adolescent East Germans, anger,
anxiety and self-confidence changed substantially within a relatively short time span from
before to after Reunification (using as a counterfactual trend, the development of a slightly
older cohort between the same ages). Second, these changes had a lasting impact on these
adolescents, impacting their outcomes as young adults. These findings highlight the im-
portance of studying and promoting socio-emotional development at early ages. Third,
focusing on gender differences, we show that similar shocks to socio-emotional develop-
ment affect the behavior of boys and girls very differently. This is also important from the
point of view of policy, as it suggests that careful targeting is needed. While a great deal
of attention has been paid to particular problems related to the externalizing behavior of
boys, especially in the classroom, less attention has been given to severe problems in inter-
nalizing behavior (related to mental-health problems) in girls. However, as we highlight,
both externalizing behaviors and self-control problems, as well as internalizing behaviors
related to mental-health problems, are detrimental in the short run and appear similarly
relevant for longer-run health, well-being and (educational) success.
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Chapter 3
Fertility Peer Effects
joint with Katja Maria Kaufmann∗
3.1 Introduction
Decisions of family formation, such as entering a committed relationship or parenthood, are
among the most important and long-lasting decisions of an individual. Their consequences
range from labor market outcomes (in particular for women, see e.g. Kleven et al., 2019) to
well-being (see e.g. Bertrand, 2013). The effects of childbirth on different areas of life can
be influenced by the social environment of an individual. For example, a parent’s labor
supply decision could depend on whether extended family members such as grandparents
or siblings can provide support in terms of time and resources (see e.g. Kaptijn et al.,
2010; Thomese and Liefbroer, 2013). Further, the social environment can directly affect
preferences for children and the timing of childbirth due to different mechanisms like social
learning, pressure, or emotional contagion (see e.g. Bernardi and Klaerner, 2014).
In this paper, we answer the question of whether there are family spillovers in fertility
decisions. In particular, we are interested in whether an individual’s decision about when
to have the first child is influenced by her sibling, and what the underlying mechanisms
for this relationship are.
There is a large literature on the existence of peer effects, in the context of classmates or
friends, in a number of areas (e.g. for smoking behavior among youth see Powell et al., 2005;
for academic achievement see Lin, 2010; for household consumption see De Giorgi et al.,
2019; for residential choices see Patacchini and Arduini, 2016). Relationships between
family members, such as siblings or cousins, differ from relationships among friends or
colleagues. Since, in contrast to other peers, an individual cannot self-select into the own
∗Department of Economics, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, briq, CESifo, HCEO and IZA
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family, family peers compose a special peer group. The literature on the existence of family
and in particular sibling spillovers is more limited (recent exceptions are in the areas of
education see e.g. Nicoletti and Rabe, 2019; or labor supply, see e.g. Nicoletti et al., 2018).
The main challenge in peer effect analyses is to distinguish between different sources
leading to similar outcomes of individuals within the considered reference group (Manski,
1993). In the recent literature peer effects are well-identified using randomized peer groups
(e.g. Sacerdote, 2001), quasi-random cohort variation (e.g. Hoxby, 2000), or via partially
overlapping peer groups (see e.g. De Giorgi et al., 2019). However, well-identified literature
on peer effects in the fertility decision is limited, with only a few papers focusing on teen
fertility. In the context of teenage siblings, Monstad et al. (2011) exploit an educational
reform affecting only one sibling to provide evidence on contagion effects from the older
sisters’ teenage pregnancy on the younger sister. Using the age of menarche and miscar-
riages as instruments, Yakusheva and Fletcher (2015) and Fletcher and Yakusheva (2016)
document spillovers in the likelihood of teenage pregnancy among high-school friends.
Spillovers in the context of adult fertility have been so far mainly investigated by
sociologists. Balbo and Barban (2014) use a series of discrete-time event history models to
show that a friend’s childbearing increases the own risk of entering parenthood, peaking
around two years after the friend gives birth and declining afterward. Similarly, but in the
context of family peers, Lyngstad and Prskawetz (2010) use continuous-time hazard models
to describe woman’s births’ depending on their siblings’ fertility history. They find that
within the first 12 months after a sibling gives birth, the own hazard of conception increases
every month and turns negative in the second and third year. While these two papers
don’t explicitly tackle the identification problem analytically, but rather argue why in their
context identification assumptions hold, Buyukkececi et al. (2020) exploit information on
different peer groups to reach identification. They use Dutch data to show that fertility
peer effects accumulate across different interaction groups. Comparing siblings’ and co-
workers’ influence, they show that women are influenced more by their sibling (irrespective
of the gender) as opposed to their female co-workers.
The economics literature on fertility peer effects is scarce.1 Modeling fertility decision
in a game theory context where women strategically interact with their coworkers, Ciliberto
et al. (2016) show that the workplace composition of a woman is an important factor of
fertility. In particular, they document positive effects across worker types as defined by
1For an overview on how to introduce social interactions into standard economic models of fertility see
Kohler et al. (2001)
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age or education, and find negative peer effects within age types and among low educated
coworkers. Focusing on neighborhoods Morales (2015) provides evidence for positive peer
effects on the age of entering motherhood. Instead of peer effects itself, Mishra and Parasnis
(2017) focus on the mechanism behind fertility spillovers and show that the preference to
conform as well as education are important mediators. Observing higher fertility among
immediate peers, both in terms of geography and religion, increases the preference for more
children. The importance of family peers as defined by siblings is considered by Kuziemko
(2006), who distinguishes between information and cost-sharing motives and shows that
within the first two years of a sibling giving birth, fertility patterns are contagious. Nicoletti
et al. (2018) extend the family peer definition to include cousins, to document positive
spillovers in the context of labor supply decisions of women after entering motherhood.
With this paper, we contribute to this literature by providing well-identified causal evi-
dence on the existence of family peer effects in adult fertility decisions. Rich administrative
data allow us to look beyond teen fertility, which makes up a small fraction of pregnancies
and where the social environment is likely to play a different role. We shed light on peer
effects among siblings, who compose a particularly close peer group and thus are likely to
affect each other in important decisions such as fertility.
One prominent mechanism of social interactions is information sharing/ learning from
peers. This channel is more pronounced when individuals are uninformed or uncertain
about the exact consequences of a decision. Therefore, we focus only on first births, that
is, the decision on when to enter parenthood. We document positive spillovers for women
starting one year after a sibling gives birth, with effects persisting at least up to two-and-a-
half years after sibling’s birth. For men, spillovers take more time to realize, in particular
at least two-and-a-half years. Overall, a sibling’s birth within the last two years can almost
quadruple the probability of becoming and mother, and triple the likelihood of becoming
a father in any given quarter.
There are different reasons why a sibling’s fertility could lead to spillovers. Social effects
driven by fertility preferences can lead to two opposing effects. First, positive spillovers
will occur if the underlying mechanism is the desire to conform with the sibling. Second,
it will lead to negative spillovers if an individual prefers to be different from the sibling.
Our results indicate that the desire to conform is more likely since spillovers are in general
positive, and even stronger in case of same gender (men with brothers) and small age
difference (women with siblings up to one year age difference). Another mechanism can
work via parents pressuring for grandparents so that a sibling giving birth would lead to
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two possible effects. Either positive spillovers via increased pressure to conform can occur,
or negative spillovers due to decreased pressure occur when grandparents are satisfied after
the arrival of the first grandchild. In our main results, we document positive spillovers, so
that the increased pressure (or desire) to conform as an underlying mechanism seems to
dominate.
By analyzing how effects depend on help by the extended family, we find that spillovers
are stronger for both men and women, in the case support by the grandmother in terms of
time and geography is available. Also, tight connections to the labor market as measured
by being the main breadwinner of the household leads to weaker and in some cases even
negative spillovers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the
data, the sample used throughout the analysis, and variables. We continue with a detailed
description of the identification and estimation strategy in Section 3.3. Main results are
discussed in Section 3.4, and extended by heterogeneous results in Section 3.5. Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data and Sample Description
In the following analysis, we use dutch administrative data maintained by Statistics Nether-
lands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS). The municipal register data (Gemeen-
telijke Basis Administratie, GBA), which records every person living in the Netherlands,
contains information that allows us to follow families across generations and over time. In
1994, the register data was digitized and provide information, including among other things,
on birth records, marriage histories, education, labor market status, and neighborhood of
residence.
Linking individuals to their parents, we define siblings based on having the same
mother.2 In the analysis, we focus on sibships of two, that is individuals with only one
brother or sister. Including sibships of more than two requires a more complex setup,
including potential snowball effects between multiple siblings’ births. Using birth records,
we link individuals to their children, in case they have any. Restricting the age between
2Conditioning sibship on both, having the same mother and father only slightly decreases the sample
size. The main reason why we do not condition additionally on having the same father is, this leads in
some cases to very large age differences between siblings.
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20 and 40, we create a rolling panel over the calendar quarters of the years 1999 to 2017.3
We set the minimum age to 20 to avoid capturing teenage fertility and exclude those over
40 since by then entry into parenthood is likely to be realized (in Appendix in Figure C.1
we show that dutch men and women enter parenthood on average when they are 29 to 31
years old). In addition, for identification purposes, observations in which siblings report
to live in the same neighborhood in a given quarter are excluded from the analysis (for
details see 3.3.1).
Our main sample thus includes all individuals born between 1975 and 1985 who can be
linked to their mother and have only one sibling. Doing so, by construction, the maximum
age difference between siblings cannot exceed ten years. Both birth records and household
register, are translated such that for each quarter between 1999 and 2017, we know whether
a birth occurred, the individual is married or cohabiting, and the neighborhood in which
the individual is residing. The first panel-year (1999) includes only individuals born in
1975-1979. Until 2005, every year, an additional cohort enters the sample and starting in
2016, every year, the birth cohort exceeding the age of 40 exits the sample. This setup
gives us overall 117,618 sibling pairs, of which approximately 36% are sister-sister pairs,
36% are brother-brother pairs, and 28% are mixed gender sibling pairs.
3.2.2 Variable Description
The main outcome of interest indicates whether a birth occurred in a given quarter of a year,
wherein we only consider the first birth to an individual. Hereby our main individual of
interest is the sibling who gave birth as second within her sibship. To investigate potential
spillovers from the sibling giving birth first on the main individual, we include the sibling’s
fertility history over the past two years. In particular, we include indicators taking the
value of one in case the sibling entered parenthood in half-year intervals from current up
to two-and-a-half years ago (i.e.up to half a year ago, half to one year ago, etc.).
Additional controls include current marriage and cohabitation status, age and its
squared, and years of completed education. We include these controls for the main in-
dividual as well as the sibling. Further, in addition to neighborhood fertility, we include
neighborhood averages for all control variables. Hereby only relevant neighbors, as defined
by women (or men) between the age of 20 and 40 living in the same neighborhood at a
3Data is available starting in 1995, however, information on the level of education is only available
starting in 1999 so that we exclude the first four years available to us.
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given time, are considered. Neighborhood fertility is defined as the fraction of relevant
neighbors giving birth to their first child in a given quarter.
3.2.3 Summary Statistics
In Table 3.1, we report summary statistics of birth outcomes belonging to the main indi-
vidual, her sibling, and her neighborhood. The first column reports summary statistics for
the female sample, and the second column reports statistics for the male sample.
In total, around 48% of the women and 39% of men in our sample enter into parent-
hood within the observed time. Over the sample period, on average 1% of women enter
motherhood in any quarter, and 0.8% of men become a father in any given quarter. With
1.4%, quarterly sibling fertility is slightly higher than individual fertility, which is mainly
driven by construction, i.e. defining the main individual as the sibling giving birth second
(if at all). Overall, sibling fertility histories over the past two years are quite constant
around 3% in each half-year and comparable for women and men.
The Netherlands is divided into twelve provinces, which are further sub-divided into
more than 350 municipalities (“gemeenten”). Each municipality consists of up to a hundred
districts (“wijk”), which is an aggregation of neighborhoods (“buurt”). These neighbor-
hoods are slightly more aggregate than postcodes4 and are the regional level on which we
define neighborhoods. Each individual in our sample has on average around 560 relevant
neighbors in a given quarter. In each quarter, around 41% of women’s neighbors give birth
to their first child, while only around 30% of men’s relevant neighbors enter fatherhood.
In Table 3.2, we report summary statistics of individual characteristics, and variables
used for heterogeneity analyses. Of the main individuals considered, that is, the sibling
who gives birth second, around 60% of both women and men, are the younger sibling in
the family. The majority of the sample has a sister so that the female sample consists of
more sister-sister pairs, while for men opposite gender pairs are more common. In terms
of an age difference, 11% of both women and men have a sibling that is close in age (i.e.
up to one year difference), while 21% have siblings who are at least four years older or
younger.
Since almost all individuals between the ages of 20 and 40 actively participate in the
labor market, we focus on being the main breadwinner of the household to differentiate
4In 2017, a neighborhood summarized on average seven five-digit postcodes, and includes on average
1,500 individuals.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Entry into Parenthood
Enter Parenthood
Women Men
Quarterly likelihood of
Main Individual 0.0097 0.0082
[0.0982] [0.0904]
Sibling 0.0143 0.0145
[0.1187] [0.1195]
Sibling’s likelihood
up to half-year ago 0.0288 0.0292
[0.1671] [0.1684]
half to 1 year ago 0.0294 0.0299
[0.1689] [0.1702]
1 to 1.5 years ago 0.0299 0.0303
[0.1702] [0.1715]
1.5 to 2 years ago 0.0301 0.0306
[0.1709] [0.1721]
Average Neighborhood entry
up to half-year ago 0.4132 0.2995
[0.1342] [0.1089]
half to 1 year ago 0.4134 0.3004
[0.1352] [0.1093]
1 to 1.5 years ago 0.4137 0.3015
[0.1362] [0.1098]
1.5 to 2 years ago 0.4141 0.3026
[0.1373] [0.1103]
N Individual 77,372 100,246
effects by labor market attachment. Around half of the women in our sample and 75% of
men are the main breadwinners of their household at some point over the observed period.
For both women and men, 41% have a mother (grandmother to child born) that is not
active in the labor market. The majority of individuals (75% of women and 70 % of men)
live in a neighborhood other than the grandmother. Approximately 20% of women and
men have a sibling living in the same neighborhood as the grandmother. After excluding
sibling pairs living in the same neighborhood, we find that less than 10% of women and
men live in the same district as their sibling.
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Table 3.2: Variable Description - Characteristics
Women Men
Individual Characteristics
Sibling is male 0.4556 0.4182
[0.4980] [0.4933]
Individual is younger sibling 0.6362 0.5890
[0.4811] [0.4920]
Age difference of siblings up to 1 year 0.1101 0.1110
[0.3131] [0.3142]
Age difference of siblings at least 4 year 0.2152 0.2082
[0.4109] [0.4060]
Individual lives in sibling’s district 0.0839 0.0912
[0.2772] [0.2879]
N Individual 77,372 100,246
Individual is main breadwinner 0.5261 0.7419
[0.4993] [0.4376]
N Individual 74,085 95,678
Grandmother
is retired 0.4137 0.4161
[0.4925] [0.4929]
N Individual 72,226 92,882
lives in same neighborhood 0.2435 0.2912
[0.4292] [0.4543]
lives in sibling’s neighborhood 0.1992 0.1819
[0.3994] [0.3858]
N Individual 76,935 99,642
3.3 Empirical Implementation
An individual’s decision to enter parenthood can be modeled, using a utility-based choice
model as introduced by McFadden (1974). Let the latent utility of an individual i at
time t be denoted by U∗it. Assuming this utility is an additively separable function of
individual, family and neighborhood characteristics, and siblings’ fertility choice, individual
i decides to enter parenthood, yit = 1, whenever her utility from doing so is positive, i.e.
U∗it(Xit, yst) > 0. We exploit the order in which siblings give birth so that the sibling’s
76
decision is already made and known by the individual.5 Also, by ordering siblings according
to their fertility history rather than age, we are not restricting the direction of the effect,
meaning a younger sibling can influence the older one, but the reverse is possible as well.
In our reduced-form application, we use a linear-in-means approximation frequently
used in the peer effects literature, and allow individual i’s fertility decision to depend on
different timings of the siblings’ outcome:
yit = β1ys,−−→t−1 +
∑
k∈K
βkys,
−−→
t−k + γ0y¯−it +X
′
itα+X
′
stα
s + X¯ ′−itα
n + ηi + δt + uit (3.1)
where yit = 1{ birthit = 1} indicates i becoming a parent in quarter t; ys,−−→t−1 indicates
that sibling s entered parenthood at some point up to and including quarter t − 1, so
that y
s,
−−→
t−k with k ∈ K = {3, 5, 7} captures the siblings fertility over the past two years;
y¯−it = 1Nit
∑
j∈Nit yjt measures the fraction of i’s relevant peers entering parenthood in
quarter t (excluding individual i); X includes marriage and cohabitation status, age and age
squared, and years of education so that Xs and X¯ refer to sibling and average neighborhood
characteristics, respectively; δt captures separately year and seasonality trends; ηi are time-
constant individual level unobservables; uit is an error term.
The main challenge in estimating peer effects is to isolate the direct influence of the
considered peers’ outcome, here sibling, on the individual (Manski, 1993). A correlation
in siblings’ outcomes could be due to the direct influence (endogenous effect), but could
also be due to peer characteristics or unobserved shocks affecting both the individual
and her peers. In our context, siblings not only share genetics but also usually grow up
together facing the same parenting and norms, which could be leading to similar fertility
preferences and outcomes (exogenous effect). Similar sibling outcomes could also arise due
to unobserved shocks affecting both siblings, such as sorting into similar (family-friendly)
neighborhoods (correlated effect).
To overcome the reflection problem (isolate the different effects) between individual i
and sibling s, in addition to exploiting the natural timing of births, we use an instrumental
variable strategy that exploits partially overlapping peer groups. Assuming that each
individual interacts with her sibling and neighbors, but not with the neighbors of her
sibling, the latter can be used to instrument the siblings’ fertility. This approach is a
common way of solving the endogeneity problem in the context of peer effects proposed
5Alternatively, one could model a strategic game allowing siblings to simultaneously decide when to
enter parenthood as Ciliberto et al. (2016) do it in the context of co-workers.
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and employed, among others, by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), De Giorgi et al. (2010), and Blume
et al. (2015).6 The instrument exploits that an individual is more likely to enter parenthood,
with more neighbors becoming parents (for neighborhood peer effects on fertility outcomes
see e.g. Morales, 2015; Nicoletti et al., 2018). Which means, the first stage estimates
how the sibling’s neighbors affect the sibling’s entry into parenthood. In each regression,
we instrument four endogenous variables (sibling’s fertility history for the last two years)
and report under- and weak identification statistics (see Kleibergen and Paap, 2006, for
details). The first tests the relevance of instruments, by testing the matrix rank, and the
second, given that the instruments are relevant, tests whether the instruments are weak.
We control for time-constant individual (and family) level unobservables using first-
differences. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered on individual level.7 The main
parameters of interest are the β’s in equation 3.1 capturing the direct effect of the sibling’s
outcome (endogenous effect). Correlated effects would confound results if uit includes
unobserved shocks on family or neighborhood level, we discuss this concern in the next
section.
3.3.1 Threats to Identification
There are four potential threats to the identification strategy used. First, if siblings have
similar residential preferences leading them to sort into similar neighborhoods, this would
lead to an overestimation of any sibling spillover effect. In this case, observed spillovers
would be due to selection rather than endogenous behavior contagion. Controlling for
characteristics of the own neighborhood (X¯ ′−it) makes sure that effects are net of similarities
in residential areas.
Second, if individuals know the neighbors of their sibling, our instruments lose their
exogeneity. This would occur, for instance, if both siblings live in the same neighborhood
and thus interact with the same people. To make sure that this does not happen, we exclude
all observations in which siblings report to live in the same neighborhood at a given time.
Another concern might be that one sibling still lives in the neighborhood both siblings grew
up in, wherein the other moved away. Since they don’t live in the same neighborhood they
6Alternatively, exogenous peer group variations could be used. In the context of siblings, this would
require quasi-random variation in the entry into parenthood of one sibling. Monstad et al. (2011), for
instance, exploit an educational reform which affected only the older sibling to provide evidence on within
families spillovers in teen births.
7The results are robust to using two-way clustering on individual and neighborhood level.
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are included in the sample. However, if the sibling that moved away still is in contact with
some past neighbors (e.g. old school or cohort mates), the exogeneity of the instruments
would be threatened, and it would also lead to an overestimation of any sibling spillover.
However, this would only occur if both the sibling and the childhood neighbors the main
individual was in contact with, stayed in the same neighborhood until adulthood.8
Third, potential feedback or reversed causality effects could lead siblings to influence
their neighbors. This would lead to a correlation of the error term of the main equation
with the instruments. We circumvent this by exploiting the timing of births, for both
siblings and the relevant neighbors of the sibling, we consider the first child. Given this,
the natural time between fertility decision and actual realization of birth solves reversed
causality concerns.
Last, there could be correlated shocks affecting both siblings and some of their neigh-
bors. Imagine a situation in which a big firm, employing a large group of individuals,
introduces a change in their maternity/ paternity leave regulations. If siblings live in the
same district or municipality and the firm is covering a large fraction of this area, these
firm-level changes would confound results by affecting the instruments and individuals at
the same time. We test for this by including regional fixed effects and can show that
our findings are robust to aggregate level shocks on municipal, district, and neighborhood
levels.
3.4 Main Results
In Table 3.3, we report our main estimation results based on a linear in means model with
individual, year, and quarter fixed effects (as described by equation (3.1)). In particular, we
present separately for women (columns [1]-[3]) and men (columns [4]-[6]) three specifications
estimating sibling spillovers in the entry into parenthood. Column [1] and [3] report results
based on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations for the sample of women and men,
respectively. Results in columns [2], [3], [5], and [6] are based on two different specifications
estimated via two-stage least squares (2SLS).
In columns [1], [2], [4], and [5] sibling’s entry into fertility is considered within the past
8The register data is available starting from 1995 so that we are only able to link the younger part of
our sample to their childhood neighborhoods. In particular, suppose the relevant childhood neighborhood
refers to when the individual was 12 to 13, this would allow us to link less than half of our sample since
the oldest cohort would be those born in 1983.
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two years, and columns [3] and [6] include an additional lag allowing spillovers also up
to two-and-a-half years after entry into parenthood. In all specifications, we control for
marital and cohabitation status, age, and years of education of the main individual, the
sibling, and average levels in the neighborhood of the individual (for the full set of results,
see Table C1).
Table 3.3: Sibling Spillover - Main Results
Outcome: Become Mother Become Father
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Sibling gave birth
up to half year ago 0.014*** -0.014 -0.015 0.008*** 0.007 0.007
[0.000] [0.009] [0.009] [0.000] [0.008] [0.008]
half to 1 year ago 0.019*** 0.005 0.003 0.012*** 0.005 0.003
[0.001] [0.009] [0.010] [0.000] [0.008] [0.008]
1 to 1.5 years ago 0.018*** 0.021** 0.018* 0.012*** 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.009] [0.010] [0.000] [0.008] [0.008]
1.5 to 2 years ago 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.024** 0.011*** -0.005 -0.006
[0.001] [0.010] [0.010] [0.000] [0.008] [0.008]
2 to 2.5 years ago 0.024** 0.016*
[0.011] [0.008]
N Observations 3,017,119 3,015,409 2,892,002 3,741,811 3,739,450 3,582,263
N Individuals 77,382 77,372 76,987 100,256 100,246 99,640
Statistics
Under-identification 884.32 811.07 776.06 709.45
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Weak-identification 232.37 170.10 199.20 144.98
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Dependent
variable: columns [1]-[3] enter motherhood, columns [4]-[6] enter fatherhood. Individual controls: marriage
and cohabitation status, age, age squared, and years of education. Contextual controls for sibling: an
analog of individual controls. Contextual controls for neighbors: entry into parenthood, become a parent,
marriage and cohabitation status, age, and years of education. IV’s used in columns [2], [3], [5], and [6]:
average neighborhood entry into parenthood in sibling’s neighborhood in each half-year within two years
([2] and [5]), and within two-and-a-half years ([3] and [6]). In each regression, we control for year and
quarter fixed effects. For the full results including controls see Table C1.
The OLS results show that entry into parenthood is by 1-2 percentage points more
likely in case a sibling became a parent in any half-year up to and including the past two
years. These effects prevail for both women and men, albeit slightly stronger for women.
These results, in particular, the coefficient of up to half a year ago, give the impression
that siblings plan their entry into parenthood jointly. However, these results are likely to
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be upward biased due to the reflection problem (see Manski, 1993). To correct for the
endogeneity between siblings’ decisions and obtain causal effects, we instrument lagged
outcomes of the sibling using their neighborhood fertility. In particular, we instrument
the sibling’s fertility outcome in a given half year by the fraction of the sibling’s relevant
neighbors entering parenthood. The reported under-identification statistics are significant
on at least 1% for all 2SLS specifications confirming the relevance of the instruments used
in the first stage. The weak identification statistics are all above 100 so that we are not
concerned about a big bias due to weak instruments.
The 2SLS estimates for a woman’s sibling giving birth up to one year ago turn in-
significant. Starting from the past one year, in any half-year that a woman’s sibling gives
birth, the likelihood of becoming a mother increases by 2-2.7 percentage points. Given the
baseline probability of becoming a mother in any quarter of 1 percent, these effects are
quite sizable. This longer response time suggests that women exploit the sibling’s expe-
rience to ease their uncertainty about entering parenthood. That effects are zero up to
and including the first year after a sibling’s birth, reduces the chances that the underlying
mechanism is a joint decision to enter parenthood. In the sense that siblings could plan to
enter parenthood at the same time, but not be successful at the same time.
For men, in contrast to correlations presented in column [4], we do not find sibling
spillovers within the first two years after a sibling enters parenthood. However, two to
two-and-a-half years after a sibling becomes a parent, the likelihood of becoming a father
increases by 1.6 percentage points, tripling the initial likelihood of 0.8% in any given quarter
(though only on 10%).
Comparing OLS to 2SLS results, it seems that, especially for men, similar fertility
behavior among siblings within one year from each other is mainly driven by similar back-
ground and preferences. Men are not only less prone to direct spillovers but also take
more time to respond to their sibling’s fertility as compared to women. To understand
these patterns and investigate potential mechanisms underlying these contagion effects, we
provide a heterogeneity analysis in the next section.
3.5 Heterogeneous Results
In this section, we study how the effect of a sibling giving birth within the last two years
differs by the gender composition of siblings, the age and age difference, and the availability
of the grandmother (i.e. the mother of the individual). For this, we estimate the 2SLS
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specification in column [2] of Table 3.3 for women and column [5] of Table 3.3 for men,
allowing each sibling birth outcome to differ by the considered characteristic.
Heterogeneous results by gender and age for the female sample can be found in columns
[1]-[4] of Table 3.4, and for the male sample results by gender and age are reported in
columns [5]-[8]. Columns [1] and [5] of Table 3.5, document differences by labor market
attachment for women and men, respectively. In columns [2]-[4] and [6]-[8] of Table 3.5,
we allow spillovers to differ by the availability of the grandmother for women and men,
respectively.
3.5.1 Results by Gender
The main results show that women are generally more prone to sibling spillover in fertility
decisions as opposed to men. Hereby, column [1] of Table 3.4 shows irrespective of having a
brother or a sister, one-and-a-half to two years after the sibling becomes a mother/ father
women are on average 3.6 percentage points more likely to become a mother. For men,
on the other hand, in general, there are no spillovers within the first two years of a sibling
entering parenthood. However, allowing this effect to differ by the sibling’s gender, we find
that having a brother, as opposed to having a sister, entering parenthood within the last
half-year, increases the likelihood of becoming a father by 3.4 percentage points (column
[5] of Table 3.4). Note that given the quarterly likelihood of becoming a mother of 1%
and becoming a father of 0.8%, the average spillover among brother is stronger than the
average spillover on a woman (irrespective of her sibling’s gender) reported in Table 3.3.
This difference between men and women could indicate different underlying channels
leading to spillovers. For women irrespective of the gender, it takes around one to two
years to respond to sibling fertility. This could indicate that observing and learning for
the sibling’s (or the sibling’s partner’s) experience is important. For men, on the other
hand, having a brother become a father leads to a spillover within the first half-year, which
could, for instance, indicate a preference to have a child grow up with his/ her cousins, or
sharing resources with the sibling (such as child care).
3.5.2 Results by Age
Since fertility decreases with age (in particular for women), the age difference between
siblings could be of importance. Siblings that have a high age difference are unlikely to
influence each other if the main driving channel is a homophily argument, in the sense
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneous Results: Gender and Age
Outcome: Become Mother Become Father
Individual Age difference Individual Age difference
het. Var.:
has a
brother
is at
least 35
up to 1
year
more
than 4
years
has a
brother
is at
least 35
up to 1
year
more
than 4
years
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Sibling gave birth
up to half year ago -0.018 -0.014 -0.014 -0.011 -0.006 0.008 0.007 0.007
[0.012] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
x het. var. 0.011 0.001 -0.009 -0.017 0.034** 0.003*** 0.004 -0.002
[0.018] [0.000] [0.018] [0.014] [0.016] [0.000] [0.015] [0.011]
half to 1 year ago -0.006 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.008
[0.012] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
x het. var. 0.028 -0.001 -0.021 -0.013 0.006 0.002*** 0.024 -0.011
[0.018] [0.000] [0.024] [0.016] [0.016] [0.000] [0.019] [0.014]
1 to 1.5 years ago 0.013 0.020** 0.018* 0.029*** 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.007
[0.012] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
x het. var. 0.019 -0.002*** 0.036 -0.039** -0.005 0.000 0.035 -0.028**
[0.019] [0.000] [0.026] [0.016] [0.016] [0.000] [0.021] [0.014]
1.5 to 2 years ago 0.036*** 0.026*** 0.021** 0.036*** -0.010 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001
[0.013] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
x het. var. -0.022 -0.003*** 0.052** -0.046*** 0.013 0.001** 0.014 -0.018
[0.020] [0.000] [0.022] [0.014] [0.015] [0.000] [0.017] [0.012]
N Observations 3,015,409 3,015,356 3,015,409 3,015,409 3,739,450 3,738,803 3,739,450 3,739,450
N Individuals 77,372 77,365 77,372 77,372 100,246 100,200 100,246 100,246
Statistics
Under-identification 344.84 888.26 94.72 533.08 458.30 776.12 211.33 607.62
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Weak-identification 44.54 116.74 12.18 69.09 58.73 99.61 27.16 78.08
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Dependent variable:
columns [1]-[4] enter motherhood, columns [5]-[8] enter fatherhood. Individual controls: marriage and cohabitation
status, age, age squared, and years of education. Contextual controls for sibling: an analog of individual controls.
Contextual controls for neighbors: entry into parenthood, become a parent, marriage and cohabitation status, age,
and years of education. IV’s used: average neighborhood entry into parenthood in sibling’s neighborhood in each
half-year within two years and their interaction with the het. Var. reported on the header. In each regression, we
control for year and quarter fixed effects.
that being similar to and taking the same decisions as the sibling gives a high utility. It
is possible that siblings that are close in age compare themselves stronger to each other
as opposed to siblings with a high age difference. If this kind of “competition” drives the
behavioral spillover, then effects should decline with the age difference between siblings.
We test this hypothesis in columns [2]-[4] and [6]-[8] of Table 3.4 for women and men
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separately.
First, we confirm that the rising age of women leads to a significantly weaker spillover
of sibling fertility. In particular, having a sibling enter parenthood one to two years ago
has a 0.2-0.3 percentage point weaker influence on women that are 35 years and older
compared to women who are between the ages 20 and 34. Doing the same exercise for
men, we find the opposite effect, with men who are between 35 and 40 responding around
0.1-0.3 percentage points stronger to sibling fertility as compared to men aged 20 to 34.
Second, we study how the effect differs for siblings that have an age difference of up to
one year (columns [3] and[7] in Table 3.4), and siblings that have an age difference of at
least four years (columns [4] and [8] in Table 3.4). While for men, we find no significant
difference in the average spillover of siblings that have an age difference of up to one year
as opposed to more, for women, having a closed aged sibling entering parenthood one-
and-a-half to two years ago, leads to significantly stronger spillovers. In particular, the
effect increases by additional 5.2 percentage points, which almost triples the main effect.
Columns [4] and [8] of Table 3.4 show that for both men and women, having a sibling
who is at least four years older or younger enter parenthood leads to significantly weaker
spillovers as compared to siblings with an age difference up to three years. In sum, these
results indicate that, especially for women, either the “competition” between siblings, or
homophily is a particularly strong driver of spillovers.
3.5.3 Results by Labor Market Attachment
Labor market participation is an important factor regarding family formation, especially
for women, who are found to face a “child penalty” (see e.g. Kleven et al., 2019). Given this,
women strongly connected to the labor market should be less affected by their sibling’s
fertility in terms of timing of birth. Specifically, due to higher opportunity costs, they
should be more strategic in terms of the best timing concerning their career. To validate
this, we show in column [1] of Table 3.5 how effects differ between women who are the
main breadwinner of their household, and those who are not (i.e. active but earning less
or not active). We find that strong labor market attachment leads in every half-year of the
past two years to a 1 percentage point weaker spillover from sibling’s fertility.
For men, we document a slightly different pattern, up to half a year after a sibling gives
birth, men who are main breadwinners are 0.4 percentage points more likely to become
a father compared to those who are not the main earner of the household. Interestingly,
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Table 3.5: Heterogeneous Results: Labor Market and Grandmother
Outcome: Become Mother Become Father
Grandmother Grandmother
het. Var.:
main
bread-
winner
is
retired
in same
neigh.
in
siblings
neigh.
main
bread-
winner
is
retired
in same
neigh.
in
siblings
neigh.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Sibling gave birth
up to half year ago -0.004 -0.011 -0.014 -0.012 -0.003 -0.004 0.007 0.010
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
x het. var. -0.011*** 0.002*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
half to 1 year ago 0.012 0.011 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
x het. var. -0.009*** 0.001 0.002 0.010*** -0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.011***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
1 to 1.5 years ago 0.024** 0.015 0.021** 0.022** -0.007 -0.013 0.002 0.002
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
x het. var. -0.010*** 0.002** 0.000 0.011*** -0.001** 0.000 0.001 0.014***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
1.5 to 2 years ago 0.028** 0.020* 0.026** 0.027*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
x het. var. -0.010*** -0.000 0.001 0.009*** -0.004*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.013***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
N Observations 2,196,618 2,192,211 2,974,677 2,974,677 2,697,502 2,707,062 3,689,929 3,689,929
N Individuals 73,619 71,980 76,866 76,866 94,993 92,590 99,557 99,557
Statistics
Under-identification 779.98 787.18 847.28 857.00 710.62 692.24 781.31 772.90
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Weak-identification 103.08 102.87 110.59 111.91 90.80 88.82 100.40 99.29
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Dependent variable:
columns [1]-[4] enter motherhood, columns [5]-[8] enter fatherhood. Individual controls: marriage and cohabitation
status, age, age squared, and years of education. Contextual controls for sibling: an analog of individual controls.
Contextual controls for neighbors: entry into parenthood, become a parent, marriage and cohabitation status, age,
and years of education. IV’s used: average neighborhood entry into parenthood in sibling’s neighborhood in each
half-year within two years and their interaction with the het. Var. reported on the header. In each regression, we
control for year and quarter fixed effects.
this effect turns negative in case the sibling’s birth occurred more than half a year ago.
This could indicate that with more time observing sibling’s parenthood also men who are
strongly attached to the labor market, plan parenthood more strategically with respect to
their career.
85
3.5.4 Results by Availability of Grandmother
The focus here is on the first child of an individual, meaning that there is no direct expe-
rience in child care. Thus, support by the extended family such as the grandmother (i.e.
the own mother), can be considered as an important source of support, especially if the
grandmother is available, i.e. already retired/ not active in the labor market or lives close
by.9 We focus here on the grandmother because the literature shows that grandmothers are
more likely to provide child care support as compared to grandfathers (e.g. see Thomese
and Liefbroer, 2013). If siblings compete for grand-maternal resources, then effects should
be more pronounced in cases where the grandmother is available, and even more so if the
grandmother is not equally available to both siblings. We study these potential differences
in columns [2]-[4] and [6]-[8] of Table 3.5 for women and men, respectively.
First, we look at how effects differ if the grandmother has time, in the sense that
she is not actively participating in the labor market. For both women and men, having
a mother that is not active in the labor market leads to significantly stronger fertility
spillovers. Most striking, in the case of women, grandmother availability even leads to a
0.2 percentage point increase in immediate spillovers within the first half-year of the sibling
entering parenthood. While this increased effect by the grandmother decreases for women
over time, for men, it consistently increases spillovers within the first two years of a sibling
entering parenthood.
Second, we allow effects to differ by grandmothers’ geographical availability. In columns
[3] and [7] of Table 3.5 we check for differences in case the grandmother lives in the same
neighborhood as the individual, and in columns [4] and [8] of Table 3.5 we allow effects to
differ in case the grandmother lives in the sibling’s neighborhood. For women, the effect
does not differ if the grandmother lives in the same neighborhood as opposed to having the
grandmother live further away. For men, however, having the grandmother living in the
same neighborhood leads to a 0.2 percentage point increase in the likelihood of becoming
a father up to half a year after a sibling entered parenthood in a given quarter.
In contrast to that, having a mother that lives closer to the sibling leads for both, women
and men, to stronger spillovers in any half-year after the sibling gave birth to the first child
within the last two years. In particular, the effects increase by 1 percentage point, which
is as much as the baseline likelihood of becoming a parent in any given quarter. These
9This has been shown in the context of many European countries, e.g. see Kaptijn et al. (2010) for the
Netherlands; Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003) for Germany; and Del Boca (2002)for Italy.
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results on geographical availability suggest that there is no need for competition in case
the mother is already close, but if she is closer to the sibling, the mother might be less
available in the future so that the effects are stronger. Also, observing the willingness of
grand-maternal support might reduce the uncertainty and reassure an individual’s decision
to enter parenthood. Given that this pattern is comparable between women and men,
both maternal and paternal grandmothers seem to be a resource, siblings compete for, and
individuals rely on.
3.6 Robustness
As discussed in section 3.3.1, a concern could be that our results are biased due to unob-
served correlated shock, for instance, due to siblings working in the same firm, or because
individuals have contact to their sibling’s neighbors. We test the first by employing in ad-
dition separately municipality, district, and neighborhood fixed effects and can show that
our results are robust with respect to all three additions. The second is tested by checking
whether results differ if individuals live closer and are thus more likely to be in contact
with neighbors. Results in Table C2 show that effects do not differ between individuals
that live in the same district as opposed to those who live further apart.
In all regressions, standard errors are clustered on the individual level, but results
are robust to using two-way clustering on individual and neighborhood level. In terms
of alternative specifications, including lags of controls (for the individual, her sibling, the
neighborhood averages) does not lead to additional information and does not change the
results. Also, we estimate spillovers separately, including always only one of the sibling
fertility outcomes in equation 3.1. This exercise leads to the same spillover pattern, with
only minor changes in coefficient size.
3.7 Conclusion
With this paper, we provide well-identified causal evidence on the existence of peer effects
in adult fertility decisions. We document positive spillovers for women starting one year
after a sibling gives birth, with effects persisting at least up to two-and-a-half years after
the sibling enters into parenthood. A sibling entering parenthood within the last two years
can almost quadruple the average likelihood of becoming a mother in any given quarter.
87
For men, spillovers take more time to realize, in particular around two-and-a-half years
and lead to a tripled likelihood of becoming a father in any given quarter.
There are different reasons why fertility could lead to spillovers between siblings. First,
social effects driven by fertility preferences will lead on the one hand, to positive spillovers
if the underlying mechanism is the desire to conform with the sibling, on the other hand,
it will lead to negative spillovers if an individual prefers to be different from the sibling.
Our results indicate that the desire to conform is more likely since spillovers are in general
positive, and even stronger in case of the same gender (men with brothers) or close age
differences (women with siblings up to one year age difference). Second, parents could
pressure for grandchildren, so that a sibling becoming a parent would lead to two possible
effects. On the one hand, positive spillovers via increased pressure to conform with the
sibling and exceptions of the family could prevail. On the other hand, it could lead to
negative spillovers if the pressure decreases in case grandparents are satisfied after the first
grandchild. In our main results, we document positive spillovers, so that the increased
pressure (or desire) to conform as an underlying mechanism seems more likely.
Family peers can have a significant influence on long-lasting decisions in life. Our
results highlight that such social influences within the family are not negligible in the
fertility context and could be an influential mediator of policy changes. An interesting
extension would be to see the width of the contagion by including the extended family to
test for effects between cousins, or how effects change when an individual is allowed to have
more than one sibling.
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Appendix A
Addendum to Chapter 1
A.1 Details on Measures
Table A1a reports summary statistics of the variables used to create cognitive and non-
cognitive skill measures. The top panel reports the four school subject grades on which the
cognitive measure is based. The grades are coded to range between 0 (fail) up to 5 (A).
The bottom panel lists six questions on which the self-esteem measure is based. Answers
range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Table A1b reports summary statistics of the set of questions used to create verbal in-
vestment, activity investment, and monitoring measures. The first panel reports statistics
on questions used to create a verbal investment measure separately for mothers and fa-
thers. The second panel reports summary statistics on questions used to create an activity
investment measure separately for mothers and fathers. The third panel reports the set
of questions, on which the monitoring measure is based. These questions are answered by
the child so that no distinction between mothers and fathers is made.
Table A2 reports summary statistics on the ten questions on which the health measure
is based. Hereby, answers range from 1 (everyday) to 5 (never).
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Table A1: Description: Main Variables
(a) Variables measuring skills
Question Mean Std.Dev. Answers N.Ind.
Cognitive Skill Measures
Grades in School-Subjects
Math Math-grade in the most recent grading period. 2.622 1.209 0 4 3424
English English-grade in the most recent grading period. 2.857 1.044 0 4 3424
Science Science-grade in the most recent grading period. 2.593 1.310 0 4 3424
History History-grade in the most recent grading period. 2.617 1.359 0 4 3424
Joint measure Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Cognitive 0.089 0.931 -3 2
Peer Cognitive 0.038 0.982 -4 2
Non-Cognitive Skill Measures
Self-Esteem
Item 1 You have a lot of good qualities. 4.285 0.713 1 5 3424
Item 2 You have a lot to be proud of. 4.309 0.772 1 5 3424
Item 3 You like yourself as you are. 3.998 0.988 1 5 3424
Item 4 You do everything just about right. 3.688 0.947 1 5 3424
Item 5 You feel socially accepted. 4.075 0.819 1 5 3424
Item 6 You feel loved and wanted. 4.253 0.812 1 5 3424
Joint measure Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Self-Esteem 0.018 0.996 -6 1
Peer Self-Esteem 0.011 0.988 -6 2
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Table A1: Description: Main Variables continued
(b) Variables measuring parental investment
Question Mean Std.Dev. Answers N.Ind.
Verbal Investment
Mother
Item 1 Talked about someone you are dating. 0.508 0.500 0 1 3424
Item 2 Talked about your school work or grades. 0.682 0.466 0 1 3424
Item 3 Talked about other things you have done at school. 0.593 0.491 0 1 3424
Item 4 Talked about personal problems you are having. 0.408 0.492 0 1 3424
Item 5 Had a serious argument on your behavior. 0.335 0.472 0 1 3424
Father
Item 1 Talked about someone you are dating. 0.290 0.454 0 1 2750
Item 2 Talked about your school work or grades. 0.564 0.496 0 1 2750
Item 3 Talked about other things you have done at school. 0.493 0.500 0 1 2750
Item 4 Talked about personal problems you are having. 0.182 0.386 0 1 2750
Item 5 Had a serious argument on your behavior. 0.252 0.434 0 1 2750
Joint measures Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Maternal Investment 0.156 0.630 -1 1
Paternal Investment 0.528 0.358 -0 1
Activity Investment
Mother
Item 6 Worked on a project for school together. 0.142 0.349 0 1 3424
Item 7 Went together to a movie, play, museum, concert,
or sports event.
0.268 0.443 0 1 3424
Item 8 Played sports together. 0.096 0.295 0 1 3424
Item 9 Went shopping togther. 0.730 0.444 0 1 3424
Item 10 Attended a church related event together. 0.428 0.495 0 1 3424
Item 11 Have done nothing of the above mentioned. 0.016 0.125 0 1 3424
Father
Item 6 Worked on a project for school together. 0.118 0.322 0 1 2750
Item 7 Went together to a movie, play, museum, concert,
or sports event.
0.249 0.432 0 1 2750
Item 8 Played sports together. 0.316 0.465 0 1 2750
Item 9 Went shopping togther. 0.237 0.425 0 1 2750
Item 10 Attended a church related event together. 0.340 0.474 0 1 2750
Item 11 Have done nothing of the above mentioned. 0.082 0.274 0 1 2750
Joint measures Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Maternal Investment 0.182 0.551 -1 2
Paternal Investment 0.542 0.343 0 2
Parental Monitoring
Item 1 Not own decision when to be home on weekend
nights
0.683 0.465 0 1 3424
Item 2 Not own decision with whom to hang out 0.125 0.331 0 1 3424
Item 3 Not own decision when to go to bed on week nights 0.328 0.470 0 1 3424
Item 4 Not own decision what to eat 0.165 0.372 0 1 3424
Item 5 Not own decision what to wear 0.086 0.280 0 1 3424
Item 6 Not own decision how much TV to watch 0.156 0.363 0 1 3424
Item 7 Not own decision what to watch on TV 0.213 0.410 0 1 3424
Joint measure Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Monitoring 0.082 0.871 -1 4
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Table A2: Description: Variables Measuring Health
Health
In the last month, how often...
Item 1 ...did you feel really sick? 4.243 0.747 1 5 3424
Item 2 ...did you wake up feeling tired? 3.139 1.221 1 5 3424
Item 3 ...did you have skin problems, such as itching or pim-
ples?
3.576 1.129 1 5 3424
Item 4 ...were you dizzy? 4.400 0.823 1 5 3424
Item 5 ...did you have chest pain? 4.604 0.693 1 5 3424
Item 6 ...did you have a headache? 3.584 0.870 1 5 3424
Item 7 ...did you have aches, pains, or soreness in your muscles
or joints?
3.630 0.958 1 5 3424
Item 8 ...did you have a stomachache? 3.880 0.747 1 5 3424
Item 9 ...did you have trouble eating, or a poor appetite? 4.324 0.876 1 5 3424
Item 10 ...did you have trouble falling asleep or staying asleep? 4.014 1.041 1 5 3424
Joint measures Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Health 0.003 0.996 -6 2
Peer Health 0.002 1.000 -8 3
92
A.2 Full Set of Results
In Table A3 I report the full set of results, i.e. including all controls, from the main
regression analysis. Hereby The Main Equation estimated is the investment equation,
while the cognitive and non-cognitive equation are reported under Supplementary Equation.
Each column reports results on separate estimation of the system described by equations
1.5, 1.6a, and 1.6b. In each row, a different investment measure is used, which is indicated
in the first row of the table.
Table A3: Parental Investment and Child Skills - full results
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Main Equation
Dep.Var.: Parental
Investment
Cognitive Skill 0.026 0.011 0.118 0.173* -0.035
[0.124] [0.126] [0.102] [0.104] [0.136]
Self-Esteem 0.042 0.233** 0.054 0.065 -0.087
[0.117] [0.118] [0.050] [0.049] [0.128]
Health -0.055** -0.013 -0.027 -0.016 0.031
[0.024] [0.022] [0.017] [0.017] [0.026]
Peer Cognitive Skill -0.138** -0.025 0.002 0.055 -0.146*
[0.069] [0.067] [0.069] [0.076] [0.079]
Peer Self-Esteem 0.009 -0.002 0.051 0.133* 0.000
[0.097] [0.102] [0.077] [0.080] [0.106]
Family Atmosphere -0.012 -0.004 -0.024 -0.022 -0.040
[0.022] [0.022] [0.016] [0.016] [0.025]
Household Size 0.242*** 0.187*** 0.196*** 0.170*** 0.187***
[0.037] [0.038] [0.033] [0.033] [0.041]
Living Conditions 0.015 0.014 0.024 0.014 0.011
[0.019] [0.018] [0.015] [0.016] [0.021]
Free Time Activities 0.026 0.023 -0.003 0.002 0.019
[0.019] [0.018] [0.015] [0.015] [0.021]
Peer Health -0.050 -0.024 -0.014 -0.021 0.001
[0.032] [0.031] [0.028] [0.029] [0.039]
Supplementary Equations
Continued on next page
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Table A3: Parental Investment and Child Skills - full results - continued
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Dep.Var.: Cognitive Skill
Lag-Cognitive Skill 0.332*** 0.336*** 0.294*** 0.289*** 0.321***
[0.042] [0.042] [0.048] [0.048] [0.042]
Lag-Self-Esteem 0.039 0.041 0.062 0.070* 0.039
[0.039] [0.039] [0.042] [0.042] [0.039]
Lag-Health 0.040 0.046 0.076* 0.077* 0.047
[0.037] [0.037] [0.045] [0.045] [0.037]
Lag-Investment 0.039** 0.039** 0.042* 0.042* 0.035*
[0.019] [0.019] [0.022] [0.023] [0.019]
Lag-Peer Cognitive Skill 0.113* 0.107 0.136* 0.131* 0.119*
[0.066] [0.066] [0.073] [0.073] [0.067]
Lag-Peer Self-Esteem 0.028 0.029 0.020 0.020 0.023
[0.061] [0.062] [0.069] [0.069] [0.060]
Problems in School -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.045* -0.049** -0.069***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.023] [0.023] [0.019]
Peer Problems in School 0.020 0.020 -0.014 -0.015 0.018
[0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.024] [0.021]
Free Time Activities 0.035** 0.033** 0.034* 0.032* 0.037**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.016]
Peer Free Time Activities 0.019 0.018 -0.007 -0.007 0.020
[0.019] [0.019] [0.022] [0.022] [0.019]
Dep.Var.: Non-Cognitive Skill
Lag-Cognitive Skill -0.025 -0.026 -0.037 -0.037 -0.030
[0.038] [0.038] [0.046] [0.046] [0.038]
Lag-Self-Esteem 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.088* 0.091** 0.122***
[0.039] [0.039] [0.046] [0.046] [0.039]
Lag-Health -0.010 -0.006 -0.033 -0.032 -0.003
[0.037] [0.036] [0.045] [0.045] [0.037]
Lag-Investment 0.020 0.019 0.009 0.009 0.018
[0.018] [0.019] [0.022] [0.022] [0.018]
Lag-Peer Cognitive Skill -0.015 -0.014 0.024 0.020 -0.019
[0.064] [0.064] [0.072] [0.072] [0.064]
Lag-Peer Self-Esteem 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.066 0.056
[0.057] [0.057] [0.065] [0.065] [0.056]
Continued on next page
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Table A3: Parental Investment and Child Skills - full results - continued
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Emotions about School 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.146***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.022] [0.022] [0.018]
Peer Emotions about School 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.004
[0.019] [0.019] [0.023] [0.023] [0.019]
Free Time Activities 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.069***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.021] [0.021] [0.017]
Peer Free Time Activities 0.036** 0.035** 0.035* 0.035* 0.033*
[0.018] [0.018] [0.021] [0.021] [0.018]
Observations 3424 3424 2299 2299 3332
Test of Overidentifying
Restrictions
9.3560 7.3964 14.1539 15.1552 14.1515
p-value (0.8980) (0.9648) (0.3631) (0.2978) (0.5874)
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in
brackets.
A.3 Details on Peers’ Parents
One concern of the analysis could be, whether parents know the parents. In case parents
do not know the peers of their children, it is very unlikely that the response captured in
the main results is driven by the actual peers the child is in contact with. Table A4 reports
in part (a) overall averages on how many parents in the sample have met their child’s best
friend, the parent of the best friends, and with how many parents they talked to in the past
four weeks. Only 4% have not met the best friend of their child, and up to 87% report to
have met the best friend’s parents. In part (b) it can be seen that the fraction of parents
who met the best friend and/ or the best friends’ parents do not differ between parents of
children aged up to 15 and those with older children. The only difference is that parents
of relatively older children talked on average with slightly more parents over the past four
weeks.
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Table A4: Contact to Peers and Peers’ Parents
(a) Main Sample
Mean Std.Dev. Min.&
Max.
N.Ind.
Met child’s best friend 0.9610 0.1937 0 1 3383
Met best friend’s parents 0.8658 0.3409 0 1 3383
Number of parents talked to 2.1746 1.4778 0 4 3379
(b) Differences by age of child
Age 15 or
younger
Above Age
15
Difference
Met child’s best friend 0.9606 0.9614 0.00
[0.1946] [0.1927] [0.90]
Met best friend’s parents 0.8615 0.8707 0.01
[0.3455] [0.3356] [0.43]
Number of parents talked to 2.0892 2.2726 0.18***
[1.4682] [1.4831] [0.00]
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A.4 Full Set of Results on Dynamic Peer Groups
In Table A6 and A5 I report the full set of results, i.e. including all controls, from the
regression analysis using dynamic peer groups. Hereby The Main Equation estimated is
the investment equation, while the cognitive and non-cognitive equation are reported under
Supplementary Equation. In each column, a different investment measure is used, which is
indicated in the first row of the table.
Each column in Table A5 reports results on separate estimation of the system described
by equations:
∆JIit = β1 + ∆Jθ
′
i,tβ2 + ∆JX
′
itγ + ∆JGX
′
itβ3 + ∆Jit
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C
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C
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C
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C
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C
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C
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C
i,t
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N
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N
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N
3 + ∆JX
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Each column in Table A6 reports results on separate estimation of the system described
by equations:
∆JIit = β1 + ∆Jθ
′
i,tβ2 + ∆JGθ
′
itα + ∆JX
′
itγ + ∆JGX
′
itβ3 + ∆Jit
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C
3 + ∆JGθ
′
i,t−1δ
C
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This is the main system of equations described by 1.5, 1.6a, and 1.6b, extended by the
changes in average peer characteristics in each equation.
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Table A5: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks with ex-
ogenous effects only - full results
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Main Equation
Dep.Var.: Parental
Investment
Cognitive Skill 0.015 0.068 0.011 0.169*** -0.030
[0.071] [0.070] [0.067] [0.063] [0.099]
Self-Esteem 0.035 0.207* 0.095 0.024 -0.095
[0.063] [0.123] [0.058] [0.057] [0.083]
Health -0.158 -0.195 -0.086 0.053 -0.040
[0.130] [0.145] [0.095] [0.097] [0.183]
Peers: Female 0.007 -0.038** -0.016 -0.040** -0.049*
[0.020] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.026]
Peers: Maternal HS degree 0.061* 0.036 0.001 -0.003 -0.052
[0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.028] [0.043]
Peers: White -0.071* 0.068* 0.007 0.023 0.067
[0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.036] [0.056]
Peers: Minority -0.016 0.031 -0.017 0.006 0.104**
[0.033] [0.033] [0.036] [0.036] [0.047]
Peers: Father Professional 0.021 -0.005 0.000 0.043*** -0.024
[0.017] [0.017] [0.015] [0.014] [0.024]
Peer Health 0.005 -0.004 0.022 0.002 0.043
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.025] [0.036]
Family Atmosphere 0.024 0.043* 0.020 0.046*** 0.040
[0.019] [0.022] [0.018] [0.017] [0.026]
Household Size 0.015 -0.020 0.124*** 0.096*** -0.034
[0.027] [0.025] [0.032] [0.032] [0.046]
Living Conditions 0.001 0.009 0.032* 0.015 -0.026
[0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.018] [0.023]
Free Time Activities -0.014 0.016 0.030* 0.044** 0.020
[0.022] [0.025] [0.017] [0.018] [0.029]
Supplementary Equations
Dep.Var.: Cognitive Skill
Lag-Cognitive Skill 0.471*** 0.470*** 0.438*** 0.435*** 0.426***
[0.050] [0.050] [0.057] [0.057] [0.050]
Continued on next page
98
Table A5: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks with ex-
ogenous effects only - full results - continued
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Lag-Self-Esteem 0.098** 0.095** 0.093 0.117** 0.085*
[0.045] [0.045] [0.057] [0.056] [0.045]
Lag-Health 0.055 0.069 0.048 0.053 0.089**
[0.043] [0.043] [0.051] [0.052] [0.043]
Lag-Investment 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.069***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.027] [0.028] [0.024]
Lag-Peer Cognitive Skill 0.029 0.035 0.046 0.039 0.022
[0.056] [0.057] [0.061] [0.061] [0.056]
Lag-Peer Self-Esteem 0.020 0.021 -0.030 -0.042 0.015
[0.047] [0.047] [0.056] [0.056] [0.047]
Peers: Female -0.005 -0.001 0.013 0.011 -0.005
[0.027] [0.027] [0.031] [0.031] [0.028]
Peers: Maternal HS degree 0.064 0.067 0.174*** 0.162*** 0.072
[0.044] [0.044] [0.055] [0.057] [0.046]
Peers: White -0.021 -0.020 -0.172** -0.164** -0.037
[0.059] [0.058] [0.070] [0.071] [0.061]
Peers: Minority -0.042 -0.041 -0.221*** -0.220*** -0.069
[0.049] [0.049] [0.056] [0.057] [0.049]
Peers: Father Professional -0.030 -0.035 -0.051* -0.048* -0.035
[0.025] [0.025] [0.027] [0.027] [0.025]
Problems in School -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.112***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.031] [0.031] [0.027]
Peer Problems in School -0.005 -0.003 -0.009 -0.010 -0.012
[0.021] [0.021] [0.027] [0.027] [0.021]
Free Time Activities 0.044** 0.043* 0.065** 0.063** 0.056**
[0.022] [0.022] [0.026] [0.026] [0.023]
Peer Free Time Activities 0.023 0.019 0.027 0.035 0.014
[0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.024] [0.021]
Dep.Var.: Non-Cognitive
Skill
Lag-Cognitive Skill 0.001 -0.004 -0.055 -0.054 0.002
[0.046] [0.045] [0.056] [0.057] [0.046]
Lag-Self-Esteem 0.144*** 0.146*** 0.175*** 0.172*** 0.157***
[0.049] [0.048] [0.065] [0.065] [0.051]
Continued on next page
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Table A5: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks with ex-
ogenous effects only - full results - continued
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Lag-Health -0.009 -0.013 -0.005 -0.018 -0.010
[0.044] [0.043] [0.053] [0.053] [0.045]
Lag-Investment 0.001 0.003 -0.013 -0.018 0.007
[0.023] [0.023] [0.029] [0.030] [0.024]
Lag-Peer Cognitive Skill 0.018 0.009 -0.013 -0.011 0.008
[0.051] [0.051] [0.056] [0.056] [0.052]
Lag-Peer Self-Esteem 0.078* 0.084* 0.070 0.079 0.057
[0.043] [0.043] [0.053] [0.053] [0.044]
Peers: Female 0.021 0.025 0.018 0.020 0.027
[0.026] [0.026] [0.031] [0.031] [0.027]
Peers: Maternal HS degree -0.061 -0.055 -0.071 -0.072 -0.041
[0.043] [0.042] [0.055] [0.055] [0.044]
Peers: White 0.042 0.029 0.045 0.049 0.031
[0.057] [0.056] [0.069] [0.069] [0.059]
Peers: Minority 0.069 0.062 0.026 0.030 0.044
[0.044] [0.044] [0.057] [0.057] [0.045]
Peers: Father Professional -0.013 -0.008 0.050* 0.050* -0.009
[0.025] [0.025] [0.029] [0.029] [0.025]
Emotions about School 0.159*** 0.156*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.158***
[0.025] [0.024] [0.029] [0.030] [0.026]
Peer Emotions about School -0.022 -0.021 -0.020 -0.023 -0.020
[0.021] [0.021] [0.026] [0.026] [0.021]
Free Time Activities 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.064** 0.063** 0.084***
[0.022] [0.022] [0.027] [0.027] [0.023]
Peer Free Time Activities 0.028 0.026 0.012 0.013 0.029
[0.021] [0.021] [0.025] [0.025] [0.022]
Observations 1818 1818 1156 1156 1745
Test of Overidentifying
Restrictions
27.9191 35.4492 31.4379 29.4473 27.4869
p-value (0.3625) (0.1902) (0.2124) (0.2457) (0.2823)
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
100
Table A6: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks - full results
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Main Equation
Dep.Var.: Parental
Investment
Cognitive Skill 0.064 0.077 0.017 0.157** -0.041
[0.074] [0.073] [0.069] [0.067] [0.106]
Self-Esteem 0.030 0.177* 0.075 0.022 -0.093
[0.063] [0.104] [0.057] [0.058] [0.080]
Health -0.070 -0.189 -0.049 0.072 -0.061
[0.126] [0.135] [0.100] [0.102] [0.180]
Peer Cognitive Skill -0.113** -0.007 -0.043 0.020 0.021
[0.054] [0.052] [0.051] [0.053] [0.070]
Peer Self-Esteem -0.013 0.042 0.042 -0.004 0.087
[0.047] [0.041] [0.044] [0.046] [0.057]
Peers: Female 0.028 -0.034 -0.004 -0.043** -0.044
[0.026] [0.024] [0.021] [0.021] [0.031]
Peers: Maternal HS degree 0.077** 0.025 0.005 -0.008 -0.081*
[0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [0.029] [0.045]
Peers: White -0.085** 0.070* -0.010 0.022 0.070
[0.043] [0.042] [0.041] [0.038] [0.057]
Peers: Minority -0.045 0.034 -0.034 0.013 0.111**
[0.035] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.050]
Peers: Father Professional 0.035* -0.001 0.011 0.043*** -0.019
[0.018] [0.018] [0.006] [0.016] [0.025]
Peer Health 0.016 -0.015 0.008 0.001 0.033
[0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] [0.038]
Family Atmosphere 0.015 0.049** 0.018 0.047*** 0.043*
[0.020] [0.021] [0.018] [0.017] [0.026]
Household Size 0.012 -0.022 0.124*** 0.103*** -0.033
[0.027] [0.025] [0.033] [0.032] [0.046]
Living Conditions -0.002 0.010 0.037** 0.018 -0.030
[0.017] [0.016] [0.018] [0.017] [0.023]
Free Time Activities -0.004 0.016 0.029 0.043** 0.013
[0.021] [0.023] [0.018] [0.018] [0.029]
Supplementary Equations
Continued on next page
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Table A6: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks - full results
- continued
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Dep.Var.: Cognitive Skill
Lag-Cognitive Skill 0.473*** 0.472*** 0.440*** 0.441*** 0.424***
[0.050] [0.050] [0.057] [0.057] [0.050]
Lag-Self-Esteem 0.096** 0.097** 0.094* 0.118** 0.089**
[0.045] [0.045] [0.057] [0.056] [0.045]
Lag-Health 0.053 0.066 0.050 0.050 0.083*
[0.043] [0.043] [0.051] [0.052] [0.043]
Lag-Investment 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.071***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.027] [0.028] [0.024]
Lag-Peer Cognitive Skill 0.030 0.033 0.052 0.049 0.026
[0.056] [0.057] [0.061] [0.061] [0.056]
Lag-Peer Self-Esteem 0.019 0.021 -0.038 -0.040 0.015
[0.048] [0.047] [0.056] [0.056] [0.047]
Peers: Female -0.004 -0.001 0.007 0.008 -0.003
[0.027] [0.027] [0.031] [0.031] [0.028]
Peers: Maternal HS degree 0.063 0.068 0.162*** 0.167*** 0.077*
[0.044] [0.044] [0.056] [0.056] [0.046]
Peers: White -0.020 -0.024 -0.155** -0.169** -0.045
[0.059] [0.058] [0.071] [0.071] [0.060]
Peers: Minority -0.045 -0.045 -0.210*** -0.226*** -0.072
[0.049] [0.049] [0.056] [0.057] [0.049]
Peers: Father Professional -0.030 -0.035 -0.053* -0.048* -0.036
[0.025] [0.025] [0.027] [0.027] [0.025]
Problems in School -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.111***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.031] [0.031] [0.027]
Peer Problems in School -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010
[0.021] [0.021] [0.027] [0.027] [0.021]
Free Time Activities 0.045** 0.043* 0.063** 0.064** 0.055**
[0.022] [0.022] [0.026] [0.026] [0.023]
Peer Free Time Activities 0.023 0.019 0.029 0.034 0.015
[0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.025] [0.021]
Dep.Var.: Non-Cognitive Skill
Lag-Cognitive Skill 0.006 -0.006 -0.056 -0.055 -0.002
[0.046] [0.045] [0.056] [0.056] [0.046]
Continued on next page
102
Table A6: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks - full results
- continued
Parental Investment
Mother Father
Verbal Activity Verbal Activity Monitoring
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Lag-Self-Esteem 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.154***
[0.049] [0.049] [0.065] [0.065] [0.051]
Lag-Health -0.009 -0.012 -0.007 -0.019 -0.012
[0.044] [0.043] [0.053] [0.053] [0.045]
Lag-Investment 0.002 0.001 -0.014 -0.021 0.006
[0.023] [0.023] [0.029] [0.030] [0.024]
Lag-Peer Cognitive Skill 0.015 0.017 -0.008 -0.009 0.005
[0.051] [0.050] [0.056] [0.056] [0.052]
Lag-Peer Self-Esteem 0.085** 0.083* 0.074 0.082 0.064
[0.043] [0.043] [0.053] [0.053] [0.044]
Peers: Female 0.024 0.024 0.015 0.020 0.029
[0.026] [0.026] [0.031] [0.031] [0.027]
Peers: Maternal HS degree -0.058 -0.055 -0.083 -0.076 -0.036
[0.043] [0.042] [0.055] [0.054] [0.044]
Peers: White 0.037 0.028 0.054 0.045 0.025
[0.057] [0.056] [0.070] [0.069] [0.059]
Peers: Minority 0.065 0.063 0.040 0.030 0.039
[0.044] [0.043] [0.057] [0.057] [0.045]
Peers: Father Professional -0.012 -0.010 0.051* 0.051* -0.008
[0.025] [0.025] [0.029] [0.029] [0.025]
Emotions about School 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.156***
[0.025] [0.024] [0.030] [0.030] [0.025]
Peer Emotions about School -0.023 -0.021 -0.022 -0.025 -0.021
[0.021] [0.021] [0.026] [0.026] [0.021]
Free Time Activities 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.063** 0.063** 0.082***
[0.022] [0.022] [0.027] [0.027] [0.023]
Peer Free Time Activities 0.027 0.026 0.012 0.015 0.028
[0.021] [0.021] [0.025] [0.025] [0.022]
Observations 1818 1818 1156 1156 1745
Test of Overidentifying
Restrictions
38.1680 34.5425 33.1427 34.9175 32.6385
p-value (0.1455) (0.2200) (0.2720) (0.2073) (0.2493)
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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In Table A7 I report the full set of results, i.e. including all controls, from the regression
analysis using dynamic peer groups separately for girls (column [1]) and boys (column [2]).
Hereby the equations and estimation is the same as the results presented in Tbale A6 .
Table A7: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks by gender
Parental Investment
Monitoring
Girls Boys
[1] [2]
Main Equation
Dep.Var.: Parental Investment
Cognitive Skill -0.116 0.181
[0.119] [0.166]
Self-Esteem -0.174* 0.029
[0.094] [0.117]
Health -0.106 -0.212
[0.157] [0.252]
Peer Cognitive Skill 0.067 -0.203*
[0.088] [0.121]
Peer Self-Esteem 0.038 0.173
[0.059] [0.140]
Peers: Female -0.072* 0.037
[0.039] [0.054]
Peers: Maternal HS degree -0.076 -0.042
[0.058] [0.067]
Peers: White 0.117 -0.027
[0.075] [0.083]
Peers: Minority 0.125* 0.009
[0.071] [0.070]
Peers: Father Professional -0.002 0.022
[0.031] [0.041]
Peer Health 0.045 0.035
[0.046] [0.073]
Family Atmosphere 0.069** 0.045
[0.035] [0.041]
Household Size -0.008 -0.029
[0.059] [0.062]
Continued on next page
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Table A7: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks by gender
- continued
Parental Investment
Monitoring
Girls Boys
[1] [2]
Living Conditions 0.042 -0.081**
[0.027] [0.040]
Free Time Activities 0.021 -0.001
[0.034] [0.044]
Supplementary Equations
Dep.Var.: Cognitive Skill
Lag-Cognitive Skill 0.455*** 0.400***
[0.066] [0.069]
Lag-Self-Esteem 0.204*** -0.009
[0.064] [0.059]
Lag-Health 0.095* 0.078
[0.058] [0.063]
Lag-Investment 0.074** 0.084**
[0.032] [0.033]
Lag-Peer Cognitive Skill -0.007 0.026
[0.076] [0.068]
Lag-Peer Self-Esteem -0.023 0.031
[0.060] [0.071]
Peers: Female -0.003 -0.019
[0.040] [0.038]
Peers: Maternal HS degree 0.094* 0.037
[0.052] [0.074]
Peers: White -0.023 -0.038
[0.077] [0.089]
Peers: Minority -0.098 -0.002
[0.066] [0.070]
Peers: Father Professional -0.033 -0.007
[0.032] [0.037]
Problems in School -0.158*** -0.107***
[0.033] [0.038]
Peer Problems in School -0.016 -0.006
[0.030] [0.028]
Free Time Activities 0.063** 0.035
[0.029] [0.032]
Continued on next page
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Table A7: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks by gender
- continued
Parental Investment
Monitoring
Girls Boys
[1] [2]
Peer Free Time Activities 0.013 0.050
[0.026] [0.032]
Dep.Var.: Non-Cognitive Skill
Lag-Cognitive Skill 0.093 -0.101*
[0.064] [0.059]
Lag-Self-Esteem 0.212*** 0.066
[0.068] [0.069]
Lag-Health -0.034 -0.036
[0.064] [0.057]
Lag-Investment 0.021 -0.009
[0.032] [0.032]
Lag-Peer Cognitive Skill 0.069 0.001
[0.070] [0.065]
Lag-Peer Self-Esteem 0.051 0.034
[0.059] [0.059]
Peers: Female 0.038 -0.026
[0.038] [0.036]
Peers: Maternal HS degree -0.057 -0.025
[0.053] [0.069]
Peers: White 0.085 -0.009
[0.075] [0.084]
Peers: Minority 0.018 0.090
[0.058] [0.063]
Peers: Father Professional -0.025 0.003
[0.036] [0.032]
Emotions about School 0.138*** 0.170***
[0.033] [0.036]
Peer Emotions about School -0.066** 0.029
[0.030] [0.027]
Free Time Activities 0.108*** 0.044
[0.031] [0.032]
Peer Free Time Activities 0.058** -0.005
[0.029] [0.030]
Continued on next page
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Table A7: Parental Investment and Child Skills - Changing friendship networks by gender
- continued
Parental Investment
Monitoring
Girls Boys
[1] [2]
Observations 977 841
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 37.8983 35.7997
p-value 0.1246 0.1478
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A8: Correlations of Skills and Background Characteristics
Cognitive ∆ Cognitive Self- ∆ Self- Female Maternal White Minority
Skill Skill Esteem Esteem HS degree
∆ Cognitive Skill 0.450*** 1.000
Self-Esteem 0.149*** 0.014 1.000
∆ Self-Esteem -0.005 0.015 0.459*** 1.000
Female 0.100*** -0.012 -0.122*** 0.034** 1.000
Maternal HS degree 0.142*** -0.009 0.068*** -0.006 -0.019 1.000
White 0.111*** -0.021 0.001 0.018 -0.019 0.158*** 1.000
Minority -0.111*** 0.021 -0.001 -0.018 0.019 -0.158*** -1.000 1.000
Father Professional 0.160*** -0.014 0.021 -0.015 -0.030* 0.127*** 0.107*** -0.107***
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A9: Correlations of Friends’ Skill Changes and Composition Changes
∆ Peer ∆ Peer ∆ Peers: ∆ Peers: ∆ Peers: ∆ Peers:
Cognitive Self- Female Maternal White Minority
Skill Esteem HS degree
∆ Peer Self-Esteem 0.154*** 1.000
∆ Peers: Female 0.160*** 0.032** 1.000
∆ Peers: Maternal HS degree 0.143*** 0.191*** 0.559*** 1.000
∆ Peers: White 0.154*** 0.116*** 0.483*** 0.674*** 1.000
∆ Peers: Minority -0.033** 0.137*** 0.380*** 0.460*** -0.125*** 1.000
∆ Peers: Father Professional 0.147*** 0.075*** 0.244*** 0.376*** 0.349*** 0.148***
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
107
Appendix B
Addendum to Chapter 2
B.1 Comparison with other Datasets
To supplement our analysis, we compare our measures on risky and disruptive behavior
with German and US surveys aiming the surveillance of risky behavior among children and
adolescents. We report comparable measures in Table B13.
KiGGS and SEYLE (Germany)
The Robert Koch Institute (RKI), which is a federal institute and part of the Federal
Ministry of Health, is running the “German Health Interview and Examination Survey
for Children and Adolescents” (KiGGS) since 2003. The aim of the study is to collect
comprehensive health data on children and adolescents that are representative for the
whole country1. We use information collected in the baseline study in 2003 that covers the
core topics of health status, health related behavior, and take-up of health services. The
KiGGS sample focuses on 14 to 17-year-old high school students, which is slightly younger
than our sample of 18 to 21 year olds in 1995.
In terms of suicidal tendencies, unfortunately the RKI did not include an explicit ques-
tion. However, we supplement the KiGGS for this topic with the Saving and Empowering
Young Lives in Europe (SEYLE) Survey, which is a longitudinal research project based
on randomly selected 11 European countries. One of the key objectives of this study is to
collect data on the mental health and well-being, lifestyles, values, and risk behaviors of
adolescents aged 14 to 16 in Europe. The study also conducts a suicide-preventative RCT,
however we will only exploit information from the baseline survey reported for German
1For more details about the survey and how it was conducted, see here
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students.2 The baseline survey of Germany was conducted in 2010 at several schools in
Heidelberg and in the Rheine-Neckar-Area, with students that are 14 to 16-year-old.
Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance (US)
The Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) aims to monitor six categories of
priority health-risk behaviors among adolescents and is conducted jointly by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and state and local education agencies. National
surveys started in 1990 and are still conducted today, however we use results reported
from the 1995 to keep the year comparable to our sample. The survey targets a nationally
representative sample of students attending grades 9 through 12.3 In Table B13 we report
YRBSS statistics that refer to 12th graders only.
B.2 Full Set of Long-run Results
In the following we present the full set of results, i.e. including all controls, of the results
reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Hereby each table considers a different outcome which is
indicated in the head of the table. Columns [1] and [2] link the long-run outcome with
changes in anger, columns [3] and [4] link long-run outcomes to changes in anxiety, and
columns [5] and [6] link changes in self-confidence to long-run outcomes.
2For more details on the setup and results of the RCT see Wasserman et al. (2010)
3For a detailed discussion on sampling, survey questions, and implementation see Kann et al. (1996).
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Table B1: Longer-Run Outcome: Physical Fighting
Physical Fighting
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) 0.041*** 0.068***
[0.012] [0.021]
∆ Anger x Female -0.053**
[0.025]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) 0.000 -0.002
[0.010] [0.019]
∆ Anxiety x Female 0.006
[0.022]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) -0.003 0.012
[0.010] [0.020]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female -0.025
[0.022]
Anger (Pre) 0.046*** 0.088***
[0.011] [0.020]
Anger (Pre) x Female -0.082***
[0.021]
Anxiety (Pre) 0.017 0.026
[0.013] [0.025]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female -0.015
[0.028]
Self-Confidence (Pre) -0.002 0.013
[0.010] [0.018]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female -0.026
[0.021]
Treated 0.022 0.034 0.032* 0.041 0.031* 0.039
[0.016] [0.029] [0.017] [0.031] [0.016] [0.031]
Treated x Female -0.012 -0.016 -0.019
[0.033] [0.034] [0.033]
Female -0.063*** -0.060*** -0.075*** -0.069*** -0.072*** -0.064***
[0.015] [0.019] [0.016] [0.020] [0.016] [0.019]
Constant 0.083*** 0.075*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.077***
[0.015] [0.017] [0.016] [0.019] [0.015] [0.017]
N Observations 863 863 863 863 863 863
N Individuals 863 863 863 863 863 863
R-squared 0.054 0.073 0.032 0.034 0.028 0.031
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B2: Longer-Run Outcome: Destroy Property
Destroy Property
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) 0.041*** 0.071***
[0.013] [0.023]
∆ Anger x Female -0.056**
[0.026]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) -0.001 0.028
[0.010] [0.021]
∆ Anxiety x Female -0.047**
[0.023]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) -0.007 -0.008
[0.009] [0.020]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female -0.003
[0.021]
Anger (Pre) 0.041*** 0.063***
[0.012] [0.019]
Anger (Pre) x Female -0.037
[0.023]
Anxiety (Pre) -0.003 0.028
[0.011] [0.022]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female -0.050**
[0.024]
Self-Confidence (Pre) -0.009 -0.023
[0.010] [0.021]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female 0.023
[0.023]
Treated 0.063*** 0.106*** 0.073*** 0.110*** 0.071*** 0.114***
[0.018] [0.032] [0.019] [0.034] [0.018] [0.034]
Treated x Female -0.074** -0.064 -0.083**
[0.037] [0.039] [0.038]
Female -0.076*** -0.044** -0.083*** -0.058*** -0.086*** -0.050***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018]
Constant 0.085*** 0.066*** 0.083*** 0.071*** 0.085*** 0.068***
[0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.015] [0.017]
N Observations 863 863 863 863 863 863
N Individuals 863 863 863 863 863 863
R-squared 0.064 0.078 0.046 0.058 0.047 0.055
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B3: Longer-Run Outcome: Suicidal Thoughts
Suicidal Thoughts
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) 0.070*** 0.040
[0.019] [0.026]
∆ Anger x Female 0.053
[0.039]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) 0.040** -0.006
[0.020] [0.027]
∆ Anxiety x Female 0.071*
[0.039]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) -0.050** 0.022
[0.019] [0.026]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female -0.110***
[0.037]
Anger (Pre) 0.083*** 0.063**
[0.020] [0.027]
Anger (Pre) x Female 0.031
[0.040]
Anxiety (Pre) 0.052** 0.009
[0.021] [0.031]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female 0.065
[0.042]
Self-Confidence (Pre) -0.084*** -0.021
[0.019] [0.026]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female -0.096***
[0.037]
Treated 0.053* -0.019 0.058* -0.015 0.053* -0.013
[0.031] [0.041] [0.032] [0.042] [0.031] [0.041]
Treated x Female 0.128** 0.128** 0.106*
[0.061] [0.063] [0.062]
Female 0.164*** 0.108*** 0.141*** 0.087** 0.133*** 0.086**
[0.030] [0.041] [0.030] [0.041] [0.030] [0.040]
Constant 0.170*** 0.202*** 0.179*** 0.206*** 0.182*** 0.206***
[0.025] [0.028] [0.025] [0.028] [0.025] [0.028]
N Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833
N Individuals 833 833 833 833 833 833
R-squared 0.055 0.063 0.042 0.052 0.056 0.072
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B4: Longer-Run Outcome: Repeated Suicidal Thoughts
Repeated Suicidal Thoughts
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) 0.021* 0.012
[0.011] [0.010]
∆ Anger x Female 0.016
[0.022]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) 0.021* -0.017
[0.012] [0.010]
∆ Anxiety x Female 0.063***
[0.021]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) -0.017 0.014
[0.012] [0.010]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female -0.046**
[0.020]
Anger (Pre) 0.031*** 0.016
[0.012] [0.011]
Anger (Pre) x Female 0.025
[0.023]
Anxiety (Pre) 0.010 -0.012
[0.011] [0.010]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female 0.032
[0.020]
Self-Confidence (Pre) -0.022* 0.010
[0.012] [0.008]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female -0.050**
[0.021]
Treated 0.035** -0.005 0.033** -0.001 0.034** -0.002
[0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017]
Treated x Female 0.070** 0.058* 0.060*
[0.032] [0.032] [0.032]
Female 0.065*** 0.034* 0.057*** 0.032* 0.055*** 0.029
[0.016] [0.019] [0.015] [0.018] [0.015] [0.018]
Constant 0.009 0.027** 0.012 0.026** 0.013 0.027**
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
N Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833
N Individuals 833 833 833 833 833 833
R-squared 0.033 0.040 0.028 0.044 0.029 0.043
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B5: Longer-Run Outcome: Alcohol Consumption: Regular
Alcohol Consumption: Regular
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) 0.016 0.054*
[0.021] [0.029]
∆ Anger x Female -0.073*
[0.042]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) 0.005 0.012
[0.021] [0.029]
∆ Anxiety x Female -0.013
[0.041]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) -0.005 0.000
[0.020] [0.030]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female -0.007
[0.040]
Anger (Pre) 0.015 0.022
[0.020] [0.028]
Anger (Pre) x Female -0.012
[0.041]
Anxiety (Pre) -0.005 -0.012
[0.021] [0.031]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female 0.013
[0.042]
Self-Confidence (Pre) -0.024 -0.007
[0.019] [0.030]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female -0.028
[0.039]
Treated 0.006 -0.007 0.008 0.001 0.009 0.006
[0.032] [0.045] [0.032] [0.045] [0.032] [0.045]
Treated x Female 0.026 0.013 0.004
[0.065] [0.065] [0.065]
Female -0.078** -0.090** -0.080** -0.084** -0.085*** -0.086**
[0.032] [0.043] [0.031] [0.042] [0.032] [0.042]
Constant 0.751*** 0.758*** 0.750*** 0.752*** 0.753*** 0.753***
[0.026] [0.030] [0.027] [0.030] [0.026] [0.030]
N Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833
N Individuals 833 833 833 833 833 833
R-squared 0.009 0.013 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B6: Longer-Run Outcome: Alcohol Consumption: Heavy
Alcohol Consumption: Heavy
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) 0.037* 0.066**
[0.022] [0.032]
∆ Anger x Female -0.055
[0.045]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) 0.026 0.056*
[0.022] [0.033]
∆ Anxiety x Female -0.053
[0.044]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) 0.020 0.040
[0.022] [0.035]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female -0.031
[0.045]
Anger (Pre) 0.046** 0.060*
[0.023] [0.033]
Anger (Pre) x Female -0.027
[0.045]
Anxiety (Pre) -0.005 -0.002
[0.023] [0.035]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female -0.003
[0.046]
Self-Confidence (Pre) 0.003 0.014
[0.022] [0.034]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female -0.016
[0.044]
Treated -0.130*** -0.141*** -0.130*** -0.147*** -0.114*** -0.126**
[0.035] [0.052] [0.035] [0.051] [0.035] [0.052]
Treated x Female 0.024 0.033 0.018
[0.070] [0.070] [0.071]
Female -0.144*** -0.155*** -0.152*** -0.164*** -0.151*** -0.160***
[0.035] [0.047] [0.034] [0.046] [0.034] [0.046]
Constant 0.614*** 0.618*** 0.614*** 0.620*** 0.609*** 0.614***
[0.029] [0.034] [0.029] [0.034] [0.029] [0.034]
N Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833
N Individuals 833 833 833 833 833 833
R-squared 0.043 0.045 0.041 0.043 0.040 0.040
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B7: Longer-Run Outcome: Cigarette Smoking
Cigarette Smoking
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) 0.058*** 0.085***
[0.022] [0.032]
∆ Anger x Female -0.052
[0.045]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) 0.015 -0.011
[0.022] [0.034]
∆ Anxiety x Female 0.042
[0.045]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) 0.017 0.061*
[0.021] [0.033]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female -0.067
[0.043]
Anger (Pre) 0.098*** 0.117***
[0.022] [0.032]
Anger (Pre) x Female -0.038
[0.045]
Anxiety (Pre) 0.030 0.026
[0.023] [0.035]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female 0.002
[0.046]
Self-Confidence (Pre) 0.001 0.025
[0.021] [0.034]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female -0.033
[0.043]
Treated 0.016 -0.023 0.024 -0.012 0.035 -0.008
[0.034] [0.049] [0.035] [0.051] [0.035] [0.050]
Treated x Female 0.076 0.064 0.071
[0.068] [0.069] [0.070]
Female 0.043 0.008 0.019 -0.011 0.024 -0.008
[0.034] [0.045] [0.034] [0.046] [0.034] [0.046]
Constant 0.348*** 0.364*** 0.355*** 0.371*** 0.347*** 0.364***
[0.029] [0.033] [0.029] [0.034] [0.029] [0.034]
N Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833
N Individuals 833 833 833 833 833 833
R-squared 0.025 0.027 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.008
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B8: Longer-Run Outcome: Subjective Health
Subjective Health
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) -0.115** -0.138**
[0.045] [0.064]
∆ Anger x Female 0.057
[0.089]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) -0.084* 0.014
[0.044] [0.061]
∆ Anxiety x Female -0.162*
[0.088]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) 0.085* 0.082
[0.045] [0.068]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female -0.013
[0.092]
Anger (Pre) -0.180*** -0.175**
[0.045] [0.068]
Anger (Pre) x Female 0.003
[0.090]
Anxiety (Pre) -0.189*** -0.142**
[0.044] [0.062]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female -0.066
[0.087]
Self-Confidence (Pre) 0.160*** 0.130*
[0.042] [0.067]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female 0.042
[0.086]
Treated -0.157** -0.022 -0.157** -0.048 -0.154** -0.022
[0.068] [0.091] [0.068] [0.091] [0.069] [0.092]
Treated x Female -0.258* -0.196 -0.254*
[0.134] [0.135] [0.138]
Female -0.258*** -0.144 -0.190*** -0.102 -0.191*** -0.083
[0.067] [0.091] [0.066] [0.091] [0.067] [0.091]
Constant 0.278*** 0.219*** 0.240*** 0.195*** 0.251*** 0.196***
[0.055] [0.062] [0.057] [0.065] [0.057] [0.065]
N Observations 859 859 859 859 859 859
N Individuals 859 859 859 859 859 859
R-squared 0.040 0.045 0.042 0.049 0.038 0.043
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B9: Longer-Run Outcome: Life Satisfaction
Life Satisfaction
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) -0.103** -0.100*
[0.044] [0.059]
∆ Anger x Female -0.001
[0.088]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) -0.118*** -0.093
[0.043] [0.067]
∆ Anxiety x Female -0.043
[0.088]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) 0.083* -0.014
[0.043] [0.062]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female 0.158*
[0.086]
Anger (Pre) -0.137*** -0.097
[0.042] [0.060]
Anger (Pre) x Female -0.072
[0.083]
Anxiety (Pre) -0.114** -0.134**
[0.047] [0.067]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female 0.041
[0.093]
Self-Confidence (Pre) 0.118** 0.084
[0.046] [0.061]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female 0.048
[0.091]
Treated -0.052 0.012 -0.039 0.011 -0.048 -0.007
[0.066] [0.090] [0.068] [0.092] [0.066] [0.088]
Treated x Female -0.114 -0.097 -0.057
[0.132] [0.136] [0.133]
Female -0.078 -0.029 -0.032 0.016 -0.027 0.001
[0.066] [0.088] [0.066] [0.089] [0.066] [0.086]
Constant 0.075 0.044 0.049 0.023 0.054 0.038
[0.054] [0.060] [0.055] [0.061] [0.054] [0.060]
N Observations 859 859 859 859 859 859
N Individuals 859 859 859 859 859 859
R-squared 0.014 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.017
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B10: Longer-Run Outcome: German Grade (in grade 10)
German Grade (in grade 10)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) -0.086* -0.111*
[0.046] [0.065]
∆ Anger x Female 0.058
[0.092]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) -0.101** -0.047
[0.044] [0.069]
∆ Anxiety x Female -0.084
[0.090]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) 0.053 -0.079
[0.041] [0.064]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female 0.205**
[0.083]
Anger (Pre) -0.070 -0.091
[0.045] [0.066]
Anger (Pre) x Female 0.043
[0.090]
Anxiety (Pre) -0.222*** -0.172**
[0.046] [0.077]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female -0.075
[0.096]
Self-Confidence (Pre) 0.062 -0.037
[0.043] [0.071]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female 0.140
[0.089]
Treated -0.302*** -0.230** -0.285*** -0.238** -0.303*** -0.252**
[0.068] [0.100] [0.067] [0.100] [0.068] [0.100]
Treated x Female -0.140 -0.084 -0.063
[0.138] [0.135] [0.136]
Female 0.446*** 0.510*** 0.499*** 0.532*** 0.467*** 0.492***
[0.068] [0.097] [0.067] [0.096] [0.068] [0.095]
Constant 0.161*** 0.130* 0.118* 0.105 0.154** 0.144**
[0.062] [0.073] [0.063] [0.075] [0.062] [0.072]
N Observations 723 723 723 723 723 723
N Individuals 723 723 723 723 723 723
R-squared 0.090 0.091 0.116 0.118 0.088 0.096
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B11: Longer-Run Outcome: Math Grade (in grade 10)
Math Grade (in grade 10)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) -0.072 -0.128**
[0.048] [0.065]
∆ Anger x Female 0.110
[0.097]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) -0.066 -0.084
[0.044] [0.073]
∆ Anxiety x Female 0.028
[0.092]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) 0.023 0.034
[0.043] [0.071]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female -0.017
[0.090]
Anger (Pre) -0.099** -0.166**
[0.046] [0.070]
Anger (Pre) x Female 0.122
[0.094]
Anxiety (Pre) -0.203*** -0.224***
[0.043] [0.072]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female 0.035
[0.090]
Self-Confidence (Pre) 0.051 0.075
[0.045] [0.076]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female -0.039
[0.095]
Treated -0.377*** -0.356*** -0.367*** -0.350*** -0.383*** -0.361***
[0.070] [0.105] [0.070] [0.106] [0.071] [0.107]
Treated x Female -0.055 -0.032 -0.044
[0.142] [0.141] [0.143]
Female -0.041 -0.012 0.011 0.028 -0.021 0.000
[0.071] [0.099] [0.070] [0.098] [0.071] [0.098]
Constant 0.468*** 0.459*** 0.428*** 0.418*** 0.462*** 0.450***
[0.061] [0.070] [0.061] [0.072] [0.062] [0.071]
N Observations 723 723 723 723 723 723
N Individuals 723 723 723 723 723 723
R-squared 0.048 0.050 0.068 0.069 0.043 0.044
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Table B12: Longer-Run Outcome: Abitur Degree
Abitur Degree
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ Anger (Post-Pre) -0.044* -0.046
[0.023] [0.032]
∆ Anger x Female 0.001
[0.047]
∆ Anxiety (Post-Pre) -0.050** -0.049
[0.022] [0.036]
∆ Anxiety x Female -0.004
[0.045]
∆ Self-Confidence (Post-Pre) 0.003 -0.031
[0.022] [0.034]
∆ Self-Confidence x Female 0.058
[0.044]
Anger (Pre) -0.027 -0.038
[0.023] [0.035]
Anger (Pre) x Female 0.018
[0.047]
Anxiety (Pre) -0.122*** -0.133***
[0.022] [0.034]
Anxiety (Pre) x Female 0.018
[0.045]
Self-Confidence (Pre) 0.031 0.016
[0.022] [0.035]
Self-Confidence (Pre) x Female 0.022
[0.044]
Treated 0.372*** 0.359*** 0.379*** 0.362*** 0.361*** 0.349***
[0.035] [0.052] [0.035] [0.052] [0.036] [0.052]
Treated x Female 0.023 0.031 0.032
[0.071] [0.070] [0.072]
Female 0.052 0.042 0.080** 0.068 0.059* 0.046
[0.035] [0.045] [0.034] [0.045] [0.035] [0.045]
Constant 0.246*** 0.252*** 0.224*** 0.229*** 0.247*** 0.254***
[0.029] [0.032] [0.029] [0.033] [0.029] [0.033]
N Observations 723 723 723 723 723 723
N Individuals 723 723 723 723 723 723
R-squared 0.138 0.138 0.168 0.169 0.137 0.139
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. “Treatment” takes value one (zero) if in the younger (older) cohort.
“Post-Pre” measures changes in Anger (or Anxiety, Self-Confidence, respectively) between ages 12/13 and
13/14 (i.e., before versus after Reunification for the treated (younger) cohort). The outcome variable is
measured in 1995 for both cohorts.
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Appendix C
Addendum to Chapter 3
C.1 Dutch Fertility: Average Age at First Child
Figure C.1 plots the average of entry into parenthood between 1995 and 2017 for the whole
Dutch population. Hereby, the red line plots the average of the mother when she gives
birth for the first time. The blue line plots the average age of the father when the mother
gives birth for the first time. We restrict our sample to the ages 20 to 40, which might
seem restrictive given the delay in fertility in Europe over the last years. For the dutch
population, a slight increase in the age of entry into parenthood can be seen. The averages
are clearly under 40, which means, with our restriction, we are likely to capture the fertility
decision of the majority of our sample.
C.2 Full Set of Results
Table C1 reports the full set of results, i.e. including all control variables, of the main
results discussed in section 3.4. The dependent variable in columns [1]-[3] is entry into
motherhood, and for columns [4]-[6] it is entry into fatherhood. In columns [2], [3], [5], and
[6] sibling outcomes are instrumented by average neighborhood entry into parenthood in
sibling’s neighborhood in each half-year within two years. In each regression, we control
for year and quarter fixed effects.
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Figure C.1: Average Age of Parenthood Entry in the Netherlands (1995 - 2017)
Source: CBS, Birth - key figures
Table C1: Sibling Spillover - Main Results - Full Set of Covariates
Outcome: Become Mother Become Father
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Sibling gave birth
up to half year ago 0.014*** -0.014 -0.015 0.008*** 0.007 0.007
[0.000] [0.009] [0.009] [0.000] [0.008] [0.008]
half to 1 year ago 0.019*** 0.005 0.003 0.012*** 0.005 0.003
[0.001] [0.009] [0.010] [0.000] [0.008] [0.008]
1 to 1.5 years ago 0.018*** 0.021** 0.018* 0.012*** 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.009] [0.010] [0.000] [0.008] [0.008]
1.5 to 2 years ago 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.024** 0.011*** -0.005 -0.006
[0.001] [0.010] [0.010] [0.000] [0.008] [0.008]
2 to 2.5 years ago 0.024** 0.016*
[0.011] [0.008]
Individual Characteristics
Married 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***
Continued on next page
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Table C1: Sibling Spillover - Main Results - Full Set of Covariates continued
Outcome: Become Mother Become Father
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Cohabiting 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Age Squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years of Education -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Siblings’ Characteristics
Married -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Cohabiting -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Age Squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years of Education 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Neighborhood Averages
Entry Parenthood 0.349*** 0.350*** 0.360*** 0.430*** 0.431*** 0.440***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]
Become Parent in general -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.083*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.124***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Married -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.130***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Cohabiting -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.045***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years of Education 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N Observations 3,017,119 3,015,409 2,892,002 3,741,811 3,739,450 3,582,263
N Individuals 77,382 77,372 76,987 100,256 100,246 99,640
Statistics
Continued on next page
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Table C1: Sibling Spillover - Main Results - Full Set of Covariates continued
Outcome: Become Mother Become Father
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Under-identification 884.32 811.07 776.06 709.45
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Weak-identification 232.37 170.10 199.20 144.98
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level.
C.3 Additional Results
In Table C2 the dependent variable of column [1] is to enter motherhood, and in column [2]
it is to enter fatherhood. In each regression, we control for year and quarter fixed effects.
Further, we include individual level controls for marriage and cohabitation status, age, age
squared, and years of education. As contextual controls for siblings we include the analog
of all individual controls. Contextual controls of neighbors include entry into parenthood,
become a parent, marriage and cohabitation status, age, and years of education. In both
regressions, sibling outcomes and their interactions are instrumented by average neighbor-
hood entry into parenthood in sibling’s neighborhood in each half-year within two years
and their interaction with the dummy indicating whether the individual and sibling live in
the same district.
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Table C2: Additional Heterogeneous Results
het. Var.: live in Sibling’s district
Outcome: Become Mother Become Father
[1] [2]
Sibling gave birth
up to half-year ago -0.014 0.007
[0.009] [0.008]
x het. Var. 0.002 0.001
[0.002] [0.001]
half to 1 year ago 0.005 0.005
[0.009] [0.008]
x het. Var. -0.000 -0.001
[0.002] [0.001]
1 to 1.5 years ago 0.021** 0.001
[0.009] [0.008]
x het. Var. -0.002 0.000
[0.002] [0.001]
1.5 to 2 years ago 0.027*** -0.005
[0.010] [0.008]
x het. Var. -0.002 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002]
N Observations 3,015,409 3,739,450
N Individuals 77,372 100,246
Statistics
Under-Identification 884.93 775.38
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Weak-Identification 116.27 99.51
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors are clustered on
the individual level.
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